PAGE-2 | ICPS

He who exercises no forethought but makes fight
of his opponents is sure to be captured i?Y them.

Sun Tzu

Chapter 4
The Advance

The opponents of which Sun Tzu speaks need not be people
only-they can be circumstances, logistics, and physical condi-
tions. To enter a situation blindly, to move the principal from a
safe position to a position where safety is unknown, is to take un-
necessary risk. The alternative to proceeding with uncertainty is to
undertake an executive protection practice know as the advance
survey, or the advance.

What is an advance? Its definition is the totality of an EP spe-
cialist’s efforts to learn about an executive’s route and destination
and all the details that affect the trip and the stay. Its practical effect
is a preemptive strike against confusion and exposure. Advance work re-
quires that a member of the protection team actually go to the desti-
nation and prepare the way. However, advance work does not apply
solely to long-distance travel. Any location that the client intends to
visit should be advanced–even if it’s just across the street. An
agent who has done a proper advance has a much better chance of
keeping his protectee-and himself–out of trouble. Further, when
a threatening event occurs, he knows how to remove the client from
the situation, whom to summon for help, and where to get medical
or any other type of assistance, depending on the situation.

Experienced EP specialists strongly emphasize the importance
of advance work. When two protective agents are available, it is
almost always best to assign one to conduct an advance and one to
accompany the principal, as opposed to assigning both to accom-
pany the principal. Advance work is that important.

Besides its direct importance in accomplishing the protective
mission, advance work has a side benefit-client appeal. While
some aspects of protective service may occasionally seem burden-
some or costly to clients, advance work is a client pleaser. Why?
Advance work saves the client time and trouble. A well-done ad-
vance saves the client from the annoyance of driving around
searching for the hotel, looking for a parking space, waiting to
check in, finding the hotel room, determining whether room serv-
ice is open, entering an auditorium through the wrong door, look-
ing around for the correct seat on the dais, enduring airport cus-
toms lines, waiting for tables at restaurants, etc. Being spared
those annoyances makes the client’s life more enjoyable, reduces
his exposure to threats, and frees him to work more or relax more.
Increasing the client’s available working time is an especially im-
portant cost justification in private sector protection.

A case in point comes from the British gossip magazine The
Tattler. Describing recent VIP sightings on the island of St.
Barthelemy in the French Antilles, the editor writes: 31

During dinner at Maya’s, the island’s most branche res-

taurant, the talk was of recent visitors such as Giorgio
Armani, Romeo Gigli, and a contingent of rich, young

Italians; … Brad Pitt and Gwyneth Paltrow, who were sur-
reptitiously photographed starkers by paparazzi lurking in

the hills near the exclusive hotel Le Toiny; and [well-to-

do executive Mr. x. .. ], who came with his wife and a man

called Bob. This Bob arrived everywhere in advance of

his boss, surveyed restaurants, and placed all of [Mr. X’s]

orders. Then there was the embattled TV chat-show host

David Letterman, who stayed shut up in his villa like a

ghost in the fame machine, making it clear what he needs

next Christmas: a Bob of his own.

31 Michael Gross, The Tatler,January 1996, p. 104.

The evangelist Matthew, quoting Isaiah, wrote, “Prepare a way
for the Lord, make his paths straight.”32 No one should grant
executives divine status, but it is a time-honored practice to labor
to make an important person’s journey and visit go as smoothly
as possible-to “let every valley be filled in, every mountain and
hill be laid low.”33 Advance work-a key part of facilitation-is
a very valuable service that the EP specialist can provide his cli-
ent.

The advance has many parallels in other realms of life. If an ex-
ecutive’s overseas business trip is the EP specialist’s exam, then
advance work is a semester of diligent study (not all-night cram-
ming). If the trip is a play, advance work is rehearsal. If the trip is
a leap, advance work is the “look before.” Most simply, conduct-
ing advance work is like turning on the lights before entering a
room.

Protective Intelligence

Chapter 1, Threat Assessment, distinguished between risk analysis
and protective intelligence. The former is more general, looking at
types of threats and the risks they pose to the client, whereas the
latter is more specific, examining the details of a particular trip or
activity. Further, risk analysis focuses on the client (who he is,
who wants to attack him), while protective intelligence focuses on
the client’s immediate surroundings and imminent circumstances.
To clarify the relationship, then, risk analysis and protective intelli-
gence gathering are the two legs on which a protective effort
stands, and advance work is the most important means of gather-
ing protective intelligence.

The difficulty of obtaining reliable intelligence about potential
adversaries and about the principal’s destination and all the cir-
cumstances and conditions between the departure and arrival
points is enormous. Here the military strategist Karl von
Clausewitz, who wrote at the beginning of the 19th century, has
much to offer: “Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory;

32 Mt. 3:3; Is. 40:3.
33 Is. 40:4.

even more are false, and most are uncertain.”34 He also observes,
“The textbooks agree, of course, that we should only believe reli-
able intelligence, and should never cease to be suspicious, but what
is the use of such feeble maxims?”35 There are only two ways in
which an EP specialist can confidently obtain reliable information:
(1) developing it himself, firsthand, or (2) using known, trusted
members of his resource network-that is, people who live and
work in the area to be visited and who are aware of the general
goals of protective operations. Generic information about the site,
gathered from a book or from phone chats with casual contacts
who are not committed to the protective effort, is not good
enough. What’s needed is an actual, physical advance.

With the advance knowledge that comes from gathering pro-
tective intelligence, the EP specialist can greatly reduce the number
of surprises he encounters and the number of opportunities to
make a mistake. In theory, moving an executive from Point A to
Point B is easy; in practice it is not. Here again Clausewitz’s expe-
rience in war highlights the challenge: 36

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing
is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by pro-
ducing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one
has experienced war. Imagine a traveler who late in the
day decides to cover two more stages before nightfall.
Only four or five hours more, on a paved highway with
relays of horses: it should be an easy trip. But at the
next station he finds no fresh horses, or only poor ones;
the country grows hilly, the road bad, night falls, and fi-

nally after many difficulties he is only too glad to reach a
resting place with any kind of primitive accommodation.
It is much the same in war. Countless minor inci-
dents-the kind you can never really foresee-combine
to lower the general level of performance, so that one
always falls far short of the intended goal.

34 Karl von Clausewitz, On War (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.
117.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., p. 119.

A proper advance reduces this phenomenon of countless little
difficulties by endeavoring to eliminate most of them in advance.
Von Clausewitz call the phenomenon “friction.” Advance work,
like “greasing the skids,” reduces that friction.

Principles of Advance Work

Like other forms of intelligence gathering, protective intelligence
gathering is heavy on the details. Hundreds, if not thousands, of
little facts must be uncovered and then stored in the protective
agent’s mind and archives.

The types of data to collect for various types of advances will be
listed in some detail below; it is enough right now to say that the
scope of data collection can seem staggering-and perhaps ri-
diculous-unless the purpose is understood. Here is an example,
borrowed from specialists in advance work, of the types of infor-
mation an advance agent should gather before a principal under-
takes the simple act of going out to eat at a restaurant: date and
time of survey; survey preparer; directions to restaurant; whether
reservations are required; restaurant’s name, address, telephone
number, and fax number; name of manager and maitre d’; en-
trances and exits, including emergency exits; location of rest
rooms; location of telephones; seating arrangements (convenient
and safe for both client and agent; examination of where other
high-profile clientele are typically seated); seating capacity; menu
and wine list; quality of service; dress code; methods of payment
and arrangements to have check paid by agent; availability of pri-
vate rooms; availability of smoking and nonsmoking sections;
parking arrangements (valet, self, or street); other events the res-
taurant is planning on the day of the client’s visit; and name, ad-
dress, and telephone number of nearest rescue squad, hospital, and
police department.F

Is that level of information-gathering really necessary? Won’t the
client end up hemmed in by it? The answers are yes and no, respec-
tively, as an understanding of the reasons for advance work will show.

37 Jerry Glazebrook and Larry Nicholson, Executive Protection Specialist Handbook
(Kansas City: Varro Press, 1994), pp. 49-50.

The major reasons for conducting an advance are these:

to reduce the principal’s exposure
to establish a safe area for him
to preserve his valuable time for more important mat-
ters

A good advance reduces the principal’s exposure by smoothing logis-
tics. If, as mentioned earlier, hotel check-in, billing, baggage han-
dling, parking, and other matters are worked out by the advance
agent, then the client can exit his car at the hotel’s front door, walk
straight through the lobby to the elevators, and arrive quickly at his
room. Similarly, if an advance agent has scouted out the route to
the client’s speaking engagement and properly studied the meeting
location, then the agent accompanying the client can lead him into
the building through a side door if that is necessary to avoid a
hostile crowd at the front door or can take different steps to avoid
other unfavorable conditions or circumstances, as recommended
by the advance agent. Obviously, these improvements over flying
blind keep the principal out of many potentially undesirable en-
counters and conditions.

A good advance establishes a sqfe area before the client arrives at a
new location. In the hotel example, the advance agent reconnoi-
ters the hotel in general and the principal’s room in particular,
working through a security checklist to make sure nothing is for-
gotten, in order to ensure a safe haven before the principal ever
sets foot inside the hotel. In the speaking engagement example,
the advance agent creates or ensures a security zone-the dais,

perhaps-by checking for hazards, obstacles, and inconveniences,
and removing or working around them, before the client arrives.

A contemporary principle of public safety states that, at least for
persons who are not poor, and despite the dangers that lurk on the
streets, safe movement is achieved by moving from one private,
secured zone or bubble to the next-rather than relying on the
forces of law and order to make entire cities safe. For example, a
woman leaves her home (which is protected by a security system)
in a locked car, drives through the guarded gate at the entrance to
her subdivision, travels the highways without opening her car’s

windows, and parks in her company’s guarded garage. If her car
breaks down en route, she uses her cellular phone to call her
automobile club. That principle is congruent with executive pro-
tection, and diligent advance work reduces even further the risks
involved by working to eliminate identifiable risks en route and at
the destination before the client gets there.

To the extent possible, executive protection keeps the principal
in a protective bubble. The bubble is flexible and transparent, but
it is still the primary safety zone. Travel, movement, activities-
these are instances where the principal may not be able to be kept
in that bubble. Therefore, careful EP specialists minimize the time
he spends outside the bubble. They do so by not leaving him
standing around in unsecured areas and by preparing a suitable se-
curity bubble at his destination.

A good advance preserves the client’s valuable time by eliminating
unnecessary waiting time. In the hotel example, the client has no
need to stand at the front desk while hotel staffers process his pa-
perwork. In the speaking engagement example, his driver will de-
tour around the traffic jam that the advance agent has warned
about and spare the client the annoyance of being stuck in a car for
hours. In both cases, aside from the benefits to safety, the ad-
vance work has saved the protectee time and relieved him of an-
noying, costly distraction.

The examples above show that, to answer the questions above,
yes, this level of information gathering really is necessary. There’s
no way to gain the potential benefits of advance work without
conducting a detailed advance. And, no, the client doesn’t end up
hemmed in by the extensive research that an advance requires. On
the contrary, advance work liberates him by speeding him con-
veniently through the world.

A further question arises, however: doesn’t all this advance
work take too much time and effort? Here the answer is no.
There’s no denying that it takes some time and effort. However,
it’s not too much time and effort for two reasons: the benefits
outweigh the costs, and over time the advance effort can be
streamlined by the advance agent’s general experience, by his fa-
miliarity with the sites to be visited, and by the notes kept from

earlier visits to those sites. Those notes, in fact, are so valuable
that every protective operation should establish a formal advance
file, where advance surveys and follow-up notes from previous
trips can be stored for future reference.

