The art of war teaches us to relY not on the
likelihood of the enenry J not coming, but on
our own readiness to receive him,’ not on the
chance of his not attacking, but rather on
the fact that we have made our position
unassailable.

Sun Tzu

Chapter 8
Workplace Violence

Violence has invaded the American workplace. As anyone who
reads the newspapers knows, one attack after another has been
wiping out workers on the job. Some attacks spring from domes-
tic conflict, others represent the revenge of angry employees, while
still others take place in the course of robberies. In general, the
high level of violence found in other social venues has followed
employees to work.

As the Sun Tzu quote above suggests, safety against workplace
violence will not come from expecting incidents not to occur; it
does no good to say, “That only happens at the post office.” To
protect his principal, the EP specialist would do better to assume
that attacks will come; he can then try to prevent them and prepare
for the few that are not preventable.

Workplace violence looms large in almost every principal’s
mind after each dramatic news report. Therefore, the EP specialist
should be able to explain to the principal what workplace violence

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consists of, how likely it is, and how the agent is going to protect
him from it. Understanding the frequency of workplace violence,
the types of victims, the types of perpetrators, typical relationships
between victims and perpetrators, motivations and psychology of
perpetrators, and styles of attack can help an agent analyze the
threat to his principal and erect appropriate defenses.

Because workplace violence, by definition, takes place in an in-
stitutional setting, the agent’s protective plan is not something he
can simply dream up and perform in a vacuum. The effort must
be coordinated with appropriate company policies and physical
security measures. The environment that must be controlled in
order to defend a principal from workplace violence is rarely under
the sole control of the EP specialist. In addition, the behavior of
other company employees greatly affects the agent’s ability to
protect the principal. That’s why defense against workplace vio-
lence has to be a company effort. As was reported in Chapter 1,
Threat Assessment, homicide is the leading cause of occupational
death for women and the third leading cause of death for all work-
ers. Clearly, workplace violence is a legitimate concern for both
the company in general and the principal in particular.

In the EP specialist’s early stages of thinking about workplace
violence, it helps to dispel a few myths. One is that employee vio-
lence is completely unpredictable, resulting from the sudden “flip-
ping out” of a perfectly normal employee. That simply is not true.
Not all incidents of violence can be predicted, but in most cases sev-
eral clues to the employee’s intentions can be seen. Employees who
exhibit bizarre thinking or obsessions could be on the road to a vio-
lent incident. However, the best predictor of future violence by a
suspect is a history of violence, and the more prior violent acts he
has committed, the more accurate that prediction is. Employees
with a history of committing domestic violence, physical or verbal
abuse, or antisocial activities are more likely to perform violence in
the workplace than employees with more peaceful histories.

Another myth is that employee threats and violence cannot be
controlled. That, too, is false. Not only can they be controlled, they
must be controlled. Threats are often the seeds that grow into vio-
lence. In some cases, by quashing threats a company may be able to

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quash violence. In other cases, the mechanisms used to quash
threats (for example, policies stating that threats must be reported to
management and that they will be acted upon) may serve the secon-
dary purpose of at least warning the EP specialist where violence
might come from. In many instances, hindsight after an episode of
workplace violence shows that the incident could have been antici-
pated and prevented. If a company takes steps to sensitize workers
to the warning signs of violence and establishes a convenient way
for them to report those signs and other suspicions, the EP special-
ist will have a much better chance of knowing what may be coming
and then being able to protect the principal from it.

The National Institute of Justice, a research arm of the U.S.

Department of Justice, has discerned four principles that underlie
the assessment of potential workplace violence.F

• Violence is a process as well as an act. Violent behavior
  does not occur in a vacuum. Careful analysis of violent
  incidents shows that violent acts often are the culmina-
  tion of long-developing, identifiable trails of problems,
  conflicts, disputes, and failures.
• Violence is the product of an interaction among three
  factors: (1) The individual who takes violent action; (2)
  stimuius or triggering conditions that lead the subject to see
  violence as an option, “way out,” or solution to prob-
  lems or a life situation; (3) a setting that facilitates or permits
  the violence, or at least does not stop it from occurring.
• A key to investigation and resolution of threat assess-
  ment cases is identification of the subject’s “attack-
  related” behaviors. Perpetrators of targeted acts of
  violence engage in discrete behaviors that precede and
  are linked to their attacks. They consider, plan, and
  prepare before engaging in violent actioP

82 Robert Fein, Ph.D., Bryan Vossekuil, and Gwen A. Holden, “Threat Assess-
ment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence,” National Institute of Justice,
Research in Action, September 1995, p. 3.

83 An exception may be the impulsive, individual psychotic homicide, discussed
later. However, that sort of person is more likely to select a victim randomly,
rather than target him specifically.

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• Threatening situations are more likely to be successfully
  investigated and managed if other agencies and sys-
  tems-both within and outside law enforcement or se-
  curity organizations-are recognized and used to help
  solve problems presented by a given case. Examples of
  such systems are those employed by prosecutors;
  courts; probation, corrections, social service, and men-
  tal health agencies; employee assistance programs; vic-
  tim assistance programs; and community groups.

In some ways, workplace violence is just one more danger from
which the EP specialist needs to protect the principal. In other
ways, workplace violence poses a greater threat than other types of
danger because it can affect the protectee regardless of whether he
is specifically the target. There are two ways in which an executive
can become the victim of a workplace violence incident: by being
the target and by being merely a bystander.

The EP specialist’s task regarding workplace violence is to edu-
cate himself about the phenomenon generally, set up notification
systems that will alert him to developing threats, take steps to re-
move those threats, and establish protective measures that will
safeguard the principal in the case of violence that is not antici-
pated or not prevented. The remainder of this chapter examines
the sources and types of workplace violence incidents, discusses
the technique of profiling workplace killers psychologically, and
suggests a number of prevention and reaction measures. It is im-
portant to note, however, that workplace violence is an imrnensely

complex subject requiring comprehensive responses. There is no
quick fix.

Sources and Types of Attacks

Workplace violence has many faces. Chapter l ‘s discussion of
threat assessment described the 1993 incident in which Gian Luigi
Ferri walked into the offices of a San Francisco law firm heavily
armed and began shooting people throughout two floors of the
building. He killed eight people, wounded six and then shot him-
self. That incident, unfortunately, is not isolated; rather, it is repre-

188

 

sentative of a level of violence that is becoming more and more
common. It is well known that the U.S. Postal Service has suf-
fered many attacks; typically, in those attacks, a disgruntled current
or former postal worker storms into a postal facility and shoots
many people. Sometimes he targets those against whom he has a
specific grievance; other times, he simply sprays the office with
bullets.

In workplaces across the country-blue collar, white collar,
large, and small-the shootings continue. The following example
typifies both the danger that such an incident can present and the
difficulty and importance of preventing such incidents:

Three Shot In Mich. Ford Plant
By B.J. REYES

Associated Press Writer

Thursday, November 14, 1996

WIXOM, Mich. (AP) – A man dressed “like Rambo”
and carrying an AKA7 shot his way into a Ford plant
Thursday, killing a manager and wounding three other
people as he sprayed gunfire through the building and
then outside at a highway.

Gerald Michael Atkins, 29, was arrested after hiding in
a drain tunnel for several hours. He was not a Ford em-
ployee and apparently went to the plant to see a girlfriend
who worked there, said company spokesman Bill Carroll.

“He was confronted by security guards at the door
and asked to leave,” Carroll said. “He then pulled out
an assault rifle and started shooting. That resulted in
chaos and panic and everyone ran.”

Said police Sgt. Richard Howe: “He more or less shot
his way into the plant.”

About 200 day-shift workers were on their lunch
break when the gunman walked into the cafeteria wear-
ing camouflage fatigues. One employee said “he looked
like Rambo” and others were struck by his calm as he
silently reloaded the assault weapon.

“He was tali, slim, AK-47 in hand. He was loading up
as he was coming through the door,” said employee Roo-
sevelt Manigo. “When he loaded up, I started running.”

189

 

190

 

The gunman fired round after round as he moved
through the 4.2-million-square-foot facility that makes
luxury Continental and Town Car models. About half
of the plant’s 3,200 workers were on duty when the
shots rang out.

Manufacturing Planning Mgr. Darrell Izzard, the plant’s
No. 2 official, was walking down a hallway when he was
fatally shot. ‘We think it was a random thing,” Carroll said.

As the gunman moved outside, he began shooting at
cars on nearby Interstate 96, which was closed for about
five hours and lined with patrol cars.

Two Oakland County sheriff’s officers near the inter-
state were hospitalized in stable condition after being hit
by the gunfire. Another man was treated for minor in-
juries after he was hit by flying glass.

The suspect was able to elude police for several hours
by taking cover in a series of storm drain tunnels, Howe
said. After officers decided the area was secured, they
used a loudspeaker to tell him to come out.

“After a short period of time he exited and gave him-
self up,” Howe said.

Jacques Nasser, president of Ford’s worldwide auto-
motive operations, said Ford security has been very tight.

“But when someone basically fires their way-blasts
their way-into a facility it’s very difficult to prevent,”
he said.

“It’s a big problem in the industry with people some-
times being able to get into the buildings,” Carroll
added. “There are a lot of entrances and a lot of ways
they can do it.”

The shooting was at least the fifth at a Michigan auto
plant since 1994.

In August, a Ford employee killed a Ford security
guard at a plant in western Wayne County over a run-in
with the guard’s daughter, then shot himself to death,
police said. OnJan. 7, 1995, a worker at the same plant
wounded his estranged wife, then killed her boyfriend
and himself.

On Dee. 9, 1994, a worker authorities said was upset
about his job assignment killed his supervisor and

 

wounded a coworker at a Chrysler Corp. plant in Ster-
ling Heights.

On Sept. 10, 1994, a worker opened fire with a handgun
as a union meeting was breaking up at a Ford complex in
Dearborn. Two workers were killed and two injured.

One key to understanding workplace violence is to realize the
various relationships that exist between attackers and victims. In
some instances, the attacker knows and specifically targets the victim
because of who the victim is personally. In other cases, the attacker
chooses the victim (1) randomly or (2) impersonally (because the
victim represents something the attacker hates, the victim is easy to
attack, or the victim is simply physically in the way). Familiar varie-
ties of workplace violence include stalking, revenge by disgruntled
employees, and domestic violence carried out at work. A less famil-
iar variety is revenge by a dissatisfied customer, strange as that may
sound. In a recent case, an obstetrician in a Texas town near the
Mexican border was shot to death after a patient of his died+’ The
suspicion is that a Mexican drug dealer-the father of a pregnant
woman who simply showed up at a hospital in labor and who died
four days later of complications-hired an assassin to kill the doctor
who delivered the baby. According to witnesses, the drug dealer and
the baby’s father told the doctor, “You will feel in your flesh what
we feel in our hearts for what you have done.” A month later, the
doctor was shot while walking from his car to his apartment.

People who commit workplace violence are, naturally, driven by
psychology. 85 That psychology may be normal or abnormal, the

8+ Hugh Aynesworth, “Obstetrician’s Slaying Has Border Doctors Up in Arms,”
The Washington Times, December 8, 1996.

85 This section on psychology draws on the work of James P. McGee, Ph.D., di-
rector of psychology for the Sheppard Pratt Health System and chief psychologist
for the Baltimore County Police Department. Dr. McGee’s training includes com-
pletion of the FBI basic and advanced hostage negotiation program and the R. L.
Oatman & Associates Executive Protection Training Course. Dr. McGee is a
Diplomate in Psychology, a certification awarded by the American Board of Profes-
sional Psychology, and a board-certified forensic examiner.

Dr. McGee has assisted R. L. Oatman & Associates extensively, providing psy-
chological profiling and specific recommendations in numerous cases of threats and
workplace violence.

191

 

difference being based on whether the perpetrator of the violence
was mentally ill and the violence was a by-product or result of the
mental disorder. Understanding the various motivations that pro-
pel people to commit workplace violence is one step in avoiding,
preventing, and reacting to such violence. The following discus-
sion of sources and types of workplace violence is general; whether
any particular type of violence is a credible threat is something the
EP specialist must determine specifically for the principal he pro-
tects.

One hesitates to call violence normal, but many types of work-
place violence at least flow from normal psychology. Social violence
is a clash that erupts from conflicts between cultures, gangs, races,
and other social groups. The conflict might involve a turf dispute
or other power struggle. High-level executives aren’t especially
likely to resolve their social conflicts with one another through
violence; however, social violence can spill into the workplace,
victimizing an executive as an innocent bystander. It is also con-
ceivable for a principal to be targeted as a representative of a social
group, even if he is not directly involved in any dispute.

Familial or domestic violence erupts from those excruciating circum-
stances in which love transmogrifies into hate. Spousal, unmarried
romantic, and parent-child relationships sometimes flare into vio-
lence. If the two parties live together, the violence is more likely to
take place at home, but if they are separated, the workplace is as
good a setting for violence as any. If such a situation directly in-
volves a protectee, he is likely to know about it in advance-after
all, it will be his sweetheart who is gunning for him-so precau-
tions can be taken. Unfortunately, there is a considerable rate of
spillover in domestic violence at work; innocent bystanders fre-
quently get caught in the cross-fire. It is not implausible for do-
mestic violence carried out at work against an executive’s secretary
to affect the executive, too-it is easy enough to walk right into
such a situation or to be swept up as a hostage.

Criminal violence consists of violence that is secondary to a crimi-
nal act, such as a robber’s shooting of a cashier. The robber’s
primary goal is not to kill people, but he may do so anyway to carry
out the robbery; of course, to the person killed, the motive doesn’t

192

 

make much difference. If the principal’s work activities place him
in situations where criminal violence against the company could
also harm him, the agent must take appropriate precautions. Con-
tract violence, sad to say, also fits into normal psychology. Such vio-
lence occurs when one party hires another to harm a third. There
is no particular reason that contract violence should occur at the
workplace except that the principal may be perceived as being
more vulnerable there because strangers are permitted in the front
door, while at the principal’s home they are not.

Other types of workplace violence, too, may flow from normal
psychology. For example, an employee may attack a coworker,
supervisor, or manager over work-related grievances. That sce-
nario usually involves the notorious phrase “disgrunded em-
ployee.” Alternatively, a non-employee or former employee may
attack an employee. The infamous examples here are disgruntled
customers and the aforementioned domestic violence carried out
at work.

Some types of workplace violence can also result from abnor-
mal psychology or mental illness. Among the risks from persons
motivated by abnormal psychology are these:

• individual psychotic homicide (for example, when a
  person is motivated by hallucinations in which he is
  commanded to kill someone)
• serial killing (typically of women, children, homosexu-
  als, or prostitutes; there is often a sexual component to
  the motivation)
• mass murder (family murderers, bombers, poisoners,
  arsonists)
• workplace revenge (with a scope well beyond those
  who might have offended the avenger)
• assassination (for irrational reasons, like erotomania)

The preceding lists of motivations, perpetrators, and victims of
workplace violence may make the workplace sound dangerous. It
is dangerous. But that should come as no surprise-contemporary
society is violent, and the workplace is a major part of society. As
Dr. J ames McGee, chief psychologist for the Baltimore County

193

 

Police Department and director of psychology for the Sheppard
Pratt Health System, has observed, if violence in society went from
its 1950s level to today’s level overnight, we would have martial law
today. However, since the level of violence rose gradually, most
people have become desensitized to it. The EP specialist, by con-
trast, can never become desensitized to violence. He must be
aware that some of the risks his protectee faces out on the mean
streets can also spill over into the workplace.

Statistically, executives face a much lower risk of death and in-
jury from workplace violence than do police officers, pizza deliv-
ery workers, and clerks in convenience and liquor stores. Still, to
some attackers, high-level protectees make the most desirable tar-
gets. Remember, a protectee doesn’t have to be a highly desirable
target in absolute terms, only in relative terms. He might not think
of himself as a fat cat, a symbol of power and wealth, but potential
perpetrators of workplace violence, from where they stand, might
see him that way.

Profiling Workplace Killers

Like most other threats against which an EP specialist protects his
client, workplace violence may appear random, but it is not. A
trained eye can see it coming-sometimes, at least. To protect his
client in the corporate environment, the EP specialist should work
with the security and human resources departments to line up re-
sources, such as psychologists, police contacts who can perform
criminal record checks, licensed private investigative firms, and

others who can help the agent investigate a person who shows
signs of being a threat. That way, the corporation can act quickly
on any signs that a person may have a tendency to commit work-
place violence. Quick action is especially important when the
agent or someone else in the corporation spots the early warning
signs that are predictors of imminent violence.