How to Perform an Advance

Although the specific bits of data that the advance agent must ob-
tain differ depending on whether he is advancing a hotel stay, an
out-of-town trip, local travel, or any other activity of the client, the
general method is the same. First of all, the agent needs a few
things before beginning the advance. He needs an energetic, in-
quisitive, and persistent disposition. At the advance site, the agent
cannot count on the local contact to point out all potential hazards
and gather all the information the advance agent needs. Rather,
the agent needs to reach out, ask questions, clarify vague answers,
and speculate about potential problems and solutions, handling
matters professionally but firmly. The whole point is to resolve
uncertainties, prevent logistical difficulties, and preempt hazards
before the principal arrives. The benefit of an advance is lost if the
agent, in response to lack of cooperation from hotel staff, says to
himself, “Well, we’ll just worry about that later. There probably
won’t be any problems.”

Before actually going to the site, the advance agent should have
a copy of or knowledge of the principal’s schedule for the day he
will be visiting; background materials concerning the scheduled
movement, such as copies of letters of invitation, copies of RSVP
letters from the principal, maps provided by the host, admission
cards or tickets, itineraries, and any other relevant pieces of infor-
mation; previous advance sheets that were completed and flied for
the same location; and the name of the contact person on-site. It
may also be useful to bring along a Polaroid camera to photograph
any unusual features of the location so the principal and protective
staff will have no surprises.

Once he has collected those materials, the advance agent should
telephone the site contact person and arrange a meeting. That
way, the agent can be sure to be able to meet with someone who

has the authority and knowledge to help him with the necessary
arrangements. Much time is likely to be wasted if the agent simply
shows up at a hotel with a list of special requests-and no one is
able to help him. On arriving at the site, the agent should intro-
duce himself to the contact person, reiterate the need for his visit,
hand the contact person a business card to make subsequent
communications easier, and set to work.

Typically, an advance agent works from a checklist. Checklists
are important, in fact probably necessary; however, they are only
tools in advance work and are not the whole of the process. An
agent might wish to use a checklist as a starting point or as a wrap-
up, the idea being to make sure no obvious points were over-
looked. But the entire time the agent is working to complete the
checklist, he should be envisioning the principal’s arrival, stay, and
departure and asking ”What if?” Checklists help an agent remem-
ber, but they don’t substitute for judgment.

The ”What if?” process is central to thinking universally about
the protective environment. It is an especially important mental ex-
ercise for the beginning protective specialist, who will find himself
asking the question more often than a veteran agent, for whom
many of the answers to the ”What if’ questions are already a part of
his mental landscape. As in any profession, experience replaces the
need to question everything all the time with a confidence and cer-
tainty born of having done all this before. Nevertheless, most vet-
eran advance people still use the ”What if?” scenario as a funda-
mental method to close the gaps that inevitably open.

Advance Work in Various Settings

Executive protection in each of the following situations consists of
advance work, on-site protection, and follow-up activities. This
chapter discusses the advance and follow-up work that must be
done for each situation; later chapters discuss on-site protection.

Speeches, meetings, luncheons, and social functions
Anytime the principal must make or attend a speech, conduct or
attend a major meeting, or participate in a luncheon, the agent

should look at it as a venture into the unknown. What are the
building and the general site like? How do we get in and out?
Who is attending the event? What activities are planned? What
resources (restrooms, telephones, medical help, police response)
are available at the site? Adventures into unknown territory may
be exciting for explorers and tourists, but for EP specialists the
unknown is something to avoid. Therefore, if it is at all possible to
send an advance agent to survey the location personally, it should
be done. Ideally, the advance person would use a map to plot the
various routes that could be taken to the site and then actually
drive them at the maximum legal speed, writing down the elapsed
time between major checkpoints. He would then examine the en-
trances and exits at the site, looking for choke points, hazards, and
other relevant conditions and analyzing their proximity to the
parking area.

The agent would also find out who works in the building, who
owns it, what goes on in any vacant parts of the building, what the
parking options are, what potential hazards might be encountered
in the neighborhood of the site, whether IDs or access passes are
required for entrance, whom to contact for coordination with any
private security staff on-site, whether firearms may be brought into
the building by the principal’s protective staff or other visitors to
the building, ete. The agent should also, shortly before the sched-
uled visit, ask utility companies about any work planned during the
time of travel or visit and check with the police about any sched-
uled parades or fairs that might interfere with travel.

Of course, a certain amount of discretion is required during all
this information-gathering-it would be counterproductive to give
absolutely everyone advance knowledge that a VIP is coming to
the site on a certain date at a certain time. Moreover, the advance
agent needs to display an appropriate demeanor. Unless he is a
law enforcement officer, his only authority rests on the reputation
or notoriety of his principal and on the agent’s own way with peo-
ple. While most people want to cooperate in an effort to keep a
VIP secure, many may never even have heard of a particular prin-
cipal. Therefore, a degree of friendly persuasion and salesmanship
is essential. The agent must not bully his way through an advance,

for his actions will reflect on the principal. Willing cooperation is
the goal.

The agent can then return to home base and share his findings
with the other protective agents. When it is time to take the prin-
cipal to the site, the advance agent can take one of three positions:
(1) accompanying the protection team in transit, (2) preceding the
team by just enough of a margin that he can warn them of hazards
they are approaching (traffic jams, road construction, protest
marches, etc.), or (3) awaiting the team at the meeting site. The
third option is by far the best. Truly, the advance is so important
that it must be conducted no matter what, even on short notice, in
which case the second option above might be all that is feasible.

If only one agent protects a principal, it may not possible for
that agent to conduct the advance himself. Doing so might mean
leaving the principal unprotected for too long. In that case, it may
be possible for the EP specialist to hire out the advance work to a
trusted freelancer. A less desirable alternative is to use the tele-
phone to contact a site manager and discuss the protective effort’s
needs-a lot can be accomplished that way.

Commuting and pedestrian travel

The advance work that affects regular commuting by automobile
and such pedestrian excursions as after-dinner walks or fitness
running consists of actually traversing the routes to be traveled.
Although they may cover familiar ground, regular routes must be
reconnoitered thoroughly and routinely because they account for
the majority of most clients’ travel time. At a minimum, several
alternative commuting routes will be continually scrutinized and
contingency plans drawn up for potential emergencies en route.
Ideally, an advance agent would drive the route, preceding the
principal’s car by several minutes so that he could warn of any
problems along the way.

Among the less obvious matters to check out on an advance are
the traffic levels at different times of day and different days of the
week; scheduled drawbridge openings (and contacts for how to find
out about unscheduled ones); railroad crossings that could hold up
the client’s drive; and, overseas, what official detour signs look like.

Out-of-town travel

Overseas travel presents probably the greatest challenge to an ad-
vance agent. Even domestic out-of-town travel is challenging to
advance properly. Details about an agent’s own city or country
may come naturally (where’s the airport, what’s a good hospital),
but similar information about other locales must be earned, some-
times with difficulty. Additional hurdles exist when the destination
is in a foreign country, where differences in language, laws, and
customs may present significant barriers to the advance agent’s
research and understanding.

Although the labor involved in properly advancing an overseas
trip may be formidable, at least the facts learned serve a dual pur-
pose. They help the executive protection staff protect the princi-
pal, and they give the principal a familiarity with the destination
that may help him in his dealings there.

The actual advance for an overseas trip consists of the specific ar-
rangements for the topics discussed above: meeting rooms, restau-
rants, offices, hotels, automobiles, airports, airplanes, etc. What is
different about advance work for an overseas trip is the need to de-
velop a portfolio of country-specific information. Sometimes called
the “pre-advance” to distinguish it from the on-site practice runs that
constitute a real advance, that portfolio becomes a tool for the protec-
tion team and can be used to brief the principal on what to expect.

The portfolio covers such topics as these: country’s physical
characteristics, natural resources, relationship to U.S., capsule his-
tory, religious practices, language, local customs and laws, women’s
concerns (modesty and restrictions on movement), political parties,
major allies, sources of foreign aid, practice of spying on visitors;
visa requirements; inoculation requirements; sanitation and hy-
giene; English-speaking doctors who were trained in the U.S., Brit-
ain, or other countries with high medical training standards; money
exchange; in-country availability of special medications (especially
any controlled substances, which should not ordinarily be trans-
ported abroad); medical evacuation arrangements and contacts;
special sensitivity about cameras; emergency contacts (embassy,
consulate, hospitals); terrorist groups active there; and local crime.

Other matters the EP specialist should research include these:
weather; terrain; accommodating special interests of the principal
(such as golf or tennis); political problems, strikes, political an-
niversaries (may be occasions for terrorist activity or riots); and
holidays. These portfolio items can be learned through research
with the u.s. federal government, in-country contact persons, li-
braries, on-line sources, or intelligence firms that specialize in pro-
viding broad-based country briefings.

Advance work regarding hotels, airports and airplanes (whether
private or commercial), and chauffeur services tends to cluster
around out-of-town travel. Although much work must still be
done after the principal arrives at or begins to use those facilities,
much must also be performed in advance.

Hotels. The hotel advance is vitally important. Because the
executive will eat and sleep there, security at the hotel must be as
good as security at the executive’s home. Because he may well
conduct business there, security must be as good as the security at
the executive’s office. But several factors combine to make hotel
security especially challenging:

Hotels are much less private than residences and of-
Word of the principal’s impending visit may very easily
leak out.
The principal’s protective staff has much less control
over a hotel environment than it does over his home or

The extensive on-site measures that must be taken to ensure se-
curity at hotels are discussed in Chapter 7. The advance work that
must be done before a protective team brings its principal to stay
at a hotel is equally extensive. It would take several pages to list
everything an advance agent must do to prepare the way for his
principal’s hotel stay. For a fuller presentation of the key points of
advances in a wide range of settings, it is more efficient to read a
book like the Executive Protection Specialist Handbook by Jerry Glaze-
brook and Larry Nicholson (Shawnee Mission, Kansas: Varro
Press, 1994).

The following is a list of only the major categories of tasks, in-
cluding information-gathering, meetings, and physical inspections:
before visiting, gather all available facts about the hotel, dates of
visit, and key contact persons, and bring along a still or video cam-
era; once there, meet with the manager to make special arrange-
ments and obtain names of secondary contacts (bell captain, maitre
d’, etc.); meet with director of security, doorman, bell captain,
maitre d’, valet parking manager, and others at same time of day at
which principal will be arriving (and make sure those same people
will be on duty when the principal arrives); conduct physical in-
spection of hotel layout and safety features; determine range of
services offered by hotel; gather information about hotel restaurant
and recreational facilities; and determine location and phone num-
bers of nearest fire department, police department, and rescue
squad.

After all that, here’s the punchline: a thorough protective team
advances two hotels in each city to be visited-in case one suddenly
becomes unavailable (due to fire) or unsuitable (due to changed
conditions in the area around the hotel, such as civic unrest). Note
that the hotel work just described applies only to the advance;
much more remains to be done once the principal arrives.

Commercial Airports and Aircraft. A number of arrange-
ments can be made in advance that will smooth the principal’s air
travel and reduce his exposure to risk. The advance agent should,
for example, make arrangements for special parking as close as
possible to the passenger screening checkpoint, so that the princi-
pal will have minimal exposure to other passengers on his way to
the gate. The agent can also make arrangements for the principal
to stay in the VIP lounge associated with the airline being used.
Such lounges, located on the secure side of the screening check-
point, provide a safe, comfortable, and relatively controllable area
in which to await the flight.

The advance agent can also make arrangements for the principal
to board the aircraft according to the method the protection team
thinks most suitable. One option is to board first, thereby avoiding
the crush of other passengers at the entrance to the J etway. Another
option is to board last so that the minimum number of passengers

will pass by and notice the principal on the way to their seats.
Whichever method the protection team chooses, these arrangements
are best made in advance with a flight services representative.

Other matters for the advance agent to investigate are the obvi-
ous ones, such as the airport’s exits, resources in case of emer-
gency, and availability and location of facilities that the principal
may wish to use (telephones, fax machines, computers, restaurants,
book shops, etc.). It is a good idea to contact airport police or se-
curity staff for special assistance before arriving at the airport. As
in the discussion of hotel advances, much remains to be done once
the principal arrives at the airport and while he is in transit. That
subject, too, is discussed in Chapter 7.

Scenario: A Well-Advanced Excursion

When all advance work has been performed properly, the trip
should run as smoothly as a well-rehearsed play. Uncertainty and
wasted time are reduced to a minimum. A well-advanced trip might
run something like this example from the author’s experience:

In February 1990, I undertook a protection assignment
with another EP specialist, Gordon Baer. We were
awaiting the arrival of a principal from Europe who was
attending a major equestrian event in Tampa. The client
was staying at the Wyndham Harbor Island Hotel, a four-
star, three-diamond property that sits on the Tampa Bay
waterfront. The 12-story hotel had 300 rooms and all the
amenities of a first-class establishment.

The principal was the type of person who expected
everything to go according to plan and nothing to be
left to chance. Of course, we had no intention of leav-
ing things to chance, and we constantly asked ourselves
the question “What if?” We had worked together for
years and were concentrating on the details, both
checking and rechecking our advance. First, we com-
pleted the advance on the private air terminal at Tampa
International Airport; we ran the primary and secondary
routes; and we knew most of the choke points between
the airport, hotel, equestrian event, and restaurants that
we might be using during the principal’s stay.

We then concentrated on the hotel. We reserved
parking spaces for the principal’s car and our follow-up
vehicle. We walked all the corridors, located the fire exits,
and determined the type of fire suppression equipment in
use at the hotel. We met with the in-house security per-
sonnel and walked the outside grounds.

The principal arrived by private aircraft. After he
cleared U.S. customs, we did our normal ramp-side
pickup and proceeded to the hotel. We has already reg-
istered the principal into his room, so we took him di-
rectly to the 12th floor executive suite. He was tired
from his overseas travel and decided to stay in after or-
dering room service. Everything had gone as planned.

Next to the principal’s bed we had placed two smoke
masks, a panic alarm that was connected directly to my
room, a 3xS card that gave our room numbers, hotel se-
curity’s phone number, and instructions for interna-
tional dialing. A flashlight sat next to those items, along
with a small “fire bag” containing duct tape, a cutting
tool, directions on how to survive a hotel fire, and a
plan of escape in case we were unable to reach the prin-
cipal. Such items are routine for our clients.

We rechecked our security brief for the next day’s ac-
tivities and ate dinner in our rooms. My room was adja-
cent to the client’s, and Gordon’s was across from mine.
As in the principal’s room, in our rooms we had laid out
emergency equipment at bedside. For each of us, that
equipment included clothes, a portable telephone, a
portable radio, a fire bag, a smoke mask, a map of
emergency exits, a key to the principal’s room, and a key
to the other EP specialist’s room. We wrapped for the
evening about 10 minutes past midnight. The principal
had arranged a 7:00 am wake-up call, and we planned to
be moving by 6:00 am.

At exactly 3:07 am I was awakened by the P A system,
blaring that there was an emergency in the hotel and
that we should proceed calmly to the fire exits.
(Remaining calm takes work-this is the moment when
all your homework and training payoff.) I jumped into
my clothes, grabbed my equipment, and summoned

Gordon on the portable radio. He was already in the
hallway. Before I went out of my room, I grabbed the
doorknob to see whether it was hot; it wasn’t, so I
cracked the door open and smelled for smoke. Since
there wasn’t any, I opened the door fully and saw that
the hall seemed to be free of fire and smoke. To add to
the excitement, the alarm kept sounding and the hallway
lights were flashing on and off.

We proceeded to the principal’s door, knocked, and an-
nounced ourselves. We opened the door with one of our
duplicate keys and saw the principal in his bathrobe,
standing by. We took our equipment and his fire bag,
smoke mask, and briefcase, and proceeded out of the
room. We went directly to the fire exit. After checking the
door for heat, we began to descend the stairs. I saw only
one resident look out his doorway to see what was the
matter, and we were already on our way out of the hotel.

As we reached the 10^th floor, we heard an announce-
ment stating that it had been a false alarm and we could
return to our rooms. I made the decision to continue
down and out until we could verify the hotel’s condi-
tion. That type of decision is a judgment call; I wanted
the principal outside until I could make sure the envi-
ronment was safe.

Once we were outside the hotel and at the sidewalk,
we could hear fire equipment racing to the site. Gordon
verified that it was a false alarm; some kids at a bachelor
party had set off the water sprinkler on the ninth floor
and sounded the alarm.

This incident was a false alarm, but it proved a good test of the
advance work and training. The protection specialists knew where
to go and what to do; they hadn’t slipped away for a nightcap and
left the principal unattended; and even though they were asleep,
they were ready.

Follow-up Work

Earlier, this chapter asked whether conducting detailed advances is
simply too much work. Two reasons were given for why it is not

too much work. The first, that the benefits outweigh the costs,
should be clear now. Proper advance work significandy improves
the principal’s security posture, eases his travels, and spares him
much time that would otherwise be wasted. The second reason was
that over time the advance effort can be streamlined by the advance
agent’s general experience, by his familiarity with the sites to be vis-
ited, and by the notes kept from earlier visits to those sites. That is
where diligent follow-up, or post-advance work, pays dividends.

After a trip, the advance agent should compile a report of perti-
nent facts he may be able to use again. The follow-up report should
note the dates of the trip, destination, purpose of trip, names of se-
curity personnel who were involved, ground and air transportation
details with contact names and numbers, problems encountered,
principals involved, lodging details and contacts, emergency phone
numbers, maps and site surveys, and weather experienced.

One more follow-up duty remains. The agent should take care
to thank the many contacts who helped him on the trip. Besides
being a sign of good manners, which will reflect well on the prin-
cipal, thank-you notes or letters pave the way for future coopera-
tion and assistance. An EP specialist who protects a celebrity
might arrange for autographed photos to be sent to persons-such
as drivers, hotel staff, or airline personnel-who helped during the
advance work and the actual trip. In other cases, thank-you letters
signed by the principal work well.

Think how different it is to be greeted at your destination by
someone who knows his way around than it is to stumble around
unfamiliar territory on your own. That advantage is what an ad-
vance agent can do for a protective operation. Doing something
for the first time is always difficult and uncertain. Fortunately, for
a principal whose protective staff has done the proper advance
work, no time is the first time.

Again, advance work is the equivalent of sending someone
ahead to light the lamps. It is one more way in which an EP spe-
cialist reduces the unknown. As Samuel Johnson wrote, “He is no
wise man who will quit a certainty for an uncertainty.”38

38 Samuel Johnson, The Idler (1758).

By altering his arrangements and changing his
plans, the skil!ful general keeps the enemy
without definite knowledge. By shifting his
camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents
the enemy from anticipating his purpose.

Sun Tzu

Chapter 5
Automobile Security

It’s the rare executive who doesn’t spend a good deal of time in
cars-whether his own, his corporation’s, or a transportation
company’s. He may commute to an office; travel to airports; ride
to meetings and other business activities; and then, after work,
motor to social events. During all those expeditions, the executive
faces a much higher risk of attack or injury than he does in the of-
fice or at home. Not only are accident rates surprisingly high, but
most deliberate attacks on protectees occur during transporta-
tion-typically car travel. The amount of time the client spends in
cars dictates the EP specialist’s concern for a pleasant, productive
ride for the client. The exposure to various dangers dictates the EP
specialist’s concern for a safe and secure ride for the client. There-
fore, the intelligent management of auto travel is one of an EP
specialist’s larger responsibilities.

Why make a fuss about car travel? Isn’t driving an ordinary,
everyday activity? Yes, but it’s an ordinary, everyday-and usually
unavoidable-activity that is much more dangerous than one cares

to admit. In 1994, motor vehicle accidents resulted in deaths at a
rate of 16.5 per 100,000 population.” equating to 43,000 deaths.
That’s roughly twice the homicide rate. Moreover, those figures
do not include the 2.1 million disabling injuries from motor vehi-
cle crashes. By contrast, fire, another familiar danger, caused death
at a rate of 1.6 per 100,000-only one-tenth the rate of deaths at-
tributable to car crashes. The major diseases present greater risks
than auto travel, but EP specialists have little control over those
risks. Among all non-disease causes of death, both intentional
(homicide) and unintentional (various types of accidents), motor
vehicle crashes present by far the greatest risk.

The other risk faced during driving-that related to the princi-
pal’s exposure to attack-is worth examining also. One source
found, using a proprietary data base, that 37 percent of terrorist
attacks against principals were waged while the victims were in
their vehicles.i” As Chapter 1, Threat Assessment, points out, not
every principal is a likely target of terrorism. But add to that dan-
ger the threat of carjacking, random gunfire, criminal opportunity,
and bombing, and motor vehicle travel becomes a risk factor
worth some thoughtful countermeasures.

For an executive, what is a car? What are its purposes? Obvi-
ously, it’s a means of transportation. It’s also, for some clients, an
office, a social setting, a sleeping compartment, and a living room.
For the EP specialist, therefore, the car is both a zone that needs
protecting and, fortunately, a protective device in itself. This
chapter examines the many responsibilities an EP specialist has in
relation to that multipurpose device, the car.

Selecting a Car

Before comfort control, route security, performance driving, and
emergency response, there is, at bottom, the car itself. In what
kind of automobile should the principal be transported? If the
principal regularly travels in his own vehicle, the EP specialist may

39 Accident Facts (Itaska, IIl.: National Safety Council, 1995), p. 2.

40 Anthony Scotti, in R. L. Oatman, Executive Protection Resource Manual (Towson,
Md.: R. L. Oatman & Associates, Inc., 1995), Ch. 1, p. 2.

not have much influence over the type of car chosen. If a com-
pany car has already been purchased, the same may be true. But
when the agent does have a say in vehicle selection-for example,
when the principal or his company is preparing to buy a new car or
when the protective operation rents a car for use out of town-
there are a few factors to consider.

For the most part, big is good, up to a limit. A large car pro-

vides several advantages:

a high degree of riding comfort
generous interior space
great protective bulk
a powerful engine

The first characteristic allows the principal to work or rest in the
vehicle. The latter three characteristics provide definite protective
advantages. Space gives the agent a place to push the client to (the
floor) in case of an attack and allows other agents room in which
to scramble or, in extreme cases, room from which to fire weap-
ons. Bulk increases bumping and ramming ability and provides
greater mass for crash protection, and a powerful engine, obvi-
ously, improves getaway ability.

Any car chosen should also have several convenience and safety
features that double as security features: electric locks, electric
windows, anti-lock brakes, locking gas cap, mobile phone, and an
exhaust pipe protected at the end with a screen or other device to
prevent deliberate clogging from the outside. The car should also
have an alarm system.