Psychological profile

There’s really no way to say for certain whether a particular person
will commit workplace violence. The best an EP specialist can do

194

 

is to employ the technique of profiling. With that technique, the
agent compares characteristics of the suspect with characteristics
of known workplace-violence criminals. If there is a high rate of
correspondence between the two, the agent may be able to (1) tar-
get his defenses more accurately and (2) take steps to remove the
attacker before he strikes (through firing, prosecution for stalking
or harassment, or other legal means).

Understanding the psychological profiles of different criminal
types can help an EP specialist predict who might commit work-
place violence. The technique helps the agent move from a large
pool of persons to a small one in considering who might pose a
risk to the principal. Profiling doesn’t give the agent an advantage
in all situations, however. When workplace violence is committed
by non-employees (angry customers or psychotics off the street),
typically the agent will not even have heard of the person before,
much less have met or analyzed him.

Different profiles apply to different types of criminals, but in
general the profile for a person who is likely to commit street vio-
lence is a 15- to 24-year-old male who is a member of a minority
group and who has a history of violent behavior, shoplifting, and
substance abuse. A different profile applies to a person likely to
commit individual psychotic homicide. Such a person is actively psy-
chotic, has command hallucinations and persecutory delusions, has
a history of violence and psychiatric hospitalization, may be
homeless, and has had some past involvement with the police
(arrest or other interaction). Attacks by such a person tend to be
impulsive and unplanned-he may simply wander in from the
street. Attacks by that type of person also tend to be highly vio-
lent, with a knife as the weapon of choice.

A person on his way to becoming a mass murderer likely suffers
from depression and paranoia; blames others for his woes; files
many lawsuits; is preoccupied with violent films, television pro-
grams, or books; is a police or military “wannabee” who had un-
distinguished, noncombatant military service; is angry and suicidal;
intimidates others by talking about guns; threatens others; has no
known history of committing violence; prepares his crime care-
fully; and has an interest in and sometimes speaks about mass

195

 

murders. (The last characteristic is the most powerful predictor of
all.) The idea that a person who is perfectly normal would ever
“snap” and commit mass murder is unfounded; there are always
warmng SignS.

The workplace avenger is typically a white male, age 30 to 55, who
is single, separated, or divorced. He may be very interested in
weapons, be a military veteran, and possess paranoid, narcissistic
personality traits. His self-esteem is low, and he is sensitive to re-
jection and criticism. He fantasizes about homicide or suicide and
may be an alcohol abuser. Workplace disciplinary action or termi-
nation of employment precipitates a shooting spree motivated by
vengeance. 86

Assassins if public figures also tend to share certain traits. Arthur
Bremer, who stalked President Nixon and later shot George Wal-
lace, is a typical example of a public figure assassin. Both contem-
porary news reports and his diary’? show him as thinking unrealis-
tically highly of himself, due to what may have been a narcissistic
personality disorder. He traveled in pursuit of his first and second
targets-Nixon and Wallace-and he gathered information about
them from newspapers, television reports, signs posted in build-
ings they visited, and various people at the scene. Bremer was able
to get close to his targets in part because he appeared normal-he
looked like an ordinary guy, not an assassin, neither crazed nor
well-trained. He bought himself a handgun to perform the assas-
sination (though he was not highly skilled at using it), and he kept
a diary of his activities.

Early warning signs

The psychological profiles given above are very general and don’t of-
fer the EP specialist much to focus on. However, workplace violence
has enough of a track record that criminologists have been able to dis-
cern a number of specific, early-warning characteristics and behaviors.
They are by no means proof that a person will become violent, but
often a person will display one or more of them before becoming

86 Roger L. Depue, The Avenger Personality (AGI, 1993).
87 New York: Harper’s Magazine Press, 1972.

196

 

violent. Basically, a list of characteristics and behaviors gives the EP
specialist and other people who are on the lookout something to look
out for. The protective team should prick up their ears if anyone
around the workplace does the following:⁸⁸

sends inappropriate written communications (unwanted

cards, flowers, pictures, letters)

writes violent notes to coworkers or management
trespasses

stalks

enters surreptitiously

repeatedly refuses to cooperate with others at work
frequently argues with coworkers

displays belligerence toward customers

refuses to obey company rules

sabotages company projects or equipment

speaks of a wish or plan to hurt coworkers or managers
sees himself as victimized by management

threatens suicide

suffers from depression

takes frequent absences

talks in a louder than normal voice
is startled easily

displays increasing irritability and impatience

suffers from problems with concentration and memory

suffers from sleeping problems

routinely blames others for his lack of success
has an unreciprocated romantic obsession

takes up much of a supervisor’s time with behavior or
performance problems

88 This list is based on ideas from a wide range of sources, including the author’s
experience; the previously cited work by Fein, Vossekuil, and Holden; S. Anthony
Baron’s book Violence in the Workplace: A Prevention and Management Guide for Business
(Bakersfield, California: Pathfinder Publishing of California, 1994); and many other
references.

197

 

undergoes a drastic change in belief systems
displays unwarranted anger

is unable to take criticism

expresses hopelessness or heightened anxiety
performs violence against inanimate objects
steals equipment

acts with a lack of concern for the safety of others

A slightly different set of characteristics predicts imminent vio-
lence (that is, violence that could erupt within two to six weeks). A
person in that group would be someone who was recently dis-
charged from a mental hospital and who abuses drugs or alcohol
and suffers from active psychotic symptoms, such as delusions,
hallucinations, or thought disorders.”

When early warning signs are spotted, the EP specialist must
follow up on them or see that someone else in the company does
so. (In a corporate setting, it would be awkward, at the very least,
for the principal’s protection specialist to go around investigating
everyone in the office.) Although it is important to respect the
privacy of a person who shows the early warning signs, especially
since the signs alone don’t prove he’s a prospective murderer, he
still needs to be investigated. If the person is an employee, it
would make sense to check through his records in the human re-
sources, finance, benefits, security, internal audit, and legal de-
partments. Before doing so, the EP specialist should certainly
consult with cOlllpany lawyers to rriake sure the research is legal.
Ideally, the EP specialist should sort out the legal questions long
before he needs to investigate someone, since it may take awhile to
obtain the legal opinion.

It also takes time to investigate behavior that seems threatening.

Although early warning signs need to be considered, some require
only a quick analysis before being safely dismissed, while others
call for more extensive investigation. In every endeavor, priorities
must be set and the most important matters handled first. Not
every act on the list of early warning signs can be investigated. To

89 McGee.

198

 

reduce the amount of time spent on investigation, the EP specialist
needs to differentiate between making a threat and posing a threat.
Some persons who make threats ultimately pose threats; many per-
sons who make threats do not pose threats; and some persons who
pose threats never make threats.??

Because the growth of workplace violence is a relatively new
phenomenon, the best ways to combat it are still under debate.
One matter that experts disagree on is the question of corporate
policy prohibiting threats. One school of thought states that the
agent must do something to reduce the number of threats issued,
many of which represent harmless venting of frustration. If the
executive works in an organization where threats from customers,
vendors, or employees occur frequently, the company should in-
stitute a policy similar to that enforced at airport screening check-
points: no jokes allowed, and all threats are investigated. The pol-
icy should also prohibit the possession of weapons. Once the anti-
threat policy has been clearly promulgated, the company should
discipline or fIre every threat-maker if the complaint is substanti-
ated.

Another school of thought considers every threat meaningful
and deems it foolhardy to expect that a policy prohibiting threats
will have any deterrent effect. People bent on violence aren’t go-
ing to be affected by a policy statement-such a policy won’t be
worth the paper it’s printed on. Instead, a company should simply
consider every threat meaningful and investigate each one.

Screening and analyzing communications

When a threatening letter or telephone call arrives, there must be a
clear means for it to be forwarded to the EP specialist for analysis.
Employees won’t necessarily think to pass those communications
to the EP specialist, the security department, or whoever else
should see them. To keep threatening communications from fal-
ling through the cracks, the company should establish a require-
ment that all such communications be reported to a designated
office.

90 Fein, Vossekuil, and Holden.

199

 

Once a threatening communication arrives in the hands of the
EP specialist, he should analyze it promptly. This is one type of
correspondence not to leave in a stack to deal with at a later date.
Through training and experience, the agent may be able to deter-
mine quickly whether the writer or caller is harmful or harmless
and whether any further investigation or intervention needs to be
done. If more does need to be done, there are two different angles
of approach: law enforcement evidentiary analysis and psychologi-
cal analysis. In most cases, the problem must be approached from
both angles at once.

Law enforcement evidentiary analysis. A threatening com-
munication-especially a letter-is not just a message; it is also
evidence. Like other evidence, it should be treated and analyzed in
certain ways. On receiving a threat letter, the agent should do the
following:

• If the letter seems threatening, treat it as police treat
  physical evidence. Keep extra fingerprints off it; pho-
  tocopy it for your own follow-up examination; and pre-
  serve it in a plastic bag for later forensic analysis or
  court action.
• Identify the postmark to see where the letter came
• Check the envelope’s return address, if it has one.

Sometimes threatening writers use their real name and
address. If so, you know who to investigate for a pro-
pensity to violence.

• Check the envelope’s destination address. If it was
  mailed to the principal’s home address and that address
  is not listed in the phone book, the writer might be
  someone who knows the principal. If the letter was
  addressed to a specific building and suite at the princi-
  pal’s place of business, that level of detail might suggest
  that the writer is an insider.
• If the letter is typed, it might be possible to link the
  document to a specific typewriter. If the letter was
  produced on a computer, the choice of fonts, the type

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of printer it was produced on, and other attributes
might serve as clues to the writer’s identity.

• If the letter is handwritten, compare the handwriting to
  that used in other letters in the threat file.
• See whether the threat file contains other communica-
  tions that might look or sound like they came from the
  same source.
• Consider notifying local or federal law enforcement of-
  ficials.

With this sort of analysis done, when the psychological analysis
is finished, the agent will be all ready for whatever steps are appro-
priate next.

Psychological analysis. The first level of psychological analy-
sis of a threatening letter can be done by the EP specialist himself.
If he feels the letter warrants further analysis, he can refer it to a
qualified psychologist.

Some characteristics of threat letters predict later violence by
the writer, while others suggest the writer will not be violent or are
inconclusive. One telling attribute of a threatening communication
is its degree of specificity. If the threat is highly specific-naming
the intended victim, listing his home or work address or informa-
tion about his family, or describing weapons that the writer intends
to use-the level of security concern should also be high. By
contrast, a letter that threatens not violence but some other action,
such as exposure of the recipient’s alleged misdeeds, does not typi-
cally foreshadow violence.

An agent can educate himself further about workplace vio-
lence by attending a training course on the subject. Or, for a
better qualified analysis of whether the communicator represents
a threat to the principal, the agent can consult outside help. One
type of resource is a psychologist with experience in threat as-
sessment, assassin profiling, and other topics related to law en-
forcement and security. Such a professional can review the
communicator’s personnel file, look into his employment and
criminal history, analyze any hostile letters or other communica-
tions the person has directed at the principal or his company, and

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interview the person’s coworkers. The psychologist then would
be able to issue a opinion on the likely level of danger posed by
the person. Because in most cases the psychologist is asked not
to contact the person directly, the psychologist’s report typically
contains qualifications and reservations. Nevertheless, such a
report can give the EP specialist some guidance as to the best
way to deal with the problem.

For example, the report might say that a belligerent, hostile, ar-
gumentative, and possibly threatening man who was fired from his
job probably has certain personality disorders with antisocial fea-
tures and occasionally binges on alcohol or other drugs but overall
presents a low risk for violence.?’ Another report might state that
a frightening, irate Vietnam veteran-who is not an employee but
who attempts to intimidate company employees with talk of his
expertise in weapons use, demolition, martial arts, ambush, and
assassination; who talks much about his guns; and who has what
he considers to be a major disagreement with the company in
question-possesses enough of the characteristics of a workplace
avenger or pseudo-commando to pose a threat to company em-
ployees. In this instance, the report would advise against con-
frontational tactics and would recommend that the company (1)
pursue a conciliatory strategy and (2) warn its employees not to
deal directly with the person but instead leave any future meetings
to persons trained to handle potentially violent subjects.

Specifically, what sort of communication merits a closer look?

An executive at a major U.S. banking company received, at his
house, a strange note from a former employee, along with the

former employee’s mutilated company ID. The executive passed it
to the corporation’s security specialist, who referred it to Dr.
McGee. The letter read as follows:

There are voices that say who are you what are you are
you real? I will be leaving soon and have no use for this
identification card. I will be issued a new one upon my
glorious arrival.

Thank you thank you thank you.

91 This and the following scenarios are based on the work of Dr. McGee.

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After studying the letter and a limited amount of biographical,
legal, and historical information about the subject, Dr. McGee de-
veloped the following profile:

B (the alleged letter writer) was recently employed by
the bank in a low-level position. Shortly thereafter, a
criminal background investigation revealed a history of
convictions for burglary and additional arrests for drug
possession and burglary. As that legal history had not
previously been reported by B, he was fired.

B is a 38-year-old Caucasian male. He is reported to
be married, but the marriage is probably unstable, and
he may have been married more than once. He is a high
school graduate, though school performance was mar-
ginal, and his IQ is in the low-average range. B comes
from a blue-collar background with divorced parents
and turbulent family life and childhood development.
Parents and siblings have histories of psychiatric illness
and substance abuse. By early adolescence, B began
using drugs and alcohol. Drugs of choice initially in-
cluded marijuana, amphetamines, and alcohol, but it is
likely he has tried most other abusable substances.

Currently B meets diagnostic criteria for polysub-
stance dependence, preferring alcohol and stimulant
drugs like cocaine. B has had episodes of unsuccessful
treatment for chemical dependence and psychiatric ill-
ness. These included inpatient hospitalizations prompt-
ed when he reported he was planning to harm himself
or others. It is likely that he has actually engaged in
some type of suicidal or self-injurious behavior in the
past, and he has also been assaultive, particularly while
intoxicated.

B’s work history is unimpressive. He has a history of
problems with coworkers and supervisors, and he has
been fired from several jobs. Financial problems are
chronic, and he often spends money on drug binges.

At times, particularly during periods of heavy drug
and alcohol use, B has experienced psychotic symptoms
including auditory hallucinations, delusional thinking
with persecutory beliefs, and disorganized and irrational

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thinking. He has probably received psychiatric diagno-
ses such as substance-induced mood disorder, sub-
stance-induced psychotic disorder, bipolar disorder type
II, and mixed personality disorder with narcissistic and
antisocial features. Some version of schizophrenia is
another diagnostic possibility. B can be thought of as a
dual diagnosis patient, which means he simultaneously
meets criteria for both mental illness and substance
abuse. Dual diagnosis patients display high rates of ag-
gressive and violent behavior toward themselves and
others.

Based on that profile, Dr. McGee made the following recom-

mendations:

The content and construction of B’s note suggests that
he was either intoxicated or experiencing psychotic
symptoms such as auditory hallucinations (voices) when
he wrote it. The statement about “leaving soon” and
“glorious arrival” are thinly veiled allusions to suicide
and death. Among perpetrators of violence, B would be
classified as a disorganized type. That suggests his vio-
lent behavior is likely to be impulsive and unsophisti-
cated rather than well planned and organized. B’s risk
for violence against bank employees is estimated to be
in the moderate range. Any signs of escalation in the
form of additional letters or attempts at personal or
telephone contact by B should be taken very seriously as
an indication of increased risk.

The preceding case fits most people’s idea of the threat of
workplace violence. The next case shows that obsessive, discom-
fiting situations can affect a principal even in a workplace at which
he is only a guest-the perpetrator’s workplace. The following is a
version of an actual letter sent to a wealthy protectee:

Dear Mr. X,

I hope your staff will not keep you from reading this
letter and will let you see it and make up your mind for
yourself. I am a 30-year-old fellow with many ques-
tions. I don’t wish to bother you, but my curiosity is ir-
resistible.

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You may not remember me, but I work in the office
at the accounting firm you use. For a long time I have
been wondering about how you live. What sort of fam-
ily do you come from? How did you meet your lovely
wife? What do you like to do on weekends? What do
you like to eat? Have you ever eaten fast food? What
do you do all day? You are so successful. How did that
happen?

I can only begin to imagine what it is like to be so
rich! My life is very different. My wife and I struggle
from paycheck to paycheck. But I’m not asking for
money, truly.

May I tour your office sometime? It’s one of my
greatest fantasies. I could see everything and get you to
answer all these questions that I can’t get out of my
mind. I could learn to be successful like you. I think
about this all the time.

Please write back. I know that you’re busy, and that
dreams don’t usually come true, but I hope I’ll get a re-
sponse back. This is the first step. This is my fantasy.

Please note that I am not a weirdo. I’m perfectly av-
erage. I look forward to hearing from you. If you don’t
write back, I’ll understand.

Sincerely,

Y

The man who received the letter passed it to his protection spe-
cialist, who referred it to Dr. McGee for analysis. After examining

the letter and collecting background information about the writer,
he developed the following profile:

Y is a 30-year-old married Caucasian male employed in a
clerical position at the accounting firm used by X. He
has held this position for about seven years, and his
work performance has been generally satisfactory,
though clients and coworkers sometimes perceive him
as overly aggressive and intrusive. His wife is a waitress,
and they have young children.

Y is a high school graduate with some technical
school training. He has average to bright-average intel-

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ligence, and his memory, attention, concentration, and
other cognitive functions are within normal limits.
There is no history of drug or alcohol problems or any
criminal activity. He is active in his non-mainstream
Protestant church. No signs of major mental illness are
evident, although a variant of manic-depressive illness
controlled by mood-stabilizing medications cannot be
ruled out. There is some evidence that Y has a mixed
personality disorder with narcissistic and compulsive
features. This causes him episodically to display poor
social judgment and grandiosity and act impulsively in
ways that are offensive and upsetting to others. Y is
extremely defensive and uninsightful about these per-
sonality flaws and may become distraught and even en-
raged when they are brought to his attention. He tends
to feel unappreciated and put upon by others and can
be quite envious and resentful of those who have more
than he does. If he perceives others as not liking or ap-
proving of him, he feels their attitudes are grounded in
envy of him.

Y’s motive for writing to X includes more than idle
curiosity. It is an attempt on Y’s part to develop a spe-
cial personal relationship with X that would result in Y’s
personal gain and achievement of social prominence
and economic success. It is likely that Y has well-
developed and elaborate fantasies of this special rela-
tionship. There is a moderately high probability that
without intervention Y will follow up the letter with an
attempt at face-to-face contact, possibly using X’s ac-
counting work as a pretext. Anything short of a strong
rebuke will be perceived by Y as encouragement. How-
ever, rejection by X is not likely to be well received and
may not even be acknowledged by Y as reflecting X’s
true wishes.

Dr. McGee’s recommendations were these:

1. Y should be confronted about the inappropriateness
   of his behavior by the management of his account-
   ing firm.

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2. Y should be notified that any similar behavior or
   attempts to have direct contact with X or X’s family
   members is grounds for immediate termination.
   Supervisors at the accounting firm should be dis-
   creetly informed of this as well.
3. Y should receive additional supervision on the job
   and be monitored periodically by management.
4. Y should undergo a psychological evaluation and, if
   indicated, counsel

The risk of violence by Y is low; however, the risk
of inappropriate approach behavior by Y toward X and
his family members is moderately high. It is suggested
that additional information be gathered and the subject
be confronted and monitored.

Throughout the entire effort to prevent workplace violence, it is
imperative that the EP specialist keep a complete file of all threat-
ening letters and records of threatening phone calls. Such a file is
the cornerstone of both psychological analysis and possible legal
action.

Investigation

If the agent or his outside consultant decides the communicator
should be investigated further-to determine whether he poses a
threat to the principal-there are several key items that must be
looked into. This level of investigation is separate from and
should precede any contact with the subject himself.

The investigation should include the following:

• examination of materials that the subject possesses,
  collects, or has created, including journals, letters,
  books, magazines, and other items that may relate to
  the investigation
• interviews with persons who know or have known the
  subject, including family, friends, coworkers, supervi-
  sors, neighbors, landlords, law enforcement officers,
  social service or mental health staff, and previous vic-
  tims of unacceptable behavior (including violence)
  committed by the subject

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• research into records kept by police, courts, probation
  and parole agencies, mental health and social services,
  and any persons aware of the subject’s interest in a par-
  ticular target, such as security personnel, managers, vic-
  tims, or colleagues

Obviously, not all the information above is readily or legally
available in every case. However, it is the type of information that
the agent may wish to gather to determine whether further work is
required.

Throughout ~ investigation, the EP specialist should focus on
gathering information specifically on the subject’s attack-related
behavior-that is, whether the subject has expressed interest in
possible targets; whether he has communicated with or about po-
tential targets; whether he has considered or attempted harm to
himself or others; whether he has obtained or practiced with
weapons; and whether he has followed or approached potential
targets, with or without weapons, at any types of events or occa-
srons.

Specific threat assessment

Once the agent has gathered the relevant information about the
threatening communicator, he can properly assess, not the general
level of threat faced by the principal, but the specific level of threat
posed by the current situation raised by the particular communi-
cator being investigated. To assess the threat, the agent can use
the findings of his investigation to answer the following questions:

• Does it appear that the subject has selected a target?
• Does he know the target well?
• Is the subject familiar with the targeted person’s work,
  life style, habits, and schedule?
• Is the target vulnerable to an attack?
• What potential changes in the target’s life could make
  an attack more difficult or less likely, such as moving,
  spending more time at home, or taking a new job?
  What changes could increase the risk of violence?

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• Does the target fear the subject?
• Do the target’s family, friends, or colleagues share that
  fear?
• Is the target convinced of the need for caution?
• If necessary, could the target plainly communicate to
  the subject that he wants no further contact with him?
• Does the subject seem to be moving toward or away
  from attacking?
• If toward, how close?
• What thresholds has the subject crossed? Has he vio-
  lated court orders, made a will, given away personal
  items, or expressed a willingness to die or be impris-
  oned?

Interviewing and intervening

The next step in gathering information to decide whether the sub-
ject poses a threat to the principal is to interview the subject him-
self. However, this is not just another information-gathering step.
It is simultaneously an interview and an intervention. In potential
workplace violence cases, intervention by the target or his repre-
sentatives might scare the prospective aggressor away or might
spur him to act on his threats. For that reason, it makes sense,
first, to consider whether to interview the subject at all.

Should the agent interview the subject? That depends on sev-
eral factors.”

• the agent’s need for information (in other words, if the
  agent is able to gather sufficient information from
  sources other than the subject himself, there may be no
  need to risk an interview)
• the facts that led the agent to start the investigation
• the investigator’s legal standing in relation to the sub-
  ject
• the investigator’s resources, training, and experience

92 Fein, Vossekuil, and Holden.

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• the stage of the investigation
• the investigator’s strategy for resolving the case.

In most cases where the subject and target have had face-to-
face contact or the subject has spoken or written a clear threat to
the target, an interview is a good idea. It helps the agent obtain
more information about the subject; it shows the subject that his
behavior has been noticed; it gives the agent a chance to tell the
subject clearly that his behavior is unwelcome and unacceptable
and must cease; and it gives the subject a chance to tell his story,
perhaps safely releasing some pent-up steam or relieving the frus-
tration of not being heard or acknowledged.

However, an interview /intervention is not always a good idea.

History suggests that it could intensify the communicator’s interest
in the target or trigger lethal behavior. For example, what if a per-
son has written to a celebrity, expressing his love and formally
proposing marriage, but has done nothing else in relation to the
celebrity? In such a case, an interview might stimulate his interest,
which could otherwise wane. What about a desperate, suicidal ex-
wife, who feels abandoned and has been stalking her ex-husband?
An interview might make her feel that time is running out and
convince her to move ahead with her violent plan before she is
jailed.

In general, confronting a subject may help if the subject has
something to lose; however, if he has little to lose, then a con-
frontation may only provoke him. For example, a person with a
family and job is likely to back down after being confronted and
told to stop bothering the protectee-the threat of exposure
means something to him. By contrast, an unemployed, marginally
functioning person who is indifferent to public exposure or even
welcomes it might be emboldened by a confrontation.

What about arranging for police to pay the subject a visit?

Good idea or bad? For various reasons, history shows that in po-
litical cases, police visits may improve the situation; in celebrity
cases, by contrast, police visits tend to make matters worse.

Throughout the investigative process, it is essential that the
agent document his efforts and findings. Not only do written rec-

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ords help the agent analyze the risk and develop possible solutions,
but they also facilitate prevention measures and, of course, prose-
cution, either before or after a violent incident occurs.

Prevention Measures

The first two categories of prevention measures discussed here are
geared toward preventing an attack, while the third category is
geared toward preventing harm to the principal once an attack is
initiated or attempted. The major categories of workplace violence
prevention are (1) deflecting or defusing problems before they
start, (2) removing the threat-by firing, prosecuting, satisfying, or
ignoring the potentially violent person, and (3) physical security-
making sure the rings of protection will secure the principal against
any newly identified threat. Together, the three categories of pre-
vention measures create a strategy of simultaneous defense and
offense.

Deflecting or defusing problems

Several types of situations in the workplace have the potential to
lead to violence either at the moment or later on, after the subject
has had time to stew over the problem and return to work armed.
When the attacker is a non-employee, someone whom the EP spe-
cialist has had no notice of or contact with, it’s difficult to deflect
problems. However, the following suggestions can help deflect or
defuse problems involving employees, contractors, vendors, and
others who spend a significant amount of time at the principal’s
workplace.

Background Checks/Preemployment Screening. In many
settings, checking the background of prospective employees-and
then not hiring people with a history of violent or other difficult
behavior-is one way to reduce the number of personnel prone to
workplace violence. Typically, an EP specialist is not in a position
to implement institutional policies requiring preemployment
screening. However, he may be able to suggest such policies to the
principal or the director of human resources, who then may be
able to institute or at least recommend them. In brief, such poli-

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cies should require the use of a job application form that includes
an appropriate waiver that permits the employer to verify the in-
formation reported on the application. Before hiring any appli-
cant, the company should check his references and investigate any
violent incidents in his past. Drug screening and psychological
testing can also help weed out unsuitable candidates from the ap-
plicant pool. However, all screening measures should first be ex-
amined by legal counsel.

It might also be appropriate to screen contract personnel who
work at the principal’s office. Vendors and service organizations
whose personnel make frequent visits or spend long periods at the
facility should certify that those individuals meet the principal’s
organization’s security requirements.

Safety Valves. Two kinds of safety valves can help reduce the
pressures that lead to workplace violence. The first type lets em-
ployees, customers, and other relevant parties blow off steam in a
safe, socially acceptable way. People who feel strong disapproval
or dislike of the principal or the organization he heads need some
positive way to communicate their displeasure. Options include
employee suggestion boxes, union grievance procedures, and hot
lines to the human relations and customer service departments.
The idea is to reduce people’s frustration and feelings of power-
lessness before they decide the only way they can solve their
problems is through violence.

A second type of safety valve lets employees report their suspi-
cions of danger. The EP specialist should see to it (through the
appropriate corporate channels) that employees are taught to look

out for signs of imminent workplace violence. He must also make
sure employees have access to convenient, discreet channels for
reporting their concerns.i” Options include periodic internal sur-
veys and violence or threat hot lines. People who suddenly erupt
into violent behavior usually have made threats in the past, and

93 One good method is to set up a toll-free 800 telephone number that employ-
ees can use to report security concerns, including threatening behavior by cowork-
ers or signs that a coworker could erupt into violence. The advantage of the 800
number is that employees can freely call anonymously from anywhere and not feel
that their identify will be disclosed by caller-ID or other call-tracing systems.

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employees tend to know about those threats even when manage-
ment doesn’t. Reporting systems can give warnings of those im-
pending dangers.

Keeping the Peace. The workplace is host to many conflicts:
personality clashes, pay disputes, policy disagreements, arguments
about annual reviews and promotions, etc. When such a conflict
escalates to shouting or seething, it could tip out of control and
lead to violence. The EP specialist and the principal should both
give some thought to techniques that keep such pots from boiling
over. That doesn’t mean becoming a full-fledged hostage nego-
tiator; rather, it means knowing how to handle a very upset person
in a way that keeps the situation from escalating to violence. In
fact, success in keeping the peace eliminates the need for a hostage
negotiator.

Peacekeeping during a high-energy argument might fall to the
principal, who is often in a position of hiring, firing, promoting,
and setting policy. It could also fall to the EP specialist, especially
if he has a cover position that makes it seem reasonable for him to
be talking to an upset employee. Here are a few tips for anyone
who wishes to keep a lid on that kind of situation:

• Project calmness and confidence, moving and speaking
  slowly and quietly.
• Pay attention to the other person so he will know you
  are interested in what he has to say.
• To avoid giving the impression that the two of you are
  butting heads, stand or sit at a right angle to the other

person rather than directly face to face.

• Tell the person you can see he is upset. Acknowledging
  a person’s feelings helps reduce that person’s frustration.
• To give the person time to calm down, use delaying
  tactics such as offering a drink of water (in a disposable
  cup that can’t become a weapon).
• Place yourself in a spot where the person cannot block
  your way to an exit.
• In your effort to keep the situation calm, try not to
  sound cold, condescending, officious, or evasive. But

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don’t let your interest in the situation tempt you to
challenge, threaten, or dare the person.

Careful Firing. Another situation that can raise the likelihood
of workplace violence is employment termination. If layoffs or
firings are on the horizon, the EP specialist should make sure that
whoever handles those activities does so in a way that reduces their
violence-producing potential. Even if the layoff or firing is neither
conceived nor carried out by the chief executive, a vengeful em-
ployee looking for a victim on which to settle his rage may well
choose the person who most represents the institution: the execu-
tive.

Careful firing uses intelligent logistics and straightforward, calm
discussion. On the logistical end, the EP specialist should consider
where the employee will be fired and by whom. To avoid both litiga-
tion and violence, it is advantageous for two company representatives
to perform the firing. That increases the number of witness who
could testify as to what was said and may help in defusing uncomfort-
able situations. It also makes sense, if a man is firing a woman, for a
female manager to attend the meeting to discourage false allegations
of harassment. The EP specialist is charged with protecting the ex-
ecutive from all threats, including embarrassment, which would be
intense if the person being fired accused the boss of offering to cancel
the firing in exchange for sexual favors.

Another logistical consideration that can keep the lid on tension
has to do with packing. If the executive gives a fired employee 15
minutes to pack up and leave the premises, and no boxes are avail-
able, tension will surely rise. It wouldn’t be hard to keep a store of
boxes and tape on hand to avoid such tension.

The agent may wish to see that company employees who fire
others receive basic instruction in how to do so in a way that dis-
courages violence. The agent should offer the following advice to
managers who have to fire employees:

• Tell the employee that the decision is final and not ne-
• Cite only general reasons for the termination; don’t get
  drawn into an argument over the particular justifica-

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tions for firing the employee. Anything that sounds
like blame will invite confrontation.

• Help the person focus on the future, reminding him
  that his experience and education will help him take ad-
  vantage of the opportunities that are out there.
• Keep a respectful distance from the person. Have no
  more physical contact than a goodbye handshake, at
• The firing is extremely significant to the employee. Es-
  pecially during a mass layoff, try not to make the per-
  son feel he is being discarded cavalierly. Getting fired
  is one of the most stressful incidents in a person’s life,
  so take care not to do or say anything that the person
  would interpret as degrading.
• Pay close attention to what the person says. Perhaps
  without even knowing it, he might give you clues about
  his likelihood of committing violence or filing a lawsuit.
• To keep the session from dragging on or requiring any
  follow-up, make sure you can answer any appropriate
  questions the person is likely to ask.

An additional option is to videotape the termination session
surreptitiously. Current technology makes such an option rela-
tively easy. One technique would be to use a super-compact cam-
era, such as a modified pencil sharpener that contains a video lens
in the pencil aperture, aimed from a desk directly toward the em-
ployee. Of course, it is essential to check with the company attor-

ney before taking any such measure.

Removing the threat

In the preceding section, “Deflecting or defusing problems,” the
types of security measures mentioned were oriented toward keep-
ing violent people from being hired and keeping normal employees
from becoming violent. However, sometimes an organization is
stuck with a potentially violent person, either because he is already
an employee or because he is a persistent customer. If a person
about whom the EP specialist has serious concern is already in-

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volved with the organization, what can be done to get rid of him?
Basically, the potentially dangerous person can be (1) fired, (2)
prosecuted, (3) bought off, or (4) ignored.