Another device to consider is one of the new emergency re-
sponse systems that summon help and pinpoint the car’s location
for responders by use of a global positioning system (GPS) and
cellular telephones.” Some of these systems, which include panic
alarms, theft protection, local navigation, and on-line tracking and
assistance, may be of more use to an executive who insists on trav-
eling alone than to a full-fledged executive protection team.

41 One example is the ADT Security Services, Inc., cellular/GPS car security
system, which provides car tracking, theft protection, emergency police notification,
and other assistance. ADT can be reached at (561) 988-3600.

Also potentially useful is a system for starting the car from a
distance. One such system provides a remote control device that
can be used to start the car’s engine, turn on its lights, and activate
various accessories (such as the heater, air conditioning, or radio).
If an explosive device has been set to detonate when the engine is
started or an accessory is activated, it’s certainly better to be
standing at some distance from the car than to be seated in it when
the bomb goes off. 42

Typical car models that many EP specialists prefer include the
Lincoln Town Car, Ford Crown Victoria, Chevrolet Suburban,
Range Rover, Jeeps, and larger BMW and Mercedes models. Use
of such cars as opposed to limousines holds several advantages:
they stand out less, rather than trumpeting the message “Here’s a
juicy target,” and they are much more practical than limos for eva-
sive driving.

For some protectees, armored cars are the best choice. Typically,
such cars are larger production models that have been modified with
various types of reinforcement, shielding, and security features. Also
typically, such cars carry a high price-ranging from $35,000 to
$75,000 or more, plus the cost of the unmodified car itself. Because
of the price, it makes sense to recommend an armored car only if
the threat assessment concludes one is essential. Even if that as-
sessment concludes an armored car is not required for daily use,
however, it behooves the agent to know the facts about such vehi-
cles. Why? If the principal plans to travel to a city or event where
the threat level is unusually high, it might be necessary to use an ar-
mored car temporarily, and the agent has a responsibility to under-
stand all equipment he uses.” If the agent is driving such a car and
an attack begins, he needs to know how much protection the car
gives him, and against which types of weapons; what security fea-
tures (such as run-flat tires) are at his disposal; and how to drive eva-
sively or ram a blockade in such a heavy vehicle.

~2 One such system is the LA–Z-START remote auto starter from C&A Control
Systems, Inc., 4522 Doris Circle, Knoxville, TN 37918. Phone (615) 922-2148.

43 Note that renting an armored car is problematic. Among other reasons,
there’s no way to know whether the armoring still meets the specifications.

An armored car typically provides more than an armored barrier
to gunfire, offering a range of other security features that are just
as important. Armoring consists of supplemental panels in the
doors, roof, and floor and both forward and aft of the passenger
compartment (armoring materials include ballistic aluminum, ce-
ramic composites, and other lightweight, exotic materials); rein-
forced posts, pillars, and rails throughout the car; and specially
laminated glass-and-polycarbonate windshields and windows to
protect the occupants of the car even if the exterior layer of glass is
defeated. (See accompanying exploded diagram of the armoring
for a Chevrolet Suburban.”)

The armoring level is usually rated specifically for the type of
weapon it is designed to resist and the anticipated threat. For ex-
ample, the O’Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt Armoring Company= rates
its vehicles from protection level II, which resists 9 mm, 124 grain,
1,400 foot-per-second handgun and automatic pistol fire, to level
VI, which resists 7.62 mm x 51 mm, 150 grain, 2,625 fps armor-

H From O’Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt Armoring Company, 9113 LeSaint Drive,
Fairfield, OH 45014. (800) 697-0307 .

5 The author, as an executive protection practitioner, has visited the company’s
plant, watched armoring taking place, and observed ballistic testing of the cars-
and thinks the company’s work is the best.

piercing rounds.f (See chart.) Armoring like that adds weight (up
to 2,750 extra pounds), and weight significantly affects how a car
drives. That’s why an EP specialist needs some advance perform-
ance familiarity with such cars.

Levels of Protection
O’Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt Armoring Company

	WeaQon Defeated	Ammunition Defeated
Level II	9mm handgun	9mm by 19
	9mm submachine gun
Level III	.44 magnum handgun	.44 magnum
Level IV	AK-47 assault rifle	7.62mm ball by 39
Level V	M-16 A2	5.56mm by 45
	M-6D machine gun	M8D ball
Level VI	M-60 machine gun	M-61 armor piercing

Other security features, beyond armoring, may include “run-
flat” tires, which have a hard vinyl inner core; a foam-filled, anti-
exploding fuel tank; a steel-reinforced front bumper designed for
ramming; electric dead bolt locks; a dual battery system; an in-
side/ outside intercom; a remote starter; a siren and public address
system; and, for principals who face a high risk of kidnapping, a
device inside the trunk for opening it. Only if the agent knows
what features the car has and understands how to use them can he
make intelligent decisions in a crisis. A protective agent should
always remember the phrase “Use your resources.” If he doesn’t

fully understand those resources, he can’t fully utilize them.

A final note: an armored car buys the executive time but is not a
genuine safe haven. The edge it provides is measured in minutes.
It may withstand a number of shots, but if it is stopped and the
attackers continue to assault it with firearms and sledgehammers,
they will eventually get through. As one auto security expert
writes, “Armored car or no armored car, keep it moving.”47

~6 Product literature, O’Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt. These levels correspond to
levels developed by Underwriters Laboratories.

47 Scotti, in Oatman, Executive Protection Rtsource Manual, Chapter 1, p. 14.

Preparation

The goal of EP transportation operations is fourfold: comfort,
convenience, safety, and security. Comfort enables the principal to
make relaxed use of his time; convenience means meeting the
principal’s schedule; safety means protecting the principal from
accidents; and security means protecting him from deliberate or
random attacks. Attaining those goals requires the correct mix of
the skills and practices that are discussed in the rest of this chapter.

Comfort, convenience, and safety

The goals that are most under the EP specialist’s control are com-
fort and convenience. As a baseline, after which the principal can
announce his own preferences, the agent should see that the radio
is off, the car is not filled with cigarette smoke, the temperature is
set to about 68 degrees, the front seat is moved forward to give the
principal ample leg room, and the car’s interior and exterior are
clean (this last condition also makes it easier to notice signs of
tampering).

The next preparatory steps influence comfort, convenience, and
also safety. The gas tank should be kept full. In the trunk the EP
specialist should keep a box or duffel bag containing a first-aid kit,
roadside reflectors or flares, basic tools, jumper cables, a flashlight,
flat-tire refill spray cans, an escape device that will enable someone
locked in the trunk to get out, and other equipment. The trunk
should also contain a real spare tire, not the miniature type, so the
car can be driven fast and far after a flat has been changed.:” The
car must be in good mechanical order-that’s a comfort, conven-
ience, and safety factor. Therefore, the agent should make sure the
car receives proper maintenance, however that is handled in the
particular circumstances. Further, he needs to make sure he can
properly operate all the car’s features: radio, locks, climate control
system, alarm system, telephone, ete. The agent should read the

48 An alternative is to use a tire like the Goodyear Extended Mobility Tire,
which is rated as being able to operate effectively at an air pressure if zero for 200
miles at 55 miles per hour. Among other advantages, it eliminates the need for a
spare tire, thus freeing up trunk space for other items.

car manufacturer’s manual carefully; Mercedes Benz and BMW
cars can be particularly complex, and some study may be required
to master the intricate systems. The placement of a suction-cup,
convex mirror on the inside of the windshield permits good view-
ing to the rear for an agent seated in the right front seat. Lami-
nated maps, local hospital guides, pens and note paper, a portable
cellular phone, and a list of frequendy called telephone numbers
can also add to safety and convenience.

Security

One further preparatory measure is the bomb search, a major se-
curity factor. Car bombs are a much more likely threat than ter-
rorist ambushes, by far. Though used by terrorists too, car bombs
are also placed by family members of the principal, romantic part-
ners, hit men, organized crime groups, disgrunded employees,
protesters (in extreme cases), and other parties that a principal
might be entangled with. Car bombings are not nearly as rare as
one might hope: FBI data record 314 bomb attacks and attempted
bomb attacks against cars in the United States in 1994.⁴⁹ To put
that figure in perspective, that’s about the same as the number of
bomb attacks against commercial operations and about one-fourth
of the number of attacks against residences.

No passenger car, no matter how well armored, is likely to be
able to withstand a bomb attack. Therefore, the agent must make
sure to prevent such an attack. The two goals are (1) to prevent an
explosive or incendiary device from being placed on or in the car,
or, failing that, (2) to discover any bomb that might have been
placed and keep the principal away from it.

In practice, that means the EP specialist has to search the car
thoroughly anytime it has been out of sight and unguarded. Be-
cause a thorough search is time-consuming, it makes sense to keep
the car in a locked, alarmed garage whenever possible. The idea is
that once the car has been searched, it only stays “sterile” if it is
continuously locked away or kept under surveillance. When the

49 FBI Explosives Unit-Bomb Data Center, General Information Bulletin 95-2:
1994 Bombing Incidents.

car must be exposed, a member of the protection team should
keep a close eye on it-and that cannot be done efficiently from
inside the car. Only by standing outside the car and watching it
can he be sure that vehicle security has not been compromised.

If a potential bomber knows the principal employs a protection
staff, he will certainly take care to conceal any bomb he places.
That, plus the fact that explosive and incendiary devices can take
many appearances, makes the search for bombs a real challenge.
To reduce the difficulty in advance, the agent should keep the car’s
exterior immaculately clean. A clean surface will more readily
show smudges, fingerprints, scratches, and other signs of tamper-
ing. Tampering inside is more evident if the interior, too, is kept
clean and orderly; even air vents should be kept pointing straight
so that any changes will be noticeable. Index marks can be placed
on hubcaps to give evidence as to whether a hubcap has been re-
moved and replaced. Such marks can be made with clear nail pol-
ish or with clear, frangible evidence tape. Talcum power in the
door handle wells reveals evidence of tampering, and clear, 5 x 7
photos of the inside of the engine compartment provide the
searcher with a point of comparison for detecting extra items
among the mass of wires, hoses, belts, and other parts. Coveralls
and gloves make it less unpleasant to crawl under the car and to
reach around in grimy areas there. Finally, a flashlight and tele-
scoping convex mirror provide obvious benefits, and a car-search
checklist, while no substitute for judgment, may keep the agent
from forgetting to search a part of the car.

Once it is time to search, the agent must have some idea what

he is looking for. The bomb probably won’t be a bundle of dyna-
mite sticks taped to a wind-up alarm clock. It could be a watch
attached to something as small as a cigarette pack. It could consist
of a blasting cap (which doesn’t look much different from a piece
of wire) connected to tubes of liquid chemicals, or a plumbing pipe
with both ends capped, or a sheet of light-green linoleum (plastic
explosive), or many other things. It might not even be a bomb
proper-it could be a canister of poison gas, an incendiary device,
or a device that disables the car en route by timer or radio control
to set the occupants up for an ambush.

A good search procedure is this: Without touching the car, scan
its exterior. Look for signs of forced entry; signs of tampering
(fingerprints, scratches, fluids or wire clippings on the ground, ex-
posed or hanging wires); marks around the tires and wheel wells;
and the condition of any index marks or tell-tales (such as frangi-
ble tape) that were placed. Next, inspect the car’s undercarriage,
systematically checking from front to back, and look at the gas-fill
door. Before opening the hood, trunk, or any door, look inside
the cracks for tripwires, then gently slide a folded dollar bill
through those cracks, stopping if the bill catches on anything. On
opening the hood, trunk, or any door, do so slowly, feeling for any
catches or tripwires. Then search the engine compartment and the
trunk.