Firing for the Purpose of Removal. A prudent EP specialist
wouldn’t allow a ticking time bomb to remain next to his protectee
day after day. But an employee who is known or strongly suspected
to be predisposed to violence is much the same as a ticking time
bomb. There’s no sense keeping that kind of risk around, and
sometimes firing the person is the best thing to do. Of course, fir-
ing raises some risks in the process of eliminating others. In other
words, a smoldering employee might erupt because of the firing.

The section on firing above described how to handle an em-
ployment termination in a way that would not spark a normal em-
ployee to violence. However, if it is necessary to fire an employee
who has a much higher probability of reacting violently and if that
person fits the profile of a workplace killer, then extreme caution is
warranted. H the employee is a loner with litde to care about be-
sides his job, then, for him, losing his job is like losing his life, and
he may take it very badly.

In many cases, the protectee will be able to excuse himself from
such hazardous and unpleasant duty. Sometimes, however, even
the chief has to do dirty work. All the tips offered in the earlier
section on firing apply, plus several additional ones. First, the ter-
mination meeting needs to be planned carefully, in advance, down
to the last detail. The EP specialist and the principal should prac-
tice what the principal will say. They should also decide whether
the El” specialist will be present in the room during the firing. If

not, he can stand outside the room, and if he hears a prearranged
signal for help, he can enter. The signal for that response can be
orchestrated in m.any different ways-with iritercorns, by voice, by
knocking on the wall, ete.

H the person being let go is especially frightening, the EP spe-
cialist should ask the police, with whom he already should have a
good relationship, to be present-if not on the spot, at least in the
building.

Prosecution. Another way to remove the threat of violence
posed by an employee, customer, vendor, or other party who

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poses a threat to the principal at the workplace is to arrange for
prosecution. Various criminal and civil remedies relating to stalk-
ing, threats, and harassment can help EP specialists intervene be-
fore a violent attack occurs.

The idea of jailing the threatening person may hold great appeal,
but the relief offered by the legal system is usually meager, tempo-
rary, and difficult to attain. Also, in practice the prosecution ap-
proach also requires the previous measure (firing), so it’s a major
undertaking.

If the EP specialist and principal are considering arranging for
the subject to be prosecuted, they should wait until they are confi-
dent it can be done successfully. That means accumulating the
necessary evidence to get the person both charged and convicted.
The problem with legal intervention, however, is that it only helps
if the suspect has something to lose. The threat of fines or a long
prison sentence may not deter a person who desperately desires
revenge or is prepared to die to achieve his objective. At bottom it
is up to the EP specialist to know how to identify, evaluate, and
manage persons who present a high risk of committing violent
acts.

Capitulation. If someone poses a threat to the principal, the
agent’s natural reaction is to focus on the principal, removing him
from harm. However, sometimes it is effective to focus on the
potentially violent person, the threatener. It might offend one’s
sense of justice even to consider giving in to that person’s de-
mands, but in some cases it is simply more practical to give the
person what he wants or needs rather than continue to risk a vio-

lent episode. For example, if an employee who fits the workplace
avenger psychological profile desperately wants an early retirement,
it is cheaper and safer to give him what he wants, even if he
doesn’t strictly deserve it. Similarly, if a manic-depressive, drug-
using weapons nut wants a refund on a product he bought from
the company, and under normal circumstances he would not be
entitled to it, the EP specialist may wish to suggest bending the
policy simply to satisfy and get rid of the person. Another sce-
nario is that a non-employee has developed an inappropriate, po-
tentially violent fixation on an employee. In that case, it might

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help to ask the person’s family, friends, neighbors, or associates
for ideas on how to change the subject’s thinking or behavior;
mental health and social service staff may also be able to help.

Extinction. If a ranting non-employee is raising concerns, one
strategy to consider is simply ignoring the person. That strategy is
also called “extinction.” A case in which extinction might be ap-
propriate would be a campaign of inappropriately angry and ag-
gressive letters written by a dissatisfied, mentally unbalanced cus-
tomer. If his psychological profile suggests that his bark is much
worse than his bite, it might payoff to do litde more than notify
him that his letters and calls are no longer welcome-and then
monitor but not respond to any future messages from him. Firing is
not an option because he is not an employee; prosecution isn’t
possible because he has not crossed the line into open threats, and
taking legal action might agitate more than pacify him; capitulation
may not work because he primarily wants to complain, not to be
reimbursed or otherwise compensated; so warning him once and
then ignoring him may be the only path to take.

Physical security

Physical security at the workplace was discussed in detail in Chap-
ter 6, Home and Office Security. Those same measures would
protect the principal from the workplace violence threats described
in this chapter. However, the security measures may need to be
fine-tuned a little if the EP specialist deems the principal to be un-
der threat of attack. The agent should consider whether any as-
pects of the building’S physical layout or access control would al-
Iowan attacker to approach the principal. If the principal likes to
have a lot of contact with the public, then the EP specialist may
have to be more aggressive in dealing with potential workplace as-
sailants. If the principal spends most of his time safely sequestered
from almost everyone, then the EP specialist may not have to ex-
pend much time or energy on workplace threats in which the prin-
cipal is not specifically targeted (such as being caught in the cross-
fire of a domestic battle). Not that those threats are unimportant,
but the EP specialist has to target his protective efforts where they
are most needed and will have the greatest effect.

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The agent should also reevaluate the normal security measures,
such as good lighting, access control, intrusion alarms, panic
alarms, safe rooms, easy-to-use phone systems, tight sign-in poli-
cies, metal detectors, and video systems. The agent may also wish
to distribute floor plans to trusted persons outside the building so

. that, in a hostage situation, police and SWAT teams could obtain
those maps to plan their actions.

Reaction Measures

“Reaction” here means after a violent incident has started. Vio-
lence in the workplace is a disaster, and like any other disaster, it
requires a rapid, coordinated, and trained response to prevent
further injury, damage, and death. Once a violent incident is un-
derway, the EP specialist needs to get the principal away from the
scene, contact the police, summon medical help, and take other
steps to remove, defend, and repair the principal.

After the event, the EP specialist should reevaluate the chain of
events that led up to the violent outbreak and allowed the principal
to be endangered. The agent should consider the following: Is
such an attack likely to happen again? Do many people hold simi-
lar grievances against the principal or his organization? Is it likely
that someone will want to pick up the torch and continue the vio-
lent person’s uncompleted mission? Are hiring practices and
physical security adequate? Are employees communicating their
concerns about imminent workplace violence to company man-
agement?

This follow-up analysis is one post mortem where the agent must
truly hope the term is used figuratively, not literally.

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The good general cultivates his resources.

Sun Tzu

Chapter 9

Protection Resources

Accountability and responsibility for executive protection fall to
one person alone-the protection specialist. However, given the
great variety and complexity of the tasks he has to handle, execu-
tive protection could never be a one-person job. James Bond
could speak many languages, shoot expertly, and find his way
around the most exotic city (and, of course, name any wine in one
sip), but even he needed help: M ran the shop, Q supplied him
with equipment, and contacts throughout the world supplied him
with information. Likewise, a good EP specialist may be an able
planner, driver, communicator, and defender, but can he also hope
to be a lawyer, a technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM)

expert, a law enforcement officer, and an entire information net-
work?

Even an organization as sophisticated, well-established, and
thoroughly equipped as the U.S. Secret Service can’t meet its pro-
tection obligations without the logistical support of the military
and the staffing support of local law enforcement agencies. A
small protection operation in the corporate, celebrity, or private
sector depends even more on help from others.

This chapter describes three categories of resources that an EP
specialist should cultivate: (1) law enforcement contacts, (2) intelli-

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gence and other information, and (3) specialized assistance, such as
legal advice, technical surveillance countermeasures, and supple-
mental personnel.

Law Enforcement Contacts

The most obvious and sought-after resource is a good law en-
forcement contact. An EP specialist cannot expect to manage a
personal protection operation without being able to call occasion-
ally on a police insider. Such an ally can help with everything from
intelligence and off-duty assistance to crisis support. Depending
on the prominence of the principal, behind-the-scenes support is
something that most law enforcement agencies are willing and
happy to provide. But an agent can’t expect to get that kind of
assistance by waiting until the need arises and making a cold call.
Here, as elsewhere in protection, advance work makes all the dif-
ference.

How does one begin? For a protection specialist who started
out in law enforcement, the approach is easy-a cop-to-cop dia-
logue between the EP specialist and line officers can open a lot
of doors. When, in addition to sharing that background, the
agent represents a prominent local citizen and can potentially of-
fer paid work for off-duty officers, the dialogue will flow even
better.

An alternative, especially for those without a law enforcement
background, is to begin at the top. The agent should call the
chiefs office and ask for an appointment to discuss the protective
operation’s needs, questions, and concerns. The first meeting with
the chief or the person he designated may not be warm and en-
couraging, but over time the relationship can be nurtured. If the
protectee is a well-known local figure, a politically astute chief of
police will recognize the benefits of cooperation. If the protectee
doesn’t hold sway locally, the chief may want to cooperate simply
to spare his city the embarrassment of having the principal at-
tacked there.

For a protective organization with sufficient resources
(including money and a principal with clout), an excellent approach

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is to host a luncheon, dinner, or other social event for the chief or
chiefs of police who are responsible for the areas in which the
principal lives, does business, or both. In a large metropolitan
area, the EP specialist should invite the city police chief, the chiefs
of the surrounding major jurisdictions, and the heads of local fed-
eral offices, including the Secret Service and FBI. Such a gathering
gives the agent an opportunity to express his concerns, explain the
nature and objectives of the protection program, and, on behalf of
the principal, thank the guests for their support.

The author held such an event within months of establishing a
new corporate protection organization, and the effort produced
priceless benefits for years. However, to keep such a relationship
alive, one must nourish it with occasional visits, phone calls, or
invitations to lunch.

Obviously, the agent’s approach to all this has to be sensible
and well crafted. He has to present a valid reason for his re-
quest for cooperation and assistance. That reason is the care-
fully assessed level of risk to the principal, not the fact that the
principal is a prominent citizen. In discussions with the police
chief, the EP specialist can acknowledge that the law enforce-
ment agency is charged with protecting the entire community,
but still diplomatically point out that some citizens-by virtue
of their standing in the community and in the world-have
special needs.

One of the prizes the agent is after is access to the department’s
intelligence section. The objective is to gain better insight into ac-
tivity that matches threats identified in the principal’s risk assess-

ment. Ideally, the agent would arrange to be contacted whenever
the police department’s intelligence proftle raised a concern that
could affect the principal. Depending on the size of the police
agency, the EP specialist might want to ask for an operationalliai-
son below the chiefs level.

Whether the protective operation is a one-man show just get-
ting off the ground or a large, well-established corporate detail, a
relationship with local law enforcement executives is crucial to its
success.

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Intelligence and Other Information

Intelligent¥] here means information that helps an agent protect his
principal. It refers primarily to facts or tips about potential threats.
A warning that carjacking has increased along the principal’s route
to work would be intelligence. Advice about run-flat tires would
not-that would be technical information. This section discusses
both types of data in its treatment of newsgathering, networking,
benchmarking, and countersurveillance. Chapter 1, Threat As-
sessment, addressed the importance of gathering intelligence and
other information when analyzing the types and probabilities of
threats to the principal. In this section, the lesson to remember is
that information-gathering requires resources, which an agent must
cultivate carefully.

Newsgathering

Part of the job is to track information about individuals, organiza-
tions, and conditions that might pose a threat to the principal.
What resources will help a protection specialist stay informed
about such matters? Everyday news sources-newspapers
(national and local), newsmagazines, and broadcast and cable tele-
vision news programs (local, national, and CNN, for example)-
set the baseline. The ordinary reading an agent does to keep cur-
rent with the news is an automatic first step.

More-targeted newsgathering can be done via the Internet. For
example, an agent can set up a personalized news service by in-
structing a computer program to search daily for any references to

the principal’s name, his company, his industry, and any relevant
characteristics that make the principal a potential target, such as his
religion, ethnic background, or status as a wealthy or politically
important person. The program will then search for keywords in
news reports from many sources. The software can also be in-
structed to search for the names of particular persons, groups, or
conditions that could threaten the principal, such as “Tupac
Amaru” or “militia.” Setting up a personalized news service is
simple, common, and cheap-there’s no reason not to do it. Also,
amazingly, some potentially threatening groups have their own

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sites on the World Wide Web, complete with pictures of members.
Periodic electronic visits to those sites can help an agent anticipate
any interest those groups might develop in the protectee.

The Internet approach can result in the automatic production of
a personalized, daily, on-screen “newspaper” that includes articles
only about subjects likely to affect the principal’s well-being. It’s
even possible to use the Internet to gather up-to-date weather re-
ports for the principal’s upcoming travel destinations. Thus, ap-
propriate software and well-informed information-systems per-
sonnel (to help choose and set up the software) are important re-
sources.

If the principal is a corporate executive, another resource for
the task of newsgathering is the company’s public relations office.
Part of that group’s job is to monitor news sources for informa-
tion about the corporation and its executives. The PR department
can also let the EP specialist know when a news source is prepar-
ing a story about the principal. That way, the agent can start plan-
ning how he will protect the principal once the story comes out
and unwanted, extra attention is focused on him. This is especially
important if the story is going to be unfavorable.

Networking

From the news media and the Internet it is only possible to obtain
certain types of information: hard facts, numerical trends, and
other publicly exchanged information. An EP specialist, however,
also needs to develop other types of knowledge-advice and tips
that are more subjective or private. Sometimes he may even need
to ask for information that is being kept a secret. (That doesn’t
mean stealing proprietary information. It just means asking the
right questions privately. As the old saying goes, a secret is some-
thing you tell to only one other person at a time.) That sort of in-
formation is not going to turn up on the evening news-it has to
be fleshed out from other people directly.

Just what is this subjective, private information that an agent
seeks through networking? It is, for example, a tip like these:

• a certain hotel in Paris is no longer a safe place to stay

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• a certain U. airport has become unbearably difficult to
  travel through
• a certain company, at home or abroad, is a particularly
  good supplier of protection support personnel
• a certain type of car is especially useful in protective
  operations

Basically, networking is a pipeline to a great number of the re-
sources that an EP specialist needs. When it’s time to retain a
good lawyer, hire extra protective staff for a big event, send a staf-
fer off for training, or select a dependable, user-friendly home se-
curity system, the EP specialist has a better chance of finding the
right solution if he asks around, gets informal advice from in-
siders-in short, if he uses his network.

That explains wl?J to network; what about how and with whom?

For an agent just getting started in protective work, a natural group
to start networking with is classmates from an executive protection
training school. Anyone, new or experienced, who attends such a
school or any other gathering of potentially good contacts should
do the following:

• Be friendly. If it’s difficult to think of what to talk
  about, ask a person about himself. That’s the fastest
  way to get someone started on his favorite topic.
• Collect business cards from people at the gathering.

On each card, jot down a few facts about the person to
jog the memory later.

• Keep the official class or attendee list. Such a list is a
  shortcut to the beginning of a network.

After the meeting, it’s time to organize the contact information
collected. If the school contained 30 people, each of whom would
be a good contact for information on a different subject, that is
simply too much to remember. It’s much better to use a computer
contact management program; that way, when the agent needs to
know some inside scoop about a certain topic, he can search his
contact database for the person who knows about it.

When a network is well developed, information will flow several
ways. The agent wants to know whom he can call on for informa-

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tion when he needs it, but he would also like to receive unsolicited
tips from contacts who think he would be interested. To bring a
network to that level of maturity and usefulness, two other steps
may be necessary:

• The EP specialist should angle to get invited to more
  meetings. He can join organizations that hold confer-
  ences or offer to speak at meetings he would like to at-
• The specialist should think about what he can offer to
  others, what he can give them to make the networking
  mutually beneficial. For example, he might be able to
  send a contact a useful article (maybe even one the
  agent wrote himself), share some security-related in-
  formation about a particular travel destination, or de-
  scribe how he solved a particular challenge in executive
  protection work.

Several types of meetings provide networking opportunities.

Professional associations, such as the American Society for Indus-
trial Security, typically sponsor topic-specific training meetings
throughout the year and hold one major convention annually.
Trade shows offer an opportunity to talk with equipment vendors
to learn of the latest in security technology. Participation in certifi-
cation programs, like the Certified Protection Professional desig-
nation from ASIS94, presents networking opportunities like those
at training schools.

An organization targeted directly at protection specialists is the

Protective Service Alliance. PSA provides contacts, information,
and publications specifically on the subject of executive protec-
tion.”

If the agent’s protective operation is associated with a large
company, it may qualify for membership in the U.S. State Depart-
ment’s Overseas Security Advisory Council. (OSAC is described

94 American Society for Industrial Security, 1655 North Fort Myer Drive, Suite
1200, Arlington, VA 22209. (703) 522-5800.

9S Protective Service Alliance, c/o Varro Group, Inc., P.O. Box 8413, Shawnee
Mission, KS 66208. (913) 432-5856.

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in Chapter 7, Domestic and International Travel.) With more than
1,400 organizations as members, OSAC presents another great
networking source.

Benchmarking

A popular management technique is benchmarking, or the process
of deliberately, carefully comparing how other companies perform
their work. In benchmarking, people typically examine other
companies’ products, services, and especially processes to gain
ideas on the best ways to run their own businesses. Something
quite different from industrial espionage, benchmarking is an open
exchange of information, typically done in a spirit of professional
development rather than competition. For example, information
systems specialists from several corporations of similar size might
meet with each other to discuss the best ways of implementing
computer networks. Once a specialist sees how his peers are do-
ing their jobs, he has obtained a benchmark against which to
measure himself.

Executive protection specialists can do the same. One agent
who protects a wealthy client can meet with agents who have
similar clients, and they can tell each other how they do what they
do. In the security field, of course, people would take pains not to
give away specific details that might compromise their clients’
safety, but there are plenty of techniques and processes that can be
shared. After all, if the group has been properly checked out (that
is, everyone present is a bona fide EP specialist), then information
can be exchanged in a spirit of cooperation-one colleague help-
ing another. In most cases, one agent isn’t competing to land the
job of protecting another agent’s client.

Benchmarking isn’t a vague, philosophical management gim-
mick-it’s all about being practical. Fortune magazine describes the
way corporate benchmarkers at Rank Xerox'” were sent to the
company’s most successful regions with this mission: “Simply find

96 Rank Xerox is an 80 percent-owned subsidiary of Xerox, operating mostly in
Europe.

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out how it was done; don’t try to figure out why it worked.”97 Will
it always feel good to see how well someone else does the job, es-
pecially if he excels in an area where the observer is weak? Well,
no. Fortune quotes Robert Hiebeler, partner in charge of Arthur
Andersen’s global best-practices group, as saying, “The goal of
identifying best practices is to disturb yourself in a positive way.”98

In sum, benchmarking gives an EP specialist-who typically
operates with much discretion and in relative solitude-a standard
against which to measure his skills and a source of new ideas for
the best ways of doing the job of executive protection.

Countersurveillance

A further form of intelligence-gathering is countersurveillance,
which helps one assess the possibility that the principal or the
protective operation is being observed. It’s a matter of watching
for watchers.

In this chapter on resources, the key point to note about coun-
tersurveillance is that most times the agent himself is too busy
watching the principal to conduct a systematic, comprehensive
counter surveillance effort. Therefore, he cultivates resources that
can do so. Those resources include the following:

• 5 tciffers in the protective detail. In a detail of three, it makes
  sense to have two stand with the principal and one
  blend in with the crowd and watch for watchers.
• Other employees of the client’s corporation. The agent can
  teach them SOITle awareness and observation skills,
  which they can put to use as they go about their ordi-
  nary work.
• Contractua! support personnel. The EP specialist can hire
  them to serve as extra eyes and ears during times when
  the risk increases or for routine and periodic counter-
  surveillance assistance.

97 Thomas A. Stewart and Ed Brown, “Beat the Budget and Astound Your
CFO,” Fortune, October 28,1996.

98 Justin Martin and Joyce E. Davis, “Are You As Good As You Think You
Are?”, Fortune, September 30,1996.

228

 

An example of a counter surveillance effort is casual observation
of an area that the principal has just visited. Someone not easily
identifiable as being with the protective team should stay behind,
dressed to blend in, and look for repeat or unusual visitors. Hind-
sight is always crystal clear, but the repeated presence of Arthur
Bremer around the George Wallace campaign could have served as
a red flag to someone conducting countersurveillance.

Some protective details videotape gatherings in places that their
principal visits, repeating the process two or three times. They
then study the tapes to see whether any individual keeps turning
up. If so, they must ask themselves whether he seems to have a
keen interest in the protectee. All this can be done in a low-key
manner. A protection detail doesn’t want to bring attention to it-
self. Also, it must be sure to ask legal counsel what steps it should
take to avoid violating any privacy laws.

Another example of countersurveillance takes place before the
principal arrives at a site. Despite one’s best efforts, it may be dif-
ficult or impossible to vary the principal’s driving route consis-
tently. In case someone has developed an interest in how and
when the principal gets to and from work, it’s useful to have a
member of the protection team conduct a countersurveillance sur-
vey along the route. The purpose is to determine whether the
principal is being watched and, if so, by whom. This is not an ex-
otic countermeasure-it’s simply a smart defensive tactic. Ideally,
it should be done by the same person over time; that way he has a
better chance of noticing the repeated presence of the same per-
sons or vehicles.

Specialized Assistance

Experts have long been the subject of scorn. The American edu-
cator and Nobel laureate Nicholas Murray Butler called an expert
someone “who knows more and more about less and less.” Still,
no agent can understand the intricacies of every aspect of execu-
tive protection-sometimes experts must be called in, and before
they can be called in, they have to be found and checked out for
capability and reliability. The following sections on legal advice,

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technical surveillance countermeasures, and supplemental person-
nel cover only a few major categories of specialized assistance.
Each EP specialist should take the time, early on, to consider what
other types of help he might need and then layout plans for how
to get such help.

Legal advice

Executive protection is a legal minefield.” The only way to trav-
erse it safely is to develop a source of legal advice. That source
might be the in-house counsel at the protectee’s corporation, or it
could be an outside attorney with experience in advising security
operations. Regardless, the time to cultivate that particular re-
source is before an incident occurs.

Step one is to find a suitable lawyer. Here is one matter where
networking can be a big help. How does one find a good me-
chanic, doctor, or building contractor? Certainly, the most familiar
way is by asking around. If the agent has developed a network of
other protection specialists, he will have a body of people to con-
sult about their experiences with particular lawyers.

Step two requires the protection specialist to meet with the law-
yer and describe the particular circumstances he expects to en-
counter. Those circumstances include the whole range of activities
that the protection effort encompasses-threat assessment; per-
sonal protection of the principal (“working the principal”); ad-
vance work; security in automobiles, at work, at home, and while
traveling; hiring and firing staff; carrying weapons; and many other
activities. In return, the attorney can describe the major categories

of legal considerations the agent should be aware of. Obviously,
the agent will want to be able to call on the attorney if something
goes wrong (in other words, if the agent or principal is arrested or
sued), but the best legal advice is preventive. The attorney can of-
fer advice about how to safeguard the protective operation legally

99 This section does not purport to be, nor should it be construed as, legal ad-
vice or opinion. Because the law is complex and varies by jurisdiction and situa-
tion, readers should consult a lawyer about specific questions, policies, and proce-
dures.

230

 

(through proper training, hiring, legal agreements with contractors,
etc.). After initial consultations, the agent will also have the attor-
ney on hand to answer specific questions as they pop up.

Because laws vary from state to state and from country to
country, it’s impossible to discuss here all the legal considerations
an EP specialist might need to know. However, a few categories
of legal concern stand out and can be addressed in general.P?

Weapons. The question of carrying weapons-both guns and
other devices-can become complicated because of the great
variation of laws by city, state, and country. That complexity puts
the EP specialist in the situation of having to maintain a difficult
balance. If the agent has too little concern for the legality of car-
rying weapons, he could unintentionally break the law and end up
getting embarrassed, arrested, or both. If he has a disproportion-
ate concern about carrying weapons, he might fail in his duty to
protect the principal.

The following are a few details the agent should ask his attorney
to answer. A different answer may apply for each jurisdiction in
which the agent operates.

• Must I register my handgun?
• Is it possible to get a permit to wear the gun under my
  jacket (in other words, to carry a concealed weapon)?
• What must I do to transport the gun legally?
• What should I do if I wish to have armed protection
  while traveling?
• What other items, besides firearms, are considered
  weapons under various laws? Tasers, kubitons, ASPs,
  chemical sprays? What are the laws regarding carrying
  or concealing them?

These considerations can easily become highly complex. If the
agent plans to accompany the principal on a trip from Los Angeles
to the Washington, D.C., area, using Baltimore-Washington Inter-

100 For much of the information in this section, the author wishes to thank
Thomas C. Morrow,].D., of the Law Offices of Thomas C. Morrow, P.A., 15 East
Chesapeake Avenue, Towson, Maryland 21286. (410) 583-0500.

231

 

national Airport, he will need to know the weapons laws of Cali-
fornia, Maryland, Washington, possibly Virginia, and the various
counties and municipalities he will pass through, not to mention
FAA regulations. (And, unless he is a law enforcement officer on
official business and the pilot says it’s ok, he can’t carry the firearm
on the plane-just in checked baggage.) An agent who is a former
law enforcement officer, or even a current one, should not rely on
professional courtesy to get him out of trouble if he violates a ju-
risdiction’s weapons laws.

Use of Force. The smartest EP specialist avoids the use of
force. By working smart, the agent may never have to use force at
all. Force has many undesirable consequences. The adversary’s
force could overpower the agent’s force, resulting in death or in-
jury to the client or agent. The adversary could be injured by what
was deemed excessive or illegal force by the agent, resulting in le-
gal problems and bad publicity for the client. Even a slight use of
force could cause a minor situation to escalate into a major one.

It helps to know the traditional terms for various levels of force.

Assault is an attempt or offer to do bodily harm to another. Battery
is any unlawful physical force inflicted on another person. Assault
with intent to murder is assault or battery with a weapon pointed to-
ward a vital part of the body; intending to commit grievous bodily
harm equals the intent to kill. Homicide is any act that results in the
death of another. Not all homicides are murders, but all murders
are homicides. Murder is generally classified as follows:

• First degree: intentional killing with willfulness, delibera-
  tion, and premeditation but without legal justification
  or mitigation.
• Second degree: killing with the intent to kill or inflict seri-
  ous bodily harm but without premeditation or delibera-
• Voluntary manslaughter: killing that would be murder ex-
  cept for the presence of a mitigating circumstance.

EP specialists aren’t especially likely to be charged with the first
two degrees of murder in the course of their work, but a charge of
voluntary manslaughter could be sought if an adversary dies in an

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attack against a principal. Also, protection agents, like anyone else,
are vulnerable to charges of vehicular homicide or vehicular man-
slaughter in cases where their driving was grossly negligent.

“He is wise who tries everything before arms,” wrote the Ro-
man dramatist Terence. Truly, knowing when to use force and
how much to use is difficult. The agent is likely to have only a
second to consider the question-if he has any time to think about
it at all. To improve the quality of his snap decisions, the agent
should develop a use-of-force plan in advance. Known in criminal
justice theory as a force continuum, such a plan would call for us-
ing the least level of force that would work in a given situation but
would match increasing offensive force with increasing defensive
force. Of course, from a protection perspective, the greatest dan-
ger lies in underestimating the threat, which could result in an in-
sufficient defense of the principal.

In general, violence and situations that come close to violence
are to be avoided. Clients don’t want to be associated with rough
stuff, and the use of force often leads to trouble. The EP special-
ist should remember that his job is to protect the principal, not to
capture, injure, or kill bad guys. Legal advice regarding the use of
force is indispensable, but the best guideline is to follow Sun Tzu’s
strategy of winning by use of the “sheathed sword.”

Defenses. Although it’s best to avoid it, sometimes force is
necessary and justifiable. In fact, necessity and justification are
closely linked in the various legal defenses of the use of force.
Traditionally, those defenses have been grouped as follows:

• Defense oj others: The agent has the same rights to defend
  the principal as the principal has to defend himself.
• Perfect seff–defense: This is a complete defense against
  homicide charges. Self-defense is justified only where a
  person has reasonable grounds to believe, and in fact
  does believe, that he or another person is in imminent
  danger of death or serious bodily harm. Perfect self-
  defense makes conduct, even homicide, justifiable or
  excusable when the agent believed, and it was reason-
  able (even if not correct) to believe, that his actions

233

 

were necessary for his safety or the safety of the princi-
pal. However, in such cases, several conditions apply:

– The agent must not be the aggressor. Any fighting

he does should be defensive. For example, he
could push an assailant away, then step back, then
push him away again if necessary, all the while step-
ping back and maintaining a defensive posture.

– The agent must not use greater force than reasona-
bly necessary in light of all the circumstances. If the
agent uses excessive force, he may legally become
the aggressor, giving the original assailant the right
to use force in self-defense.

– The agent has a duty to retreat or avoid danger if
the means to do so are within his power and con-
sistent with his safety and that of the principal.
However, there is generally no duty to retreat if the
attack is taking place within one’s dwelling, includ-
ing a hotel room.

• Imperfect se!f-defense: This occurs when the agent believes
  that force is justified to maintain his safety and that of
  the principal, but that belief is found to be unreason-
  Imperfect self-defense does not excuse conduct,
  but it eliminates the element of malice. Thus, a homi-
  cide would be reduced to voluntary manslaughter, while
  assault with intent to murder would be reduced to as-
  sault or battery.
• Prevention of forcible fe/of!): A person may use force under
  the guidelines above to prevent the commission of a
  forcible felony, such as kidnapping or robbery.

Liability. To businesspeople, property owners, and anyone else
who has something to lose, liability is the legal nightmare of the late
20^th century. Because of its cost in time, money, and reputation, li-
ability is something for a protection team to avoid at any price.

In general, an EP specialist or his organization runs the risk of
being held liable for intentional, negligent, or accidental acts. The
ins and outs of liability are too complicated to address here. How-

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ever, a few issues that are particularly relevant to protection opera-
tions must be pointed out.

First, an agent has no legal obligation to intercede to save the
life of another person (other than the principal). That means if the
principal and the agent, while walking down the street, see an old
woman getting mugged, they are not legally required to intervene
and face no possibility of liability for their inaction. However, if
the principal says, “Go help that woman,” and the agent does, they
open themselves up to potential liability if the agent injures the
woman or uses excessive force against the mugger. Of course,
there are moral and public relations dimensions to that scenario,
too, in addition to the question of the agent’s leaving the principal
unguarded, so the principal and agent should discuss, in advance,
their policy about intervening in such situations.

The scenario can be further complicated if the agent is an off-
duty police officer. In that case, he might have an obligation to
intercede, and if he commits a tort in the process, the principal
might be held liable. The question of liability is often left unclear
in work agreements. Even when it’s covered in a contract, the pri-
vate employer may still be pursued as the nearest deep pocket.

Second, there’s the question of training. An EP specialist or his
employer could be deemed negligent if a member of the protection
team committed a wrongful act and was improperly trained at the
time. For that reason, the agent must make sure his staffers are
trained correctly at the start and then stay up-to-date through
regular refresher or qualifying training courses. The training
needn’t all be formal. It can consist of discussion groups, lectures,

seminars, guest speakers at lunch, and other teaching methods, but
it must be well documented. To prove the training took place, the
EP specialist should hold onto detailed training records (class list,
outline or agenda, date and length of course) and personnel files
for each staffer, active and retired. The training and record keep-
ing are expensive, but their cost is nothing compared to the sums
the protective operation will save on insurance and, of course, li-
ability judgments.

Avoiding situations that lead to liability (unnecessary interven-
tion, excessive force, poor training) is one approach to reducing

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liability. A concurrent approach is to structure a protection pro-
gram that maintains such a high quality of leadership, supervision,
training, and attention to detail that the risk of liability is mini-
mized. Not only does that approach rather obviously reduce the
number of mistakes and accidents that could lead to liability, but it
also enables the protective operation to show (in court, if neces-
sary) that it has done everything humanly possible to prevent or
avoid the incident.

Technical surveillance countermeasures

On his own, an EP specialist can help his principal practice good
information security measures, many of which were discussed in
Chapter 7, Domestic and International Travel. However, if the
principal wants a high degree of certainty that he isn’t being
snooped on, the particular task of searching a space for eaves-
dropping equipment will require a specialist-and that specialist is
another resource that the agent needs to acquire.

Technical surveillance countermeasures are the various means
by which one looks for surreptitious listening or viewing devices in
a room, a building, an automobile, an airplane, any other place, or
any object that the principal uses. The specialty known as TSCM
is highly sophisticated, and keeping up with it is beyond most EP
specialists’ normal scope of knowledge.