Move inside and check the doors, door panels, seats, speakers,
dome lights, fuse box, dashboard, vents, ducts, controls, radio,
lighter and ashtray, glove compartment, sun visors, and headrests.
Start the engine and operate the horn, lights, brakes, heater, air
conditioner, power seats, radio, etc. Check the fuel level to see if it
has changed. The search requires concentration and thorough-
ness, but after gaining some experience, a searcher should be able
to perform the task in about 10 minutes.

In the real world, of course, the principal is not going to stand
around while the car is examined bolt by bolt. The detailed car
search just described should be performed at the start of the day or
after the car comes back from being serviced. Periodically
throughout the day, however, the EP specialist should conduct
more cursory searches. As for overnight security, by far the best

procedure is to store the locked, alarmed car in a locked, alarmed
garage.

If, by chance, the agent finds something suspicious, he should
remove the principal from the bomb, not the other way around,
and summon expert help (typically the local police department’s
bomb squad). It is important to stay well away (350 feet or more)
from the suspected bomb, to keep others at a safe distance, too,
and to turn off all cellular phones in the area (they could trigger
the bomb). Bomb experts emphasize that no one should let him-
self be talked into moving, manipulating, or ignoring a bomb.

Moreover, it is foolhardy to assume that because one bomb has
been detected and defused, no other bombs are present.t”

Security en Route

In protection work, one of three persons will drive the car: the
principal, a chauffeur, or an EP specialist. From a security stand-
point, the principal-who may own the car, love the car, and feel
he is entitled to drive the car-really should not drive the car. The
likelihood that he is trained in defensive driving techniques is slim,
and there is no way he can duck for cover while he is at the wheel.
In addition, he has probably not spent time studying alternate
routes, safe havens, and the physics of ramming blockades. Of
course, the principal is the boss, so if he wants to drive, he drives.
Nevertheless, it is a good idea for the EP specialist to emphasize
what a pleasant, useful service it is to be driven by a professional.
He should encourage the client to take the rear seat, sit back, and
enjoy the ride. However, the EP specialist shouldn’t make that
suggestion unless he is certain that he can provide a comfortable
ride. Few things are more irritating to a principal than to be driven
by someone with a spastic foot-to endure the kind of ride that
causes the principal’s head to jerk backward or roll forward with
every touch of the gas or brake. The EP specialist who intends to
drive should get someone to perform a critical evaluation of his
driving-comfort skills.

As for chauffeurs, they are usually trained to provide comfort
and convenience rather than security. If a chauffeur is a perma-
nent part of the protection team, of course, he can be trained in
evasive driving and other security measures. If the EP specialist
has to contract for a chauffeur-for example, in the process of
hiring a car service to transport the principal in another city-it
pays to develop a relationship with a single company in each city

50 A recent example is the bombing of an office building in Atlanta on January
16, 1997. An hour after the first explosion, which occurred inside the building, a
second device exploded in a trash container outside, next to the crowd that had
gathered to see the initial damage. Six people were injured, including a federal
agent investigating the first blast.

and to request the same driver each time, so he can learn what the
EP specialist wants him to do. It is also important to investigate
the chauffeur; he might lack a driver’s license, or he might have a
criminal record.

If it is necessary to hire a chauffeur for out-of-town travel, or if
a chauffeur is a permanent part of the protection team, he should
be trained or at least be given a few guidelines. For example, he
should keep the gas tank at least half full at all times; arrive 30
minutes before scheduled departures; have two sets of keys; lock
all doors once everyone is inside the car; obey traffic laws; use the
horn only in an emergency; close doors and the trunk lid firmly
but without slamming; and watch the car when it’s not in use to
guard it against tampering. He should also keep his mouth shut.
Verbose town guides or local characters are not appreciated, and
they can be very distracting to the protection mission and irritating
to everyone. The chauffeur must also be instructed that if a prob-
lem arises, the EP specialist will take charge and must be obeyed.

The best driver, from a protection standpoint, is the EP spe-
cialist himself. If more than one agent accompanies the principal,
all the better-one can drive while another sits next to him in the
front seat and assists with observation, logistics, directions, and
other matters. The EP specialist is likely to be trained in defensive
or evasive driving and to know alternate routes and safe havens.

Secure routes

Once the car is ready and a driver has been selected, it’s time to go
somewhere-that’s what the car is for, of course. Transporting
the principal safely from point A to point B requires the driver
(who is here assumed to be the EP specialist) to take a number of
special measures. First is to develop, before the drive, familiarity
with the route to be traveled. If the advance work described in
Chapter 4 has been performed, the driver knows a route that is
fast, does not pass through dangerous areas, and requires a mini-
mum of stopping; several alternate routes; safe havens at which he
can stop along the way; the location of hospitals, police stations,
and other potentially vital resources along the route; the time it will
take to reach various stages along the route; the likely level of traf-

fic; road conditions, construction work, drawbridge openings, and
other temporary factors that could affect the trip; and other facts
about the route.

Along the way, the driver will keep the car doors locked and
windows closed. By making sure he can always see the bottom of
the rear tires of the car ahead of him, he will avoid being boxed in
while stopping for a traffic light, leaving himself room to maneu-
ver the car to escape. He will avoid stopping to help at accident
scenes, instead using his portable phone to call the police for help.
Minor, rear-end collisions will make him suspicious-if someone
seems to have stopped deliberately in front of him, causing a mi-
nor crash, or has smashed into the principal’s car’s rear bumper
without skidding in an attempt to stop, the driver will consider not
stopping and instead drive to the nearest police station.

Furthermore, it is important for the EP specialist to reduce or
eliminate the need for client-requested detours that risk taking the
car through dangerous areas. One way the agent can do so is to
anticipate any of the principal’s needs that might cause a request
for such a detour. For example, what if, on the way to a meeting,
the principal announces he absolutely must have some chewing
gum? Chances are that the agent could have known and predicted
the principal’s desire. If the agent is fully prepared, he can hand
over a stick of gum and prevent the whole motorcade from having
to detour from its safe, carefully selected route just to stop at a
convenience store. This preemptive need-satisfaction comes in
handy in many other protective settings as well-at the principal’s
home, on travel, etc.

One of the great keys to reducing risk is reducing exposure. To
reduce the principal’s exposure during car travel, the driver will,
when driving on the highway, most often use the passing lane.
The problem with the slowest, rightmost lane is that cars are con-
stantly trying to merge into it to enter or leave the highway. Using
the middle lane, if there is one, leaves open the possibility of being
approached on both sides of the car at once. Using the leftmost
lane puts the driver in a protected position and exposes only one
side of the car to traffic. Furthermore, in the extreme and highly
unlikely case that attackers attempt to shoot at the principal’s car

on the highway, being in the leftmost lane leaves open the possi-
bility of employing two non-driving shooters (one in the right
front seat and one in the right rear seat) to defend the car, while
the attackers can only field one non-driving shooter (in the left
rear seat of their car).51 It is important to watch out for motorcy-
cles, however: they can easily pull alongside the car on either side,
they move very fast, and they may even enable attackers to plant a
bomb or incendiary device on the principal’s car. Again, that is
not a likely scenario for most principals, but reducing exposure can
even help protect a principal against more random attacks, such as
bump-and-robs, by making the principal less noticeable and less
accessible.

The most important factor in reducing exposure on the road is
speed. As Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote in his essay “Prudence”:

“In skating over thin ice, our safety is in our speed.”52 The driver
should obey speed limits but do everything else that is legal and safe
to keep his speed up. Knowing the route well helps. It is much
harder for an assailant standing by the road to shoot successfully at a
car that darts by quickly than to hit one that lumbers. During the
time he was stalking President Nixon, Arthur Bremer stood outside
a Canadian military airport, from which he knew the President
would emerge by car. He stood along the road, in the rain, with a
gun hidden in one of his galoshes. He later noted in his diary:

[As the motorcade approached,] people jumped from
their cars. Would the assassin get a good view? Every-
one moved in close (about 20 people). We were the
only people other than cops for a few blocks. He went
by before I knew it. Like a snap of the fingers. A dark
shillowet [sic], waving, rushed by in the large dark car.
‘All over,’ someone said to no one in particular…. I had
missed him that day. The best day to make the attempt
was over, I thought.

51 An alternative is the slingshot technique. If, on a fast road, passengers in a
car driving alongside the principal’s car begin to behave threateningly, perhaps
pulling a gun, the principal’s driver should stop his car abrupdy and change direc-
tions. The other car will likely continue to rocket ahead for several seconds at least.

52 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Prudence,” in Essays, First Series, 1841.

Street-level criminals-those who commit carjackings or cause
minor crashes followed by attempted robberies-might be foiled
by the driver’s use of a fast, relatively safe route and knowledge of
alternate routes in case of heavy traffic or some other obstacle.
However, if the threat analysis suggests that a more professional
attack on the principal’s car (by kidnappers, terrorists, or hit men)
is a realistic possibility, then an additional route consideration
arises: that is, unpredictably varying the route driven.

Every route presents some security concerns, whether they be
narrow roads, long stoplights, blind spots, or isolated areas. By
varying the route driven to, say, the principal’s office, the driver
makes it much more difficult for attackers to lurk in those areas
with any certainty that the principal will come by. Unfortunately,
no matter how much the driver might vary his route, there are
some stretches of road that he must predictably drive on, such as
the public street at the end of the principal’s driveway, the main
road out of a subdivision, or the entrance ramp to the only high-
way that leads to the office. A measure that reduces the predict-
ability of being in those places is to vary the time at which the
driver passes those spots. If the principal’s schedule allows it, and
the threat analysis suggests it is important, the car can depart the
principal’s premises at a slightly different time each morning. It is
unfortunate but true that the area at or just beyond the end of a
principal’s home’s driveway is one of the most dangerous parts of
the trip. In the last few years, many of the executives who have
died in ambushes or been kidnapped were attacked within a few
hundred yards of their driveways.

One effective technique for enhancing the security of routine
drives to the office is to send an advance route car out 15 min-
utes ahead of the principal’s car. The advance car conducts a
countersurveillance effort and checks for traffic tie-ups and other
hazards. The EP specialist in the advance car watches to see
whether the same cars or people turn up along the route day after
day; if so, a surveillance effort against the principal may be under
way.

Choreography of people and cars

It’s hard for an adversary-whether a carjacker, mugger, stalking
fan, or assassination-bent zealot-to confront the principal while
the principal’s car is flying down the highway. Vulnerability to a
face-to-face incident is far higher when and where the principal is
entering or leaving the car. Moreover, in most cases, that vulner-
ability must be faced several times each day. A well-rehearsed drill
among the protective staff and the principal gready increases the
principal’s safety in those situations.

This discussion of choreography assumes that the driver is a
permanent member of the protection team and that another EP
specialist is a passenger in the car-that arrangement is desirable
and feasible for day-in, day-out driving. In a typical arrival sce-
nario, the principal is riding in the back seat of the car, on the right
side. Why that side? That’s the sidewalk side, and it’s safer to en-
ter and leave the car from that side. As the car slows in front of
the principal’s destination, the EP specialist in the right front seat
says, “Sir, I’ll get your door.” That agent then opens his own door
first. The driver immediately relocks all the doors as the EP spe-
cialist climbs out of the car and closes his door. The agent looks
around to see if everything seems safe, signals the driver to unlock
the doors, opens the principal’s door, lets the principal out, and
closes the door. He then accompanies the client into the building.
The driver stays behind the wheel to facilitate a quick getaway if
necessary. Note that if a follow-up car is used, the process of ex-
iting from the lead car (if that is where the principal is riding)
should wait until the follow-up car arrives-unless the follow-up
car has lagged far behind.

It is just as important to choreograph the principal’s return to
the car. A few minutes before the expected return of the principal,
the driver should inspect the vehicle for signs of tampering, posi-
tion it at curbside, keep the motor running, and give the car’s inte-
rior a chance to reach a comfortable temperature. He may wish to
stand outside the vehicle to maintain surveillance on the site and
the car, but he should position himself right next to the open
driver’s door and should keep all the other doors locked. When

the principal emerges from the place he has been visiting, the
driver should get behind the steering wheel, close his door, unlock
the other doors, and remain ready to drive away-in a hurry, if
necessary. Once the EP specialist who is accompanying the prin-
cipal has placed him in the back seat and taken up position in the
front passenger seat, and after all doors are closed and locked, the
driver should pull away.

Choreography applies to cars, too. When the principal is trans-
ported in a convoy or motorcade, keeping the cars together can be
a challenge. The only solution is practice. The drivers should be
in radio contact with each other, though minimal talking is re-
quired. Most of the cars’ coordination can be done more easily
and discreetly through signaling with various lights. For example,
when it’s time to change lanes, the follow-up car signals the lead
car by turning its directional signal on. The follow-up car moves
over, then creates room for the lead car to join it in the new lane.
It’s also important to consider the positioning of the principal. It’s
unwise to drive along aimlessly in parallel traffic in such a way that
the principal is exposed for long periods to the driver or passen-
gers of the adjacent car. That is especially important if the princi-
pal is well known and recognizable to the general public.

Many convoy configurations can be used, depending on the
level of security required and the number of cars in use. In a two-
car motorcade, typically the lead car will contain a driver, one or
two EP agents, and the principal, while the follow-up car will
contain other EP agents and serve as a spare car for the principal.
In a three-car motorcade, it is common for the principal’s car to be
sandwiched between the lead and follow-up cars.

Performance Handling

Many people consider themselves good drivers, but risky, noncha-
lant, overly aggressive, or illegal driving does not make one a good
driver. A good driver, in general, is one who drives safely. A good
driver in the executive protection field is one who drives safely and,
when necessary, aggressively. As mentioned earlier, protectees
face two kinds of risk when traveling in cars: the routine but sur-

prisingly high risk of an accidental crash, and the risk (at different
levels for different protectees) of harm from a deliberate attack.
The skill of the principal’s driver can reduce both these risks.

There’s a huge difference between playing a little touch football
with the guys at the company picnic and playing for the NFL. The
two activities may be more or less the same game, but the levels of
training, skill, understanding, and commitment involved in the two
activities are worlds apart. The same holds true with driving.
Really driving, with eyes and mind busily working the changing
conditions, the driver knowing what the car can do when pushed
to its limits, and knowing-actually having tested-the limits of
his own skill: that’s the kind of driving from which a principal de-
serves to benefit.

That level of driving ability doesn’t come from years of com-
muting or even from reading an executive protection book. This
chapter can introduce the concepts important in performance
driving, but the only way to learn the actual techniques and be able
to use them both daily and in crises is to attend a driving school.
Some schools are geared to defensive driving for ordinary citizens
who wish to reduce the risk they face every time they turn the ig-
nition key. Other schools are geared specifically to law enforce-
ment officers, EP specialists, and others who must use their driv-
ing skills to save lives, including their own, and who may have to
escape from deliberate attacks, not just accidental collisions.

Driving theory

Routine driving is so simple to most adults that they rarely consider
the physics of driving and the factors that affect their control of the
car. However, an EP specialist, whose head may already be filled
with mountains of protective data, must know, understand, and in-
ternalize the facts about human reaction time, physics, weight trans-
fer, skids, and speed. Mastering those subjects requires much study
and practice-in fact, much more than can be given here. Whole
books and schools specialize in the subject. What follows is merely
a brief lesson in the dynamics of protective driving.

Cars, by themselves, do nothing. If they proceed safely, the
driver deserves credit; if they crash, it’s his fault. Driving experts

distinguish between driving out of control, which occurs when the
driver exceeds the vehicle’s limitations, and suffering a loss of control,
which occurs when the driver exceeds his own limitations. Both
conditions should be avoided, and it is up to the driver alone to do
so.

The major human limitation is reaction time. Before the driver
can stop, turn, or take any other action, the brain must receive ap-
propriate data from the senses, the brain must make a decision on
what to do next, the message must be transmitted from the brain
to the muscles that are need to move the controls, and the muscles
themselves must respond. All this normally takes about three-
quarters of a second. The process can take much longer if the
driver is tired, distracted, or frightened to the point of indecision.
Alternatively, the process can be performed a little faster if the
driver is especially well trained. But isn’t three-quarters of a sec-
ond more than fast enough? Not really-a car traveling 65 mph
travels about 71 feet in that period. And that 71 feet just counts
the reaction time; only after that distance can the car begin to stop
or turn.

Stopping distance depends not only on the driver’s reaction
time but also on the road surface, brakes, and driver’s braking ex-
perience. The equation for stopping-where S equals stopping
distance, V equals velocity in feet per second, J…l equals the coeffi-
cient of friction, and G equals the acceleration of gravity (32.2 feet
per second per second)-is this:

V2
s=–

2f.JG

The driver need not memorize this equation, and he certainly
won’t have time to compute it while driving, but a quick look at it
shows that the relationship between speed and stopping distance is
nonlinear. That is, a doubling of speed results in much more than
a doubling of stopping distance-in fact, the distance quadruples.
For example, a car traveling at 30 mph on a road surface with a
friction coefficient of 0.8 (that of a dry concrete surface) requires
38 feet in which to stop. A car traveling twice as fast (60 mph) on
a similar surface requires four times the distance-152 feet-to

stop. If that same car is traveling at the same speed (60 mph) but
on a slippery surface-say, ice, which has a friction coefficient of
0.1-then it will need 559 feet to stop. That’s a tenth of a mile.
To these stopping distances must be added the distance covered
during the driver’s reaction time: 33 feet at 30 mph, 66 feet at 60
mph.v’

Obviously, even the most conscientious driver isn’t going to
calculate these numbers as he drives down the street. But in gen-
eral, under average conditions, a driver should allow himself a
good two seconds in which to stop his car, or a little more if he
is driving especially fast or is on an unusually slippery road. The
practical expression of the two-second rule is to make sure the
car is at least two seconds behind any car in front of it and that
the driver can, in bad weather or on curvy roads, always see
ahead at least the distance he covers in two seconds. Therefore,
if the car is moving 30 mph, or 44 feet per second (fps = mph
x 1.47), the driver should leave at least 88 feet free ahead of his
car.

Along with stopping, the other two major operations a car
performs are going (forward or backward) and turning. Knowing
how a car stops is important mainly for avoiding accidents.
Knowing how a car goes and turns is important for both avoid-
ing accidents and escaping from ambushes. The physics of
turning is more complicated than that of stopping, but it is ex-
tremely important. In a nutshell, when a car is parked, each
wheel bears a certain amount of the car’s weight. When the car is
driving through a turn, a weight transfer occurs, redistributing
the amount of weight each wheel bears. The force that causes
that transfer is lateral G-force. As the G’s increase (from turn-
ing, braking, or accelerating), the car’s steering is affected more
and more; once too much force is applied to the tires, they lose
their grip on the road, and the driver may be able neither to stop
nor steer.

53 This discussion of stopping distance is inspired by the chapter ”Braking Con-
trol” in Anthony Scotti, Driving Techniques for the Professional and Non-Professional
(Ridgefield, New Jersey: PhotoGraphics Publishing, 1995).

The equation for lateral G-force, or lateral acceleration, where V
equals velocity in feet per second and R equals the radius of the
car’s path in feet, is this:

V2
LA=–
RG

Again, there’s no need to memorize the equation, and certainly
no time to use it in a pinch, but it shows, once again, a nonlinear
relationship between the car’s speed and the lateral force exerted
against it. In other words, doubling the speed at which the driver
takes the turn quadruples the force exerted on the car. There’s a
lot to learn about understeer, oversteer, maintaining control in
turns, and regaining control in skids. The executive protection
team’s driver should also know about kinetic energy, the effect of
different tire and car designs on performance, G-force ratings of
various cars, and other technical matters. That’s why driving
school is so important.

Though this chapter cannot address all the relevant technical
topics, it can offer some of the nontechnical practices that con-
tribute to controlled driving. One of the most important observa-
tions is that, when under stress, drivers tend to focus on the out-
come (impending crash) rather than the process (what can be done
to avoid hitting a tree). The best technique is to think one’s way
out of the problem by focusing on the proms. That way the driver
will be too busy to panic. Knowing the way cars behave, the way
weight shifts among wheels in turns and skids, and other mechani-
cal relationships gives the driver sornething concrete to think

about, to work with in getting out of the problem.

Another key to success behind the wheel is called “ocular
driving.” In ocular driving, the driver chooses a goal with his eyes
and drives toward it. It is natural to drive where one is looking,
but not everyone realizes the implications of that fact. When a car
starts to skid, the driver should not stare at the tree he thinks he is
about to hit but should instead look at his positive goal-that is,
the roadway. His natural reflexes will take him in the direction in
which he is looking. Similarly, when swerving around an obstacle
or attempting to squeeze the car through a tight space (such as a

narrow alley), the driver should look not at the obstacle or the alley
walls but at the patch of road where he wants the car to go. This is
a simple technique that actually works.

This section on driving theory has presented several compli-
cated topics. If the formulae seem confusing, the EP specialist
should at least remember these important points:

Doubling a car’s speed quadruples its stopping distance.
Doubling the speed at which a driver takes a turn quad-
ruples the lateral force exerted on the car. (This lateral
G-force causes cars to skid).
When in trouble, a driver should focus on the process
(what can be done to avoid crashing into a tree) rather
than the outcome (mental images of crashing into the
tree).
A driver should perform “ocular driving”-looking at
the place he wants the car to go rather than the obstacle
he wants to avoid hitting. One naturally guides the car
where one is looking.
A driver should take care not to slip up on the basics:
remaining alert, observing other cars around him,
keeping his hands at ten and two o’clock on the steer-
ing wheel, etc.

Emergency Response

The preceding section, “Performance Handling,” provided an in-
troduction to why cars behave the way they do. This section de-
scribes some of the actual defensive or evasive maneuvers an ex-
ecutive protection specialist might have to perform. This discus-
sion is directed solely at countering deliberate attacks on the prin-
cipal, not at avoiding common, accidental crashes. As above, this
treatment only introduces the concepts of security driving; to learn
them well, a driver must attend a professional driving school.

The threat of ambush is not a high risk to most protectees, yet it
cannot be ruled out. Many prominent businessmen have been
kidnapped or killed in automobile ambushes, both in the United
States and elsewhere. Ambushes, while not exactly predictable, are

100

more likely to happen in some locations than others. Locations in
which EP specialists should pay special attention to the signs of an
incipient ambush are places near the protectee’s home or office;
one-way or narrow streets; places where the protectee’s car must
drive very slowly, such as a sharp curve in the road or a median
gap at which the car stops to make a turn; and blind spots like hills
or corners.