Long before there’s any suspicion that the client is under sur-
veillance, the agent should use his network of contacts to locate a
recommended TSCM expert. No matter how enthusiastically the
expert is endorsed, the agent will have to check him out first. That
means looking into references from other clients, learning about
his background, even checking his criminal history if possible.
This preparatory work is essential because the TSCM expert, if
hired, will be given access to the client’s inner sanctum and will
have a better opportunity than anyone else to plant eavesdropping
devices if he is crooked. Ideally, the agent should also meet the
TSCM expert (or at least interview him by telephone) to determine
whether he will be a suitable resource when the need arises.

When would the need arise? An agent certainly can’t call in a
TSCM expert every time the client checks into a hotel suite-a

236

 

good, careful, physical and electronic sweep can easily cost several
thousand dollars. In most cases, the agent himself should physi-
cally search the principal’s office, home, and car for eavesdropping
devices, using a technique much like the bomb sweeps described in
Chapter 5, Automobile Security, and Chapter 6, Home and Office
Security. In routine situations, such searches can be supplemented
with other techniques for foiling eavesdroppers, such as switching
hotel rooms at the last minute or moving telephones from room to
room. But it might be necessary to summon a TSCM expert in the
following situations:

• The agent finds an object that looks like it might be an
  eavesdropping or visual surveillance device. (Such a
  find should be treated as evidence and reported to the
  FBI. In most cases, it should also be left in place and
  operating; that may make it easier to catch the eaves-
  )
• The principal has an especially sensitive meeting com-
  ing up.
• The agent wishes to get a room or car into a clean con-
  dition, meaning that, as far as is humanly possible, it is
  known to be free of surveillance devices. Afterwards,
  the agent can labor to keep the area clean through ac-
  cess control and other measures.
• The agent or principal suspects that electronic surveil-
  lance is being performed. Perhaps one of these condi-
  tions is present:

– The actions of a competitor or adversary suggest
that confidential information is leaking out.

– Strange sounds or volume changes have been no-
ticed on phone lines.

– The phone often rings and nobody, or else only a
tone, is there.

– A radio or television has suddenly developed
strange interference.

– The principal’s home or office has been burglarized,
but nothing or not much was taken.

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Most state police or highway patrol agencies field a unit that
provides full-time executive protection to their state’s governor
and sometimes other elected officials. Although these troopers are
officially committed to their particular protectees, some agencies
permit them to participate in approved off-duty employment. De-
pending on the state, this group of experienced professionals can
be an excellent protection resource. They are commissioned law
enforcement officers who have intimate knowledge of the entire
state, know executive protection, and can usually carry a firearm
off-duty. Gaining access to this resource can be tough, but an
agent with a law enforcement background may be able to get his
foot in the door. It’s well worth the try.

Even among that group, not every officer can be assumed to be
suitable-the agent has to check. Maybe the officer is available for
off-duty work because he has been suspended while charges
against him are investigated. A face-to-face meeting is in order
before any work begins. The agent will have to establish his re-
quirements, ascertain the quality of the law enforcement officer,
and explain what is expected of him. It has to be explained that
the agent, who is ultimately accountable for the principal’s protec-
tion, is in charge.

The alternative to off-duty law enforcement officers is an ex-
ecutive protection firm. Because lots of pretenders populate the
EP business, several precautions are in order:

• The agent should find a firm that has been used suc-
  cessfully by someone else in his protection network.
  He shouldn’t rely on the Yellow Pages or glossy pro-
  motional brochures.
• The qualifications, training, and background of the
  firm’s staff have to be examined. Many companies are
  managed by people with law enforcement backgrounds
  and contacts. That can be a huge advantage locally.
  The agent should check references.
• Some firms are headed by top-notch professionals with
  excellent experience-but not staffed with such people.
  For example, the firm’s president might be a Secret

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with a radio scanner. The principal should be made
aware of that risk, and the protection specialist needs to
be cautious when discussing his business over that me-
dium. In particular, he should never use the principal’s
name or other information that could compromise se-
curity if overheard.

• In addition to conducting detailed physical searches,
  TSCM experts use several other techniques to search
  for eavesdropping devices: radio frequency analysis,
  telephone system analysis, non-linear junction detec-
  tors, and others.

It’s important to note that the dangers associated with cellular
phones extend beyond eavesdropping. First, because a cellular
phone contains a transmitter, an intercept operator can home in on
the signal and use the phone as a tracking device to locate the
principal-even while the principal travels about by car, and even
when the phone is not in use. Second, a cellular phone can easily
be modified to serve as a remote-controlled bomb that a principal
is likely to carry on his person. Months after altering the phone,
the assassin can call from halfway around the world, dial a prepro-
grammed code, and activate the device.

Supplemental personnel

Sometimes a protective operation needs a few extra bodies. The
principal may be traveling to a distant location, and it may be too
complicated or expensive to bring additional protective agents
along. Or the principal may be traveling to a place to which the
agent cannot readily bring a firearm, and the agent may feel armed
protection is warranted there and so want to hire local, armed as-
sistance. Or a special event may be coming up, or the threat as-
sessment may suggest that risk has increased. But since so much is
at stake and so much will be required of the temporary help, not
just any old bodies will do. An EP specialist who needs to hire
additional, temporary help has only a few realistic options: off-duty
police officers who specialize in executive protection, or protec-
tion agents who work for another firm.

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ample, the vehicle should be spotlessly clean, fully fu-
eled, and equipped with at least minimal emergency
equipment and a cellular telephone. The driver is not
to play tour guide and should not speak unnecessarily.
The agent should also clarify his requirements for
driving technique (safe driving observing the speed
limit, with doors locked and commercial radio off, eyes
on the road, and route of travel well practiced). Any
professionally operated company will maintain these
standards, but the agent should state them anyway the
first time out.

• The costs of working with outside help have to be
  spelled out in black and white. To avoid being sur-
  prised by hidden charges, the agent should see that the
  contract specifies all the details regarding hours
  worked, travel time, meals, mileage, ete. One careful
  approach is to use a form that states when the work day
  starts and ends (for example, 7 am to 9 pm) and leaves
  a space for the hired agent and the EP specialist both to
  Other aspects to work out are how to handle
  overnight assignments. If the contract agent is to assist,
  he’ll have to stay in his room, avoid drinking, and be in-
  stantly accessible to the detail.

A glance at this book’s contents page shows the range of exper-
tise that an EP specialist must command. But no one acting alone
could master all the topics associated with executive protection.
Therefore, a prudent agent should take the trouble to develop a set
of resources that can help him where he needs help.

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Service alumnus, but the agents it hires out could be in-
experienced security guards. There’s no use engaging a
firm like that; it would be better to work alone than to
pay high fees for an “empty suit.”

• The agent must ask to see documentation of liability in-
  surance, the firm’s license to do business, and staffers’
  authority to carry firearms. (Beyond looking at the
  documents, it may be wise to call the relevant agencies
  to confirm the facts.) He should also find out what
  kinds of firearms the firm’s agents carry and whether
  they use step-down weapons, such as ASPs or pepper
• When making arrangements for the first time, the agent
  should ask for specifics about the person who will be
  assigned to the principal. The agent will need a photo-
  graph of the person, both for security purposes and to
  see whether the person presents a professional ap-
  pearance. A face-to-face meeting is also required.
• The EP specialist must clarify the firm’s role. If the
  hired agents are to be responsible, on their own, for a
  principal who flies to them unescorted by his own secu-
  rity person, the ground rules must be firmly established.
  Even with precautions, that is not a good arrangement;
  it leaves too much room for error and dashed expecta-
  The EP specialist could be made to look like a
  fool for hiring an incompetent whom he has not met to
  look after the principal.
• A preferable arrangement is for the support protection
  personnel to work under the supervision of the protec-
  tion agent, who accompanies the principal. In that
  case, very specific instructions should be given to the
  firm’s representative regarding the EP specialist’s pro-
  tection mandate, security procedures, and the princi-
  pal’s likes and dislikes.
• When hiring transportation as part of the deal, the
  agent has to be very clear about his standards. For ex-

241

 

Before heading far down the path to a career in executive pro-
tection, the candidate should educate himself as much as possible
about the field. Reading this book is a good first step. Next, it’s
wise to read more about executive protection (in newspapers,
magazines, and books) and about the security profession in gen-
eral. (See the “Resources” section at the end of this book.) Since
most executive protection assignments outside of government in-
volve guarding people who are in business or have profited sub-
stantially from business, it also pays to learn that field. An agent
who is ignorant about the subject his principal is most motivated
by will not be a good match for that principal.

If a candidate has a particular type of EP work in mind, it helps
to call someone who is doing that type of work and ask how to
follow in his footsteps. As long as the candidate doesn’t pose a
threat to the experienced agent’s job, the latter will probably be
happy to offer the former some suggestions about what would be
useful training and background. Most people are flattered to be
consulted and are enthusiastic enough about their line of work to
share their insights freely. They may even be able to advise the
candidate on the best way to obtain a position in their organization
or one that is similar. Still, even with a tip, the candidate will have
to do his homework. Some corporations will say they have EP
programs but only provide the service at board meetings, share-
holders’ meetings, etc.

Training, education, and experience

Unless a person works for a sophisticated government protective
organization (Secret Service, State Department, or military protec-
tive work, or protecting a mayor, county executive, or governor),
he will need formal training in executive protection before he can
honestly claim to be qualified to perform EP work. Fortunately, a
number of good training opportunities are available.

But how can a candidate find a school and evaluate its career-
building potential before investing his time (often a week) and
money (typically several thousand dollars)? To develop a list of
training providers to evaluate, the best technique is to ask EP
practitioners what schools they recommend. The list can be sup-

244

 

[Among the] wqys of courting defeat [are] de-
fective training … and failure to use picked men.

Sun Tzu

Chapter 10

Training, Job Opportunities, and
Finding the Right Person

The chapters up to this one have discussed the broad view and the
details of executive protection, what it is and what it isn’t, how to
protect and how not to protect. Now it’s time to get moving and
make it all happen. This chapter first looks at prospective EP spe-
cialists (termed “candidates” here), discussing what they should do
to prepare themselves for protection work (or how to improve the
skills they already possess) and how to find the right job. Then the
chapter takes a look from the other side, the viewpoint of a person

who wishes to hire a protective agent. The focus will be on what
to look for in an agent, how to find one, and how to arrange the
relationship between the principal and the EP specialist.

For the Agent

To embark on a career in executive protection, a candidate needs
two things: first training, then a job. That’s simple enough, but
there are many types of training, many types of jobs. Only the
candidate knows which types will fit comfortably with his aspira-
tions, budget, and personal responsibilities.

243

 

• What do prior students have to say about the course?

Can I talk to them personally to check?

• What is the student-to-teacher ratio?
• Does the school provide high-quality handout materials
  to which the candidate can refer after the course?
• What is the true cost, including lodging, meals, hand-
  outs, materials, and instruction? Are there any hidden
  costs?
• Does the school provide a certificate or a reference that
  a prospective employer can check when the candidate
  applies for an EP position?

A reputable school will work with the candidate to answer those
questions satisfactorily. It’s important to remember, however, that
EP schools are businesses. They aren’t perfect, and they can’t per-
form miracles. If they promise the moon (especially in the form of
a job), the candidate should be wary.

The executive protection training program offered by the
author’s firm is one example of a well-regarded school. The box
below presents one version of a high-quality, relevant curricu-
lum.l'”

Sample Curriculum for an
Executive Protection Training School

Threat assessment

Introduction to executive protection

One-on-one personal protection techniques and chore-
ography

Advance procedures in protective operations
Choreography of protection

Global terrorism and crime

Firearms: handgun, shotgun, simmunition (simulated
ammunition), range safety, ideal protection weaponry
and ammunition

101 From the R. L. Oatman & Associates, Inc., Executive Protection Program.

246

 

plemented by an Internet search and ads and listings in relevant
trade and professional publications.

Evaluating a Training School. No candidate should hitch up
with a training course before checking it out carefully. (He should
think of that process as a little free practice in advance work.)
How does one pick a good school? Basically, here is a list of im-
portant questions to ask:

• Do the instructors possess substantive qualifications
  and real-world experience? Does the school’s owner?
• Can I visit the program to get a close look at the quality
  of teaching?
• Who is allowed to attend? Are applicants subjected to a
  background investigation? (That is important. Because
  the contacts a candidate can develop at such courses
  may help him get his start and be a useful resource long
  afterwards, he doesn’t want his classmates to be a
  bunch of oddball James Bond wannabees.)
• Does the course cover the right topics? Does it tackle
  serious, detailed subject matter, or is it fluffy? (See box
  below for sample topics.)
• What is the level of instruction? Is the course for nov-
  ices or experienced EP specialists? (It’s important to
  match the level to the student.)
• Will I receive hands-on experience in some aspects of
  training (driving, firearms use, physically protecting the
  principal, etc.), or is it all book learning? Or worse, is it
  all war stories (amusing but impractical anecdotes)? It’s
  also important to strike the right balance and not over-
  emphasize guns, bombs, karate, J turns, ete. Those
  topics are exciting but not highly practical, not the real
  world of executive protection.
• Does the school have suitable classroom space and
  training grounds?
• Is the school bonded? (Check its liability insurance.) Is it
  licensed to conduct such training? (Check for complaints
  lodged with the state and the Better Business Bureau.)

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Security Drivers, Executive Awareness (a course for executives
who choose to drive themselves), the Security Driver/Bodyguard
Seminar, Firearms Deployment During Vehicle Operations, and
Police Driving Instructor Certification Program.

Other specialty topics a candidate may wish to gain training
in-in a short, specific course-are cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR) and emergency medicine, workplace violence, physical secu-
rity systems, corporate aircraft security, yacht security, and firearms
use. There’s also a great value in being able to speak a foreign lan-
guage (especially Spanish, or whatever language is spoken in the
places the principal travels to most often), so a language course
should be considered.

The Question of Education. Besides training, a candidate
also needs education. There’s no established requirement for the
level of formal education a candidate must have, but most princi-
pals are educated people, so a candidate with a good education
may blend into a principal’s life style better than a candidate with a
poor education. It’s important to be proficient in math, in reading
comprehension, and especially in speaking and writing proper
English.

In addition, the candidate should educate himself by reading
extensively about the field of security: not just executive protec-
tion, but the full range, as he may end up as part of a larger secu-
rity operation. That means knowing about report writing, investi-
gations, patrol, physical security systems, power to detain, and
many other topics.

A candidate should also educate himself about business if he

has any intention of protecting a business executive. It’s not nec-
essary to be an expert, but knowing general business concepts and
what is happening in various industries is helpful. That knowledge
makes it easier for an agent to understand what is important about
the principal, what motivates him, and what could motivate others
to harm him.

There’s another use for a general understanding of business. If
the protective operation a candidate works in is the security de-
partment of a large corporation, it helps (for many reasons, in-
cluding budget approval and department prestige) to present the

248

 

Demonstration of automatic weapons use and ballistic
vest performance

Practice with various handgun and shotgun rounds
Practical demonstration of EP scenarios (handgun pro-
tective combat, shotgun use in protective operations,
and simmunition exercise in close protective move-
ments)

Explosives overview and identification, including
building search techniques

Dynamics of protective driving

Practical driving exercises: ocular driving (for turning
and braking), slalom and accident avoidance, vehicle
bomb search, escape maneuvers

Workplace violence

Legal considerations in executive protection
Emergency medicine

Assassin profiling

Proper dress and decorum in executive protection
Practical exercise in protective operations
Dynamics of tactical thinking

Use of step-down weapons

Hand-to-hand, close-in protection methods
Armored cars and their limitations

Vehicle security systems

The art of networking

Communications equipment and methods

Another well-respected executive protection school is the
training division of Heckler & Koch International, Inc. That divi-
sion, headed by John T. Meyer, Jr., is headquartered in Sterling,
Virginia.

Some schools are particularly renowned for teaching specific
subtopics in executive protection. An example is the Scotti School
of Defensive Driving, which is the acknowledged leader in its spe-
cialty. Among its courses are Protective Driving for Chauffeurs or

247

 

appeals to protectees as much as police experience. The discipline
and challenge of a police academy, coupled with successful per-
formance as a police officer, speaks volumes about dedication,
self-discipline, and commitment. (That doesn’t mean a candidate
should put in just a couple of years in a police department and
then hit the road for the corporate world-it takes time to develop
a useful level of experience.) Although there is less in common
between the two professions than one would think, law enforce-
ment experience serves as an excellent basis on which to build an
EP career. Also, in some of the larger police departments, there
are opportunities for an officer to be assigned to an executive
protection unit or other entity, such as an intelligence unit, that has
occasional protection responsibility or liaison with the u.s. Secret
Service. Such assignments provide experience that would be rele-
vant to private sector EP work.