At such places, and at any others of the attackers’ choosing, a
car may swerve in front of the protectee’s car, blocking forward
motion; attackers may jump out of cars or step from behind
bushes and begin firing weapons; or some other, as yet un-
dreamed-of type of ambush may occur. If the ambushers are on
foot and do not block the protectee’s car with a car of their own,
there’s no reason to stop at all; the driver should simply drive away
as fast as possible, not worrying at all about the safety of the at-
tackers. (practice on a slalom track may help the driver execute a
serpentine escape.)

An exception to the automatic drive-away rule is carjacking: in
an unarmored vehicle that is stopped, if a carjacker points a gun at
the driver or principal, it is time to give the car up. The driver is
unlikely to be able to accelerate from the scene before the carjacker
shoots through the window. However, if no weapon is showing or
the vehicle is armored, it’s time to burn rubber. If the car’s doors
are already locked, as they should be, it is unlikely that the principal
can be harmed.

One further point about driving away from a threat is this: traf-
fic laws are meant to be obeyed, but not at the cost of the princi-
pal’s life. If the car is stopped at a red light and evildoers start ap-
proaching the car in a threatening manner, the driver should-
carefully-drive through the light. Likewise, backing up onto a
sidewalk in order to turn the car around to escape danger is a mi-
nor infraction compared to carjacking.

Once the driver realizes an ambush is about to take place, he
may have only a second or two-literally-to decide what he will
do. His options are limited: he can drive around the barricade, as
noted above; he can turn around, using the bootlegger turn, J turn,
or two-point turn; or he can ram through the barricade. The

101

choice of response depends on the conditions of the ambush and
the skill of the driver. There’s so little time to decide what to do,
however, that the various ambush scenarios should be practiced in
advance. That way the driver may be able to react automatically,
which is what he will have to do to react in time.

The bootlegger turn consists of driving forward (toward the
barricade), turning sharply to spin the car 180 degrees, and driving
back in the direction from which the car came. It’s an exciting
maneuver seen often in action films; like other aspects of executive
protection represented in movies, it is not very true to life. The
bootlegger turn requires a driver with a high degree of skill, a large
area in which to perform the maneuver, and a car that is physically
capable of doing the turn. Even if all those conditions are satis-
fied, the maneuver leaves the car temporarily stopped right in front
of the attackers. In most instances, the bootlegger turn is not
practical-the driver is likely to crash into something or end up in
a vulnerable position close to the ambush.

In a J turn, the driver who sees a barricade ahead of him stops
the car fast, throws it into reverse, drives backwards away from the
attackers at high speed, turns the steering wheel sharply, and, while
the car is spinning 180 degrees, throws the transmission into drive
and speeds away. Its advantage over the bootlegger turn is that the
maneuver takes the car away from the ambush immediately. How-
ever, like the bootlegger turn, it is difficult to do and it requires
more room than the driver is likely to have. A safer maneuver is
simply to drive quickly in reverse and then, once the car is a safe
distance from the attackers, perform a two-point turn, backing into
a driveway or even up on a curb, then driving away forward.

In some situations, it may not be possible to turn around and
leave the scene of the attack. The road may be too narrow, or an-
other car may be blocking the road behind the principal’s car. In
those cases, since it is important even in an armored car not to
come to a halt and become a sitting duck, the only option may be
to ram the barricade. Ramming a parked car doesn’t have to be
suicidal; in fact, it can be a very effective alternative if done cor-
rectly. The first thing to note is that the principal’s car can proba-
bly push the ambushers’ car out of the way at a surprisingly low

102

speed. That’s good, because a high-speed crash between the prin-
cipal’s car and the parked blockade car could have as destructive
an effect as any other high-speed crash. The reason a moving car
can push a parked car out of the way at a low speed is kinetic en-
ergy, which the moving car is well supplied with. The formula for
kinetic energy (KE), where W equals the moving car’s weight, V
equals velocity, and G equals gravity, is this:

WV²
KE= 2G

That formula shows, for example, that at 10 mph, a 3,500 lb.
car has enough energy to lift a 10,000 lb. object one foot off the
ground. Like the other formulas in this chapter, this one is non-
linear; that is, doubling the car’s speed will quadruple the kinetic
energy produced.

The following is a good, step-by-step description of how to ram
a parked vehicle.>’

First, determine whether it is an attack. If it is, slow the
vehicle as if to stop. You must make the attackers
think you are going to stop at the barricade. As you
approach the barricade, pick a possible ramming point.
When you are about one to two car lengths from the
barricade, brake to a sudden stop. When you stop,
your car will rock fore and aft. Try to time the accel-
eration as the bumper on your car rises. Floor the ac-
celerator, striking the blocking vehicle at the center of
one of its wheels with your right or left fender. Strike
either end of the blocking vehicle.
Keep the accelerator on the floor until you are past the
If you take your foot off the gas, you release
the energy you have built up in the car. Hold the steer-
ing wheel straight, and do not swerve away at the last
moment. You will be going no more than 5 to 15 mph.
Beginning the run too far back will allow the attacker to
figure out what you are planning and will also let you

54 Adapted from Scotti, in Oatman, Executive Protection Resource Manual, Chapter
8, pp. 3-4.

103

build up too much speed. At the recommended speed
you will hardly feel the shock. The barricade vehicle
will spin violently out of the way.

One last response to an ambush must still be discussed. If the
protectee’s car cannot go forward, cannot go backward, and cannot
go around-in other words, is trapped-and the attackers are ad-
vancing on the car with the intent to kill the passengers, there is only
one option left: shooting from the car. Doing so is truly a last resort,
but if the principal faces the risk of kidnapping or assassination, either
because of who he is or what part of the world he is traveling in, the
EP specialist had better know how to take this drastic measure.

Shooting from inside the car is such an extreme, unfamiliar, and
unnatural-feeling measure that an agent is unlikely to be able to do
it well without at least a little practice. During such practice, the
agent would learn the fine points. Here, however, are just the ba-
sics. It’s unlikely that the principal could safely run away from the
attackers if they are already bearing down on the car. Therefore,
he should stay in the car and keep the doors locked. Also, rolling
down the windows only increases the passengers’ exposure, so the
shooting must be done right through the windshield, side win-
dows, or rear window. The technique is to bring the gun’s muzzle
close to the window and then fire a double tap. The first shot
breaks the window, and the second shot goes through. This is a
messy, highly dramatic step to take-it may even temporarily dam-
age the hearing of the car’s occupants-and it should be done only
if there is no alternative but to sit there and be shot. It is the last

resort in the worst of all possible scenarios.

A principal’s exposure to attack runs particularly high when he
is traveling by automobile. Moreover, principals, like most people,
spend a large amount of time in their cars. That raises the risk to a
relatively high level. Fortunately, by taking care to select an ap-
propriate car or having one modified as needed, by learning how
the principal’s car works and how to drive it to maximum protec-
tive advantage, by practicing good route security, and by knowing
how to respond in an emergency, a protective agent can signifi-
cantly reduce the risk to the principal.

104

You can ensure the Scife!} of your defense if you
onlY hold positions that cannot be attacked.

Sun Tzu

Chapter 6

Home and Office Security

This chapter’s opening quote may sound like a tautology: obvi-
ously, a principal who is kept in a location that cannot be attacked
may be assured of a good defense. However, Sun Tzu is cleverer
than that. If his statement is taken as ironic, he may be saying that
since no position is ever completely immune to attack, no defense
is assuredly safe. Alternatively, he may be alluding to the desirabil-
ity of maintaining such strong positions that no attack is made-
that is, hardening the target so well that attacks are discouraged
and its hardness need never be put to the test.

Either way, security at a principal’s home and office is a major
undertaking for an executive protection specialist. The risk faced
per minute may be greater during travel, commuting, or public ap-
pearances, but an executive spends far more hours in the office or
at home than anywhere else. Therefore, security for those loca-
tions is essential. This chapter examines security measures that
must be undertaken to protect homes and offices, first presenting
considerations and practices that apply to both settings, then de-
tailing measures that apply specifically to home security, and finally
describing office-specific protection practices.

105

Home and Office

Many protective measures apply to both home protection and of-
fice protection. Among them are the following:

threat assessment
rings of protection
security engineering
intelligence and surveillance
life safety precautions (primarily fire and first-aid con-
siderations)
bomb prevention and response

Threatassessnnent

Chapter 1 covered threat assessment in some detail, but it is im-
portant to realize that threat assessment is not a one-time exercise.
The threat assessment process is actually a continuous operation in
which the EP specialist collects and analyzes new data constantly.
Most of the time, he can use the new pieces of information to
tweak the protection program. For example, if a small group of
protesters is planning to march back and forth across the main
entrance to the executive’s office building, it might be wise to use a
different entrance for a few days.

However, when an EP specialist sets out to establish an initial
security plan for the executive’s home and office, something a bit
more intense than that sort of fine-tuning is required. What the
protective agent must do is conduct an expanded threat assess-
ment, essentially rebuilding it from the ground up. The reason is
that an accurate measure and understanding of the threats is the
foundation on which the home and office security plans will be
built. If the foundation is weak, the security plans will be weak,
too. A thorough assessment of the threats against the principal
helps the agent gauge not only the range of threats that must be de-
fended against but also the level of the threats. For example, if
there is reason to believe that the principal could be a target of
kidnapping, it also helps to estimate the level of that threat-that
is, are the would-be kidnappers likely to be clumsy crooks who de-

106

veloped a half-baked plan after reading about the principal in
Forbes magazine, or are they highly motivated, well-financed, inter-
national terrorists? The potential crime may be the same no matter
who commits it, but the defenses to be erected would differ enor-
mously. Often, of course, there is no way to know who-and how
able-the adversary might be. In such a case, a responsible EP
specialist would assume a middle-of-the-road security posture and
would build in the flexibility to ratchet the defenses up or down as
needed.

If it has been possible to maintain a threat file-meaning a col-
lection of notes regarding unwanted visitors, threatening telephone
calls and letters, and tips about other dangers-the diligent EP
specialist would check through that file now. It also pays to take a
fresh look at local crime risks, analyzing the types, locations, and
times of various types of crimes around the home and the office.
Such information may be obtained from the local police, from the
crime analysis units of state law enforcement agencies, or from
commercial services that track reported crime data and geocode it
to draw crime maps.

What about publicity? Is it well-known where the principal
works or lives? The answers to those questions affect whether the
security measures must primarily defend against opportunistic
crimes or well-planned ones. For example, if a financial, society,
or life styles magazine has recently profiled the protectee, hun-
dreds of thousands of readers may have learned the location of the
protectee’s house or office, perhaps seen interior and exterior pic-
tures of those locations, discerned the protectee’s general com-

muting route, and so on. Such an article may also have shown a
photograph of the protectee and published his net worth. Certain
adversaries might find such intelligence useful. (In fact, protective
specialists sometimes refer, with chagrin, to magazines’ detailed
lists of the rich and famous as “hit lists.”) Protective measures
may have to change after an article like that is published. ss

55 The kidnapping of Charles Geschke, described in Chapter 1, was inspired by
newspaper articles describing an act of philanthropy by the Geschke family. The
idea to kidnap Geschke developed when two young men living in the San Jose area

107

Adversaries can gain other intelligence from the executive’s
trash, finding travel plans, personal mail, security information, and
other data. A threat assessment might reasonably conclude that
the risk of burglary, blackmail, robbery, or kidnapping could rise if
sensitive materials were thrown away in unsecured trash. That
finding might then lead to specific preventive measures at the
home and office, such as secure trash collection or routine shred-
ding or burning of documents.