The same can be said about certain specialties in the armed
services. Overseas duty as a Marine embassy guard or service as
an aide to a general or admiral (a task that often involves personal
security) is a good entree to the field. Service with a military police
branch provides the same kind of foundation as employment with
a civilian police department.

Another route for developing good experience is to work one’s
way up the corporate security ladder. That experience can then be
capped off with a test-based examination. The American Society
for Industrial Security sponsors a Certified Protection Professional
designation that requires knowledge of many of the subjects that
are important to an EP specialist.

A wise step to take before embarking on EP preparation is to call
companies that employ EP specialists and ask what they look for
when hiring. Developing the right credentials-in this case, the
combination of training, education, and experience–can really help.

How to find a position

After obtaining the necessary training, education, and experience,
the candidate needs to find a job.

Contacts. One of the best resources is classmates and in-
structors at the EP school the candidate attended. From them he

250

 

EP operation as part of the business mission of the company, to
position it as something other than a cost center. In other words,
it’s useful to be able to demonstrate a high return on the invest-
ment the company makes in executive protection. To do that, of
course, it’s necessary to understand the business mission of the
company and to be able to communicate well with corporate deci-
sion makers up and down the ladder. Once a candidate is on the
job, here are a few tips for fitting in-and furthering-the corpo-
rate mission:

• Recognize that your idea of a suitable protection budget
  may not match that of the comptroller. Get to know
  the corporation’s budget process; learn how to work
  with it and how to compromise. If an emergency or
  special circumstance arises, and you need extra funds to
  maintain security, look at all the alternatives first, find
  the most cost-effective solution, and be prepared to
  justify your request.
• Tune into the corporate cost-controlling measure
  known as outsourcing. Minimize the protective opera-
  tion’s permanent personnel costs by hiring outside help
  as needed.
• To keep a protection program alive, you need to get the
  key corporate players on your side. That requires pre-
  senting yourself-and being perceived-as an effective,
  well-informed, and articulate executive who can repre-
  sent the corporation and the principal in their best light.
  It also means discerning and conforming to the corpo-
  rate culture. You’ll have to get rid of the mindset that
  because you are “security” and have access to the prin-
  cipal, you are privileged and don’t have to conform to
  the organization’s rules and culture.
• Avoid a narrow focus. Add value to your mission. For
  example, develop a corporate crisis management program
  and tie it into your 24-hour communications center.

Experience. One way to begin an executive protection career
is to begin a career in something else: law enforcement. Very little

249

 

should stay there and develop a track record. Noone likes an
agent who has had 10 jobs in five years.

Other Preparation. Executive protection is a physically de-
manding occupation that requires strength, stamina, and quick re-
flexes. Sometimes the physical requirements run high, and most of
the time the workday is long (10 hours on average). It doesn’t
make sense to wait until a job interview to begin thinking about
getting in shape. It’s far better to make physical fitness a lifelong
pursuit. That way, when the candidate walks in the front door, the
interviewer gets a good first impression, which is a lasting impres-
S10n.

Being physically fit doesn’t mean looking like a body builder. In
fact, the muscle bound look is a turnoff for most employers. An
appearance to emulate would be that of a U.S. Secret Service agent
serving on the presidential protection detail or of a state trooper
assigned to a gubernatorial protection unit. Benchmarking against
those kinds of standards, one can’t go wrong.

On an interview and once at work, even more noticeable than
one’s musculature is one’s clothing. A man can’t go wrong with a
well-pressed, dark blue suit (or other conservative variation), a
crisp, starched white shirt, and a conservative but fashionable tie
that is well-knotted, dimpled, and cinched up tight to the top of
the collar. The shoes should be highly polished, and socks should
rise high enough that the candidate won’t flash a hairy calf when
he crosses his legs. A clean-shaven face will best match most cor-
porate standards; mustaches, beards, long sideburns, and goatees
are generally not acceptable. For women, choosing appropriate
clothing may require more research into the styles prevalent in the
industry or geographic area where the female protection specialist
will be working. Also, women’s clothes may require a little tailor-
ing to accommodate radios, firearms, and other gear. In general,
however, the idea is to dress conservatively-to fit in and not draw
attention to oneself. Attention to detail is important in all phases
of this occupation; that level of attention includes the way the
agent dresses. For that reason, it may even be wise to visit the
corporation before an interview to see how people there dress (but
be careful not to take a miscue by visiting on “casual Friday”).

252

 

can learn about the best places to look for a posinon. Some
classmates may have been employed in a private-sector EP detail at
the time they took the course. If the candidate left a good impres-
sion on them, they might be willing to see about getting him a po-
sition where they currently work. At the least, they may keep their
eyes open and let the candidate know if something comes up.

It’s also useful to find a mentor who is already in the business.

Such a person can offer career advice, send a candidate in the right
direction, and provide a straightforward critique about his pros-
pects for employment and any need for improvement.

Proximity. Another entry method is to take a position with the
security department of a corporation that supports an executive
protection program. A number of corporations have structured,
career-ladder opportunities from entry-level officer to international
executive protection specialist. The best companies to look at are
those that work in an international environment. Worldwide
companies are the most likely to need executive protection and
facilitation.

A similar approach, if necessary, is for the candidate to take a
job near what he wants to do. For example, he might be able to
get a job as a driver in a major corporation. True, it’s an entry-
level position, but he will be next to the boss and get great expo-
sure. A smart employee who wants to work his way up to EP spe-
cialist will do more than expected and increase the importance of
his job. It’s possible to look back at everything in this book and
slowly change oneself from a driver to a protection specialist.

Gaining employment as a legitimate protection officer in a good

organization can be a challenge. It takes time and effort to build
the kind of resume that will get a prospective employer’s attention,
and even more work to attract an interview and job offer. The
candidate has to be patient, smart, persistent, and willing to com-
mit significant resources to land a good EP position. He shouldn’t
expect to leave a protection training school and, with no other
background, be hired to run an executive protection detail.
Rather, he should build his resume by getting as much training and
experience as he can. He’ll have to stick with it, as careers in ex-
ecutive protection don’t happen overnight. Once he gets a job, he

251

 

would cover criminal, motor vehicle, worker’s compensation, and
credit records, as well as personal and work references and psy-
chological, drug, and possibly alcohol testing to determine his suit-
ability as an employee.

Resume. In cases where a candidate has had no personal con-
tact with a prospective employer, the resume is his first chance to
make an impression. Libraries contain many books on how to
write a resume. An EP candidate who has little experience with
resumes should consult such a book to see attractive, informative
formats. In general, the resume should be kept to no more than
two pages and should be read carefully for accuracy, neatness, con-
sistency, correct spelling, etc.

The resume is a door-opener. It shouldn’t be cute or too clever
but should be able to stand on its own merit. Above all, though it
should accentuate the candidate’s strong points, it must be honest.

In a quest for an EP position, a key resume component is a list
of specialized skills. Items to list include these:

• training or expertise in foreign languages (and whether
  the candidate can write, speak, or understand those lan-
  guages)
• diving certification
• emergency medical technician certification and its date

of expiration

• possession of a valid U.S. passport
• computer skills (and specific programs known)
• hobbies that contribute to one’s EP abilities, such as
  running, skiing, or horseback riding
• martial arts skills (but don’t overdo it; most principals
  aren’t looking for Bruce Lee)
• education
• specialized schools attended (though not necessarily
  every course the candidate ever took)
• willingness to relocate (if true)

The resume should also direct the reader to a good telephone
contact. What’s needed is a professional tone when the phone is

254

 

A candidate who is unsure how to choose the right clothes
should not be embarrassed to ask for help in a high-quality cloth-
ing store. If the mannequin in the store looks good, it doesn’t hurt
to buy the whole ensemble. Alternatively, the candidate can con-
sult one of the many, readily available books on dressing for busi-
ness. In EP, the right clothing is an important investment.

For many reasons, smoking is absolutely taboo. It’s unhealthy,
it may annoy the principal or others in the detail, it distracts the
agent from his duties, and it may draw unwanted attention. If the
candidate gets a ride to an interview, he should be sure not to ride
with someone who is smoking. The smell will stick to his clothes,
and he may be tagged as a smoker even if he isn’t one.

Behavior. Another important part of preparing oneself for EP
work is to develop good habits. The candidate’s attitude and de-
meanor should be that of a quiet, dignified, competent profes-
sional.

Interpersonal skills are critically important. An ideal candidate is
strong, emotionally mature, intelligent, mentally flexible, ethical, and
upbeat. A hard, glum expression runs counter to the impression
that most corporate executives wish to convey. Honesty and kind-
ness are other good core values. An agent also needs good powers
of concentration: he’ll need to be able to focus on a task in distract-
ing conditions while still paying attention to his surroundings in case
immediate action is necessary. Other crucial assets are problem-
solving skills, a willingness to learn, and good listening ability.

A degree of humility is also essential. The agent must get used
to the fact that he is seeking a service job and that he will often

have to subordinate his desires to those of the principal. If that’s
unpalatable, executive protection is not the right job. Even if the
agent eventually becomes a confidante and begins to feel a part of
the principal’s inner circle, it’s inappropriate to get too familiar or
relaxed. The agent is still the service provider, and the principal is
still the boss. It’s important to stay neutral, avoid gossip, and keep
a distance from office politics and the principal’s home life.

The benefits of good, clean living will be obvious when a can-
didate is searching for an EP position. In most cases, the applicant
will have to submit to a full background investigation, which

253

 

Even something as seemingly insignificant as the principal’s
hobbies can make a big difference in whether an agent would want
to work for him. For example, it wouldn’t make sense to take a
job protecting someone who is an avid golfer if the agent finds the
sport completely boring or, if the agent is prone to seasickness, to
protect a principal who loves to travel about on his yacht. Like-
wise, if the principal travels a lot and the candidate hates to be
away from home, the two might not be a perfect match.

Other, more obvious aspects of a job that need examining are
the salary, benefits, working conditions, training opportunities, ad-
vancement opportunities, and likely job security. The candidate
may also want to meet with the protective detail and find out about
specific working conditions. Still, if this is a candidate’s first EP
job, he mustn’t get too picky. He’ll have to get out there and earn
his stripes.

The right job can last a long time. As an agent builds a relation-
ship with the principal, trust forms. Over time, the principal, his
family members, and his associates all feel more and more com-
fortable having him as part of the team. The agent will become
more valuable the longer he stays.

For the Principal

Once the decision is made to seek out an executive protection spe-
cialist, the protectee mayor may not be the person performing the
talent search, interviews, and background checks. In a corporate
setting, the head of security may play the leading role; in other set-
tings, an assistant to the principal may do most of the preliminary
work. In any case, the principal will certainly have to be involved
in the latter stages of the process, such as meeting the agent, get-
ting a feel for whether the principal and the agent would get along
well, and approving the final selection.

What to look for, what to avoid

The section above called “Training, education, and experience”
lists most of the qualities and qualifications a principal should look
for in a protection specialist. However, a few points specific to the

256

 

answered. It’s no good to let the caller meet a rude response or to
have a four-year-old screen the calls.

Not long ago, people would often pay to have their resumes
professionally typeset before embarking on a job hunt. The result
looked good, but one couldn’t change anything once the resume
was printed. In the word-processing era, a candidate can actually
create a separate resume for each job applied for, emphasizing the
strengths he possesses that would most appeal to that employer.
Resumes for EP specialists are even turning up on the Internet
now-people networking electronically rather than face to face.
Also, it never hurts to keep the resume current, as opportunities
sometimes pop up fast.

A word to the wise job-seeker: Although you want to demon-
strate your experience, you also want to show that you can be dis-
creet, so don’t give out private information about others-
especially anyone you have protected-in the resume or during
interviews.

What to look for in a position

While the candidate’s primary goal is employment as a protection
specialist, his secondary goal should be a level of comfort with the
principal and his company or organization. The candidate’s ethical
standards and values-high, one hopes-should match the ethical
standards and values of the principal. A candidate should never
associate himself with an organization or principal that gives even
the appearance of engaging in illegal or unethical behavior.

Also to be avoided is any situation with a potential for abusive
behavior by a protectee, his family, or others with whom he is as-
sociated. By “abusive” is meant someone who blows up for no
reason or who belitdes people publicly and takes pleasure in it.
Who needs that?

This is the time for a candidate to do his homework. He should
research the prospective employer, searching for the employer’S
name on the Internet and finding out about his reputation, business
activities, and interests. This is not to snoop unnecessarily on the
principal but merely to gather information that would help the can-
didate decide whether he and the principal would be a good match.

255

 

person doing the hiring is hamstrung in three ways: he doesn’t
know what to ask, he doesn’t know what constitutes a good an-
swer, and he legally cannot ask (or may be hesitant to ask) many of
the things he should ask.

Many EP specialists have some background in police or military
work. Such experience weeds out people who are unsuited to
some of the physical demands of protection work. However, an
overreliance on that experience could lead a client into a poor de-
cision. The reason is that there are big differences between EP
and police or military service: EP is much less force-oriented; EP
specialists have no special legal status that allows them to carry or
use weapons or arrest people (they’re just ordinary citizens); EP
specialists have no authority to order people around; protection
work is much more prevention-oriented than police or military
service; and EP specialists have to fit into a business setting and
understand all that that entails. Also, private protection work re-
quires a different type of judgment and decision-making ability-
there’s no written code of conduct, no body of law to uphold, no
written enforcement policies. It’s a lot more freeform. The per-
son responsible for hiring is simply going to have to rely on a
combination of ordinary good judgment and advice from more
knowledgeable parties. (See ”Where to look for agents,” below,
for suggestions.)

Once several applicants have been checked out and seem to be
suitable candidates, it’s time for a chemistry experiment-that is, a
meeting to test the chemistry between the candidate on one hand
and the principal and his family on the other. They have to be able

to get along with each other, so the attributes that don’t turn up on
a resume, like personality and manners, will make a big difference
and have to be judged in person.

One approach, when possible, is for the protectee and his
spouse to meet the candidate and his spouse over dinner. The
protectee’s spouse can bring a fresh perspective to judging the
candidate, and can do so with the protectee’s interests at heart. If
the client doesn’t want to participate in a dinner meeting, the cli-
ent’s chief of staff could do so. (His perspective is likely to be
closer to the principal’s than the corporate security director’s is.)

258

 

principal’s point of view need to be emphasized here. The first is a
thorough background investigation of any candidate who is being
considered seriously. To stay on the right side of the law, the cli-
ent should get the applicant to sign a statement granting permis-
sion to check credit, criminal, motor vehicle, worker’s compensa-
tion, educational, training, insurance, and citizenship status rec-
ords. It’s also vital to look into why the candidate left his last em-
ployer or wants to leave his current one. If the client hires a pri-
vate investigative firm to conduct the background check, he should
do his own due diligence first and make sure the firm is reputable,
licensed, and bonded.

Hiring right is a big effort, but it’s worthwhile. Any agent hired
will become an insider in the principal’s business life and, to a
lesser extent, personal life. Bringing in the wrong person could
have very awkward results. In addition, an unsuitable person is
easy to hire but hard to fire.

Specifically, the client should check, through background inves-
tigation and personal interviews, whether the candidate is appro-
priately qualified in both personal and professional terms.

Personal. The principal should look for someone who

• is in good physical shape (and will take a physical to
  prove it)
• is not a substance abuser (and will take a drug test to
  prove it)
• is willing to work long hours (as can be demonstrated
  by his work history)
• is discreet (meaning, among other things, that he won’t
  blab everything about the principal in a book)
• has a pleasant personality (as he and the principal will
  spend much time together)
• is emotionally mature
• doesn’t come across at all like the Hollywood stereo-
  type of a bodyguard

Professional. The challenge is that most people who hire EP
specialists are not themselves EP specialists. Therefore, they may
not know what constitutes applicable experience or training. The

257

 

works out. (Of course, the agent must sign a confidentiality
agreement before coming on board.) If all goes well, the arrange-
ment can be made permanent. If it doesn’t, the parties can each go
on their way. No matter how the personnel search and selection
process is conducted, it’s vital not to take any shortcuts.

If the protection operation is large enough or the client’s per-
sonal budget is sufficient, an excellent way to end up with ideal EP
specialists is to think long-term, hire intelligent, trustworthy peo-
ple, and invest in the professional development of the ones with
whom the principal is most .comfortable. By putting them through
training courses and teaching them what the principal wants and
needs, the protection operation or principal can groom them to
give peak performance in the future. In that scenario, a good
agent is not hired but made.

Final Note

EP work can be exciting and rewarding, but it’s not for people
who crave glory. A protection agent should never be the center of
attention. His satisfaction has to be quiet, internal, deriving from
the knowledge that he has done his job well. For as Sun Tzu
wrote:

What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not
only wins, but excels at winning with ease. But his vic-
tories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor
credit for courage. For inasmuch as they are gained
over circumstances that have not come to light, the
world at large knows nothing of them, and he therefore

wins no reputation for wisdom; and inasmuch as the
hostile state submits before there has been any blood-
shed, he receives no credit for courage.

The wise client looks not for brassy bravado but for results, for
security, safety, and facilitation. The agent who is humble, intelli-
gent, strong, and able can provide those results by practicing and
mastering the art of executive protection.

260

 

If nothing else, at least such a meeting will show whether the can-
didate has good table manners, what his drinking habits are, etc.

Executive protection is a job that requires a very special type of
person. The EP specialist will be exposed to confidential business
information, the personal quirks of the client, and other private
matters. When hiring to fill such a position, it’s best to get it right
the first time. For an executive who genuinely needs protection,
the hiring decision can actually be a life-or-death question.

Where to look for agents

The best way to develop a list of candidates is to ask around. That
means talking to some of the following:

• an investigation firm with which the principal’s corpo-
  ration has connections (perhaps from due-diligence
  work or preemployment screening assignments)
• other executives or corporations that have personal
  protection staff
• faculty of reputable EP training schools
• a local office of the Secret Service or State Department
  (perhaps one of their agents would like to come on
  board; however, it’s important not to be overwhelmed by
  credentials and a list of famous persons the candidate has
  protected-the vast majority of Secret Service agents do
  not perform protective work unless it’s a campaign year)
• state and local law enforcement agencies
• the principal’s corporate in-house security expert (if he
  possesses the right understanding of EP work)

The person doing the hiring may also wish to advertise for can-
didates. For best results, he should advertise only in publications
targeted to security or law enforcement professionals. Newspaper
ads reach too wide an audience and are overwhelmingly likely to
attract unsuitable applicants. Also, an ad should use a post office
box for its return address. It’s best not to identify the company,
and it’s mandatory not to identify the principal.

Once a suitable candidate has been found, the principal may
wish to hire him on a temporary basis to see if the arrangement

259

 

Glazebrook, Jerry, and Larry Nicholson. Executive Protection Spe-
aalist Handbook. Shawnee Mission, Kansas: Varro Press, 1994.

Hacker, Frederick J. Crusaders, Criminals, Crasies: Terror and Terror-
ism in Our Time. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977.

Jenkins, Brian, ed. Terrorism and Personal Protection. Stoneham, Mas-
sachusetts: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1984.

Kobetz, Dr. Richard W., ed. Providing Executive Protection. Berry-
ville, Virginia: Executive Protection Institute, 1991.

Kobetz, Dr. Richard W., ed. Providing Executive Protection, Volume II.

Berryville, Virginia: Executive Protection Institute, 1994.

Mantell, Michael, and Steve Albrecht. Ticking Bombs: Defusing Vio-
lence in the Workplace. New York: Irwin Professional Publishing,
Inc., 1994.

Molloy, John T. John T Molloy’s New Dress for Success. New York:

Warner Books, 1995.

Nudell, Mayer, and Norman Antokol. The Handbook for Effective
Emergenry and Crisis Management. Lexington, Massachusetts:

Lexington Books, 1988.

Oatman, Robert L. Executive Protection Resource Manual. Towson,
Maryland: R. L. Oatman & Associates, Inc., 1995.

Savage, Peter. The Safe Travel Book. New York: Lexington Books,
1993.

Scotti, Anthony J. Driving Techniques for the Professional and Non-ProfessionaL
Ridgefield, New Jersey: PhotoGraphics Publishing, 1995.

Scotti, Anthony J. Executive Safe!Y and International Terrorism: A
Guide for Travellers. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1986.

S ecun·!y Management, monthly magazine of the American Society for
Industrial Security, 1655 N. Fort Myer Drive, Suite 1200, Ar-
lington, VA 22209.

Shackley, Theodore G., Robert L. Oatman, and Richard A. Finney.

You’re the Target: Coping with Terror and Crime. New World Pub-
lishing, 1989.

Sulk, Lawrence B. Law Enforcement Counter Intelligence. Shawnee
Mission, Kansas: Varro Press, 1996.

Traveler’s Handbook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Interna-
tional Travel Clinic, 1989.

262

 

Recommended Reading

Air Traveler’s Handbook: The Complete Guide to Air Travel, Airplanes
and Airports. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989.

Baron, S. Anthony. Violence in the Workplace: A Prevention and Man-
agement Guide for Business. Bakersfield, California: Pathfinder
Publishing of California, 1994.

Bottom, Norman R., Jr., and John I. Kostanoski. Introduction to Se-
curity and Loss Control. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1990.

Bremer, Arthur H. An Assassin’s Diary. New York: Harper’s
Magazine Press, 1972.

Broder, James F. Risk .Analysis and the Security SU17Jey. Stoneham,
Massachusetts: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1984.

Brown, George Albert. The Airline Passenger’s Guerilla Handbook.

Tucson: Fisher Books, 1989.

Chapman, Robert D. The Crimson Web of Terror. Boulder, Colo-
rado: Paladin Press, 1980.

Clark, Dr. James W. American Assassins. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982.

Clausewitz, Karl von. On War. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976.

Cooper, H. H. A. On Assassination. Boulder, Colorado: Paladin
Press, 1984.

Cunningham, William c., John J. Strauchs, and Clifford W. Van
Meter. Private Security Trends 1970–2000: The Hallcrest Report II.
Stoneham, Massachusetts: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1990.

Duet, Karen Freeman, and George Duet. The Business Secu17’ty K-9:

Selection and Training. N ew York: Howell Book House, 1995.

Duet, Karen Freeman, and George Duet. The Home and FamilY
Protection Dog: Selection and Training. New York: Howell Book
House, 1993.

261

 

Tzu, Sun. The ArlofWar, ed. James Clavell. New York: Delacorte
Press, 1983.

U.S. Department of State. Kry Officers ofPoreign Service Posts. Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1996.

U.S. Public Health Service. Health Information for International Travel.

Washington: U.S Government Printing Office.

263

 

cover, 54, 55

crash, automobile,S, 20, 21, 53, 79,
80,81,91,96,98,99,103

crime, 6, 13, 14,49,72,107,113,
133, 181

crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED),
133

crisis,S, 84, 152, 181, 183,221,249
crowd, 18,43,49,50,66, 154, 182,
228

customs, 62, 72, 152, 155, 158, 159,
177

defibrillator, 174

domestic staff, 110, 114, 119, 131,
144

domestic violence, 117, 185, 191,
192,218

Dozier, J ames, viii

dress, 37, 38, 42, 76, 151, 154, 229,
252

driver, 8,67, 78,89,247

driving (protective, defensive,
evasive), 30, 49, 59, 82, 85, 91, 95,
101, 102, 103

driving school, 96, 100, 247
driving theory, 96

driving, ocular, 99
eavesdropping, 33, 178, 179, 236,

238

elevator, 48, 51, 66, 144, 166
embarrassment, xvi, 18, 19, 31, 48,
59,139,143,159,214,231
embassy, 72, 152, 168, 179, 184
equipment, 32, 38, 40, 42, 76, 82,
111,118,125,127,133,135,143,

150,176,183,226,236,242
escalator, 51

evacuation, 53,56, 72,128,152,175
experience,usehli,67,88,200,244,

249,257

facilitation, xvii, 58, 62, 63, 66, 67,

78,85,117,132,145,251

FBI, 11, 14,86, 122, 178,222,237
Ferri, Gian Luigi, 17, 188

fire (prevention, response), 43, 76,

266

 

118,163,166
fire bag, 76, 151

fire extinguisher, 118, 166

firearm, xvi, 6, 17,33,38,41,54, 70,
92,101,104,137,154,184,202,
231,239,248,252

first aid, 117, 119, 121

fitness, 36, 252
Geschke, Charles, 11

global positioning system (GPS), 81
hard target, 3, 39, 44, 47, 49, 154
heckler, 18

helicopter, 161

Herrhausen, Alfred, 8

hijacking, 157

Hinkley, John, 41

hiring (an EP specialist), 225, 256,
259

home security, 6, 13, 86, 93, 105,
109,110,122,128,131,132,138,
225,237

hotel, 20, 29, 58, 66, 73, 149, 163,

177,237

illness, 21, 120, 153

immunization, 72, 152, 172, 173
industrial espionage, 132, 143, 177,

180

information, 3, 6, 45, 64, 74, 107,
113,129,153,177,179,223,224
injury, xvi, 19,20,21,53,79,117,

125,130,166,219,232
insane persons, 15

insider, 23, 113,200,221,225,257

intelligence, 3, 63, 73, 107, 113,222,

223,228

J turn, 101, 102,245
job,ftnding,243,246,250
K-9, 127, 139

Kennedy, John F., 57

kidnapping, viii, xvi, 5, 9, 10,23,84,
93, 100, 106, 146, 168, 169

law enforcement (contacts), 107,
113,184,221,222,232

law enforcement (hiring off-duty),
221,240

legal considerations, 17,56, 121, 184,

 

Index

access control, 110, 124, 134, 136,
144,164,218,237

advance work, 18, 57, 61, 65, 68, 69,
90, 146, 148, 155, 158, 163, 168
aircraft, 74, 139, 152, 154, 156, 158,

161,175,178,232,236,238
airline, 175

airline, choosing, 155

airport, 4, 74, 154, 155, 156, 158
alarm system, 76, 81, 85, 88, 111,

118,130,138,160,165,170,219,
238

ambush, 9, 86, 87, 93,98, 100, 104,

144

Amir, Yigal, 24

anniversary, terrorist, 73, 155
appearance of agent, 38, 59, 241, 252
appearance of principal, 14

armored car, 8, 32, 82, 84, 101

arm’s reach, 54, 58

ASIS,262

ASIS (American Society for
Industrial Security), 226
assassination, xvi, 2, 7, 15,24,30,33,
41,44,53,57,92,191,193,196,

201,239

automobile, 6, 8,21, 113, 122, 135
automobile, driving, 49,59,67, 71,
79,80,90,91,95,96,101,103,
143,154,239

automobile, selecting, 79, 80, 225
aviation, commercial, 155

aviation, private or corporate, 158
background (investigation), 203, 211,

236,240,245,253,257
benchmarking, 227
biographical information about
principal, 5, 255

 

bodyguard, xvi, 36, 39, 257

bomb, 8, 9, 24, 46, 57, 82, 92,121,
122,131,144,158,181,193,239
bomb (package, letter, mail), 10, 123,

125, 126

bomb prevention, 124
bomb questionnaire, 129
bomb screening, 125, 127

bomb search, 52, 86, 88, 129, 138
bootlegger turn, 102

Bremer, Arthur, 40, 45, 92, 229
bugs, 179, 238

business knowledge, 244, 248
carjacking, 13, 80, 93, 101,223
celebrities, xiii, 1, 14, 78, 115,210,

220

cellular phone, 67, 81, 86, 88, 136,
137,138,165,177,238,239,242
Centers for Disease Control, 172
characteristics of a good EP
specialist, 36

checklists, 66, 69,87, 137
choreography (positioning), 18,48,

94

Chretien, Aline, 109

command center, 176, 181
communication (devices,

arrangements), 136, 137, 165, 176,
182,238,249

contacts, 2, 6, 64, 68, 72, 78, 147,
151,173,180,184,194,220,221,
224,225,226,230,236,240,245,
250,254

corporate concerns, xv, xvii, 5, 17,

112,127,140,141,142,179,194,
198,199,212,222,227,244,249,
251

countersurveillance, 29, 93, 228

265

 

telephone privacy, 177, 179, 180, 237
temporary help, 140,239,259
ten-minute medicine, 120
termination (firing), 16, 196, 199,

214,216,257

terrorism, viii, xvi, 39, 72, 80, 93,
110,122,155

threat assessment, 1, 82, 106, 132,
146,172,201,208

threat ftle, 6, 107, 115, 201, 207
threat letter, 6, 15, 107, 116, 199,
200,218

training, 30, 110, 126, 131, 161, 174,
201,226,231,235,240,244,246,
254

travel, 11, 14,41,58, 71, 72, 78,82,
145,224,239

travel clinic, 172

travel, packing, 121, 148, 150, 171,

173

Tupac Amaru, 110
two-point turn, 101

U.S. Public Health Service, 172

268

 

u.S. Secret Service, 41, 53, 220, 241,
244,250,252,259

U.S. State Department, 171, 179,

226,244,259
Unabomber,10

Uniform Crime Reports, 14
use of force, 57, 109, 232
vacation,S, 140, 145
visitors, interviewing, 114

visitors, nuisance, 107, 114, 131, 177,

229

vital statistics, 20, 21

von Clausewitz, Karl, 63, 65, 181
~allace, (;eorge,30,40,229
wealthy persons, 1, 11, 13, 137,194,

223

weapon, 17, 38, 42, 55, 82, 195, 196,

199,230,231,241,258
~einstein, Harvey, 12
whatiP., 30,43, 69, 148, 184
workplace violence, 16, 185
~ynn, Kevin, 11

zealot, 15

 

198,212,229,230,231
liability, 17,234,241,245
medical, 149, 171

medical concerns,S, 21, 61, 70, 120,

175,184,219,254

meetings, 18,37,43,47,66,69,237
11erico, 13, 146, 168

motorcade, 40, 45, 91, 95, 114
murder, 14, 18,21,80, 116, 146, 186,

193,232

Nixon, Richard 11., 40, 45, 92
occupational risk, 60, 186

office, 6, 16, 101, 105, 106, 140, 198,
237

Overseas Security Advisory Council

(OSAC), 179, 226

parking, 65, 70, 74,124,143
passport, 148, 152, 157, 163,254
Peres, Shimon, 24

performance handling (of car), 95
personal safety or security, xiii, xvii,

28, 149, 168
Peru, 110, 146
Pettit & Martin, 17

physical security, 111, 133, 137, 143,
186,211,218

prevention, 2, 21, 40,44, 52,68,86,
108,109,117,123,133,160,166,
175,184,211,258

principles of protection, 27

privacy, 139, 149, 164, 177,229
procedures, importance of, 109, 125,

130,159,241

profile (of suspects), 194

profile, keeping low, 11, 65, 107,
154,168,177

protective intelligence, 3, 63
Protective Service Alliance (PSA),

226

protester, xiv, 18,47,86, 106, 144
psychology, 186, 191, 194

Rabin, Yitzhak, 24, 44

radio, 18,32,42,76,95, 130, 136,
160,165,176,183,237,239,252
ramming (cars), 53, 81, 84, 89, 101
ransom,S, 11, 13, 168

 

Reagan, Ronald, 30, 41, 53
Red Brigade, viii

relationship (between agent and

principal), 35, 46, 47, 58, 243, 256
reservations, making, 148, 149

Reso, Sidney, 23

resorts, 146, 149, 163, 175
resources, protection, xv, 2, 25, 29,

37,50,64,84,184,220,221,223,
225,236,240

restaurant, 19,47,62,65,75,164,
180

resume, 251, 254

rings of protection, 45, 52, 108, 111,

124, 133, 143,211

risk analysis, xvi, 3, 4, 10, 15,25,63
Rote Armee Fraktion, 8

route security, 45, 61, 70, 75, 89, 90,
93, 104

safe room, 137, 144, 219

schools, 96, 184,225,245,246,247,
254,259

Seale, Arthur, 24

security (equipment, systems), 24, 66,
112,133,135,138,143,160,163,
225

security engineering, 111, 133
service (aspect of EP), 58, 89,253
shooting from car, 91, 104

signal (silent, subtle), 31, 47, 48, 216
smoke mask, 29, 42, 76, 118, 137,

150,166,167
smoking, 37, 85,253
sound off, 54

spouse, 6, 16, 123,258
stalker, 14, 114, 115
street violence, 13, 15
suicide, 23, 119, 196,204

Sun Tzu, xiv, xv, xviii, 25, 35, 40, 46,
56,61,144,185,233,260
surveillance, electronic, 113, 179
surveillance, nonelectronic, 50, 52,
86,93,113,134

technical surveillance
countermeasures (TSC11), 179,
220,236

267