Rings of protection

Chapter 3, Working the Principal, discussed the theory of concen-
tric rings of protection as it applies to protecting a mobile individ-
ual as he walks about and travels through his day. In the context
of home and office security, concentric security refers to the layers
of physical and procedural security measures that surround the
kernel of the house or office in which the principal spends so
much of his time. Also called defense-in-depth, the idea of con-
centric rings of protection can be likened to the protective meas-
ures surrounding a medieval castle. From the outside, heading in-
wards, the layers would include vassals living in the village outside
the castle, who must defend their lord; a moat; the castle’s outer
walls; armed men inside the castle walls; and a fortified tower in
the center of the castle, to which the lord and his family might re-
treat in times of crisis. Those protective layers, which would have
to be fought through, one after another, would deter many aggres-
sors altogether and would certainly slow the progress of those who
were more determined.

As this book has explained elsewhere, executive protection is
not the art of imprisoning a protectee in a gilded cage. Concentric
protection, however, is the most effective means of safeguarding
anything, whether a person or a thing, and at the home or office it
can be done in such a way that the principal sees or feels very little

read that he had given $50,000 to upgrade computers at San Jose State College.
Concluding that Geschke must be wealthy, the conspirators found out the location
of his company (Adobe Systems, Inc.) and his home. Then, one morning, as he
pulled into his corporate parking space, the kidnappers abducted him at gunpoint.

108

of it. The theory of concentric protection affects most of the top-
ics that follow in this chapter; certainly it influences physical secu-
rity, surveillance, fire prevention and first aid, and bomb protec-
tion.

Overwhelming force can push through any number of rings of
protection, but very few protectees face the risk of overwhelming
force. More typically, an adversary plans to make his way into the
home or office through stealth. No matter how clever or dim the
bad guys are, whether they are highly skilled kidnappers or drug-
stupefied burglars, the need to penetrate numerous rings of pro-
tection will slow most of them down, stop them, or prevent them
from ever attempting the crime in the first place. The last thing
any EP specialist wants to see is the case in which an intruder
manages to slip through layer after layer of security to the protec-
tee’s inner sanctum, such as occurred at 2:45 a.m. on November 5,
1995, when Aline Chretien, wife of Canada’s prime minister, came
face to face with an intruder who was standing at the couple’s bed-
room door with an open jackknife. 56 Police said the man broke
into the official residence, which is surrounded by a wall made of
stone and wrought iron, by smashing a window with a rock. It can
only be assumed that the concentric rings of protection, which in-
cluded the wall, exterior lights, various sensors, Canadian Moun-
ties, and of course locked doors and windows, were not numerous
enough, contained significant gaps, or were not properly moni-
tored. Such incursions are not common at well-protected homes
and offices, and even though they apparently show a failure of the
defense in depth concept, in reality they merely show what hap-
pens when the rings of protection are not circular but C-shaped-
that is, open with wide gaps.

The intrusion into the Canadian prime minister’s residence pre-
sumably occurred because the intruder slipped through gaps in
physical protection. However, it is also possible for adversaries to
slip through other gaps in the protective rings: namely, gaps in
procedures. That occurs most often when a member of the house-

56 Associated Press, “Man with knife arrested in Canadian leader’s home,” The
Washington Times, November 6, 1996.

109

hold or office staff falls for a ruse and simply lets the intruder in,
making it unnecessary for him to defeat such physical barriers as
walls, access control systems, or locked doors. Ruses include
dressing in the uniform of a police officer, delivery person, or util-
ity worker or posing as a family friend or business associate. Such
impersonations can be made more convincing if the adversary has
had access to the principal’s trash or has otherwise gathered per-
sonal and business information about him. An adversary who
knows the name of the principal’s daughter who is away at college
can put on a realistic act by dressing as a police officer, knocking at
the door, and announcing, “I need to speak to the parents of Chel-
sea Jones. It’s an emergency.”

Of course, visitors must be positively identified before they are
let in. If the protection team does not clearly recognize a visitor
and know him to be safe, the person must be checked out with a
phone call to the organization he represents. And naturally, the
number dialed must be one the protection team finds on its own,
not one suggested by the visitor. When positive identification is
not possible, the person must not be let in, regardless of the in-
convenience. These are not special measures but common ones
that even people who face only the average level of risk-actually,
everyone-should take. However, for executives and other pro-
tectees, the issue of positively identifying visitors is especially im-
portant because (1) the protectees face an above-average level of
risk and (2) there are so many domestic staff, office staff, and
other persons who could fall prey to a ruse. The second reason
dictates the need for training not just protective staff but all staff in
proper security procedures. It is not unheard of for a well-secured
home to be invaded because a maid untrained in security proce-
dures opened the front door for a criminal who claimed to be a
plumber.

A recent example of adversaries entering a building by posing as
legitimate visitors involves Tupac Amaru, a terrorist organization
in Peru. On December 17, 1996, Tupac Amaru took over the
Japanese ambassador’s residence in Lima. The terrorists were able
to enter the building by dressing as waiters who were coming in to
serve at a large party. At first they took hundreds of people hos-

110

tage; later they released all but 72, whom they offered to free in
exchange for the release of some 450 of their comrades in Peru-
vian jails. On April 22, 1997, more than four months after the
takeover, Peruvian troops stormed the residence. Seventy-one
captives were rescued, and one died during the assault, as did two
soldiers and all 14 captors.

Several lessons can be drawn from that incident:

Screen every cook, waiter, and other person who enters
the principal’s home or office, no matter how incon-
venient that may seem. If the building is not under the
EP specialist’s control, and he has doubts that people
are being screened properly, he’ll have to try to get the
local security staff to improve their screening. Other-
wise, if the threat assessment justifies doing so, he may
have to recommend that the principal not attend.
Keep servers and other support workers at a distance
from the principal, allowing them near only when they
are needed.
When a building’s rings of protection are penetrated,
don’t hang around to see if everything turns out all
The agent needs to know all the ways of getting
the principal out of a building. At the beginning stages
of a takeover, it’s highly unlikely that the perpetrators
can have every single exit covered. That’s the time to
make an immediate escape.

Later sections of this chapter will describe techniques for inter-
viewing unwanted visitors and will emphasize the importance of
following security procedures.

Security engineering

The specific physical security measures required for a home or of-
fice cannot be prescribed broadly-the selection and placement of
equipment is a custom job that depends on the features of the lo-
cation to be secured and the level of security needed. Obviously,
such equipment as solid doors, locks for doors and windows,
alarm systems, fences and gates, closed-circuit television, exterior

111

lights, and other items would feature prominently in most physical
security schemes. But strictly speaking, each security application is
unique and specialized.

That is why the EP specialist, who is typically a generalist, may
well wish to contract with a security engineer. The probability of
obtaining optimal physical security is greater when the process is
handled by someone who specializes in designing physical security
systems, who knows about the latest and best types of equipment,
and who can specify systems that vendors will then bid to provide.
With this approach, the EP specialist avoids relying on a security
equipment vendor who tries to sell him everything the vendor
thinks he needs and not necessarily what the circumstances re-
quire. A consultant with engineering expertise can design the best
system for the EP specialist, leave procurement and installation to
others, and serve as a watchdog over the entire project.

Physical security at the executive’s office is typically not the
purview of the EP specialist alone. Rather, he may have to insert
his own special considerations into the overall corporate security
effort. At the executive’s home, the EP specialist may have a freer
reign, being able to have installed whatever security features he and
the protectee agree on. In either case, using the services of a con-
sulting security engineer can improve the likelihood that the secu-
rity equipment selected and the way in which it is installed will
produce the level of security the EP specialist desires. In this
context, the EP specialist is like a film director who knows how he
wants the light to look in a particular scene but relies on the gaffer
to select the right lamps and placement.

Contracting with a security engineer carries a cost, but it is
much less than the cost of the security equipment, and without
expert help the EP specialist runs the risk of selecting inappropri-
ate equipment or deploying it ineffectively. 57

57 One especially well-regarded security engineering firm to consider is Systech
Group, Inc., headed by John J. Strauchs. Systech can be reached at 11260 Roger
Bacon Drive, Suite 501, Reston, VA 22090. (703) 759-9600.

112

Intelligence and surveillance

At both home and office, a great advantage can be gained through
aggressive intelligence-gathering, including surveillance. In gen-
eral, it is easier to defend the principal if the agent has some idea
what to expect in terms of threats. The importance of refreshing
the threat assessment was mentioned above; this section describes
specific measures the EP specialist should take to ensure a regular
flow of intelligence into his decision-making scheme.

A key step is to increase the number of eyes and ears gathering
potentially useful information and passing it along to the agent.
Obviously, it is important to develop a liaison with representatives
of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. The agent
will want those law enforcement insiders to alert him of specific
threats, general crime trends, and other developments with security
value. Less obvious is the need to bring other people into the
greater protective team, both at home and at work. Housekeepers,
personal secretaries, gardeners, neighbors, doormen, office clean-
ers, and many others can be brought on board and encouraged to
report suspicious persons, packages, and other sightings. They can
become a passive surveillance network, reporting useful informa-
tion they come across in the course of their normal activities. For
example, a gardener might report a suspicious lurker who spends
an unusual amount of time watching the executive’s house from
across the street, or an office cleaner might report the presence of
someone who appears to be an employee but is tampering with
office locks.

Another type of intelligence network consists of electronic sur-
veillance. Both at the executive’s home and at his office, video and
sometimes audio surveillance of key areas can provide several ad-
vantages. Video surveillance recording and archiving can help
protective staff discern whether a suspicious person who has been
reported as hanging around the front entrance to the home, or the
rear entrance to the office, or any other key location has been there
before in the preceding days or weeks and what he did during any
of those visits. Such surveillance can also help protective staff spot
vehicles that do not belong near the executive’s office or home.

113

A third type of intelligence-gathering consists of the careful in-
terviewing of unwanted visitors to the executive’s home or office.
At home, the executive’s family, domestic staff, and anyone else
who opens the door or answers the phone should be trained in the
methods of dealing with such visitors, as should, at work, the ex-
ecutive’s secretary, receptionist, and other gatekeepers. When a
person tries to approach the protectee-at home, at work, or in a
public place-in order to speak with him, shake his hand, or ob-
tain an autograph, the EP specialist (or another party at the office
or home) needs to determine whether the person is merely curious,
a nuisance, or an actual threat. This is not a minor concern;
stalkers latch onto many types of protectees and can be dangerous,
determined, and difficult to shake.

An assessment of the visitor’s general behavior gives one set of
clues as to which category he belongs in. For example, a bystander
who notices that a prominent person has just stepped out of a lux-
ury car in a motorcade might step toward the principal to see what
is going on and perhaps to ask for an autograph. If the person
stops his quest when the EP specialist gives him the cold shoulder
and escorts the principal into a building, then the person is likely
to be seeking no more than a little satisfaction of his curiosity.
Most likely, that will be the end of his interest.

Now, if a person shows up uninvited at the protectee’s home or
office, repeatedly places himself in public locations that the pro-
tectee frequents, or otherwise pays unwanted attention to the pro-
tectee, that person has shown a higher level of interest. He might
fall into the category of nuisance; maybe he’s an enthusiastic fan,
or perhaps he has an unresolved grievance against the principal. If
he has been shut out from communicating with the principal by
telephone and mail, he may simply be trying to speak to the princi-
pal in person. His behavior may be annoying, even deliberately so,
but he mayor may not be dangerous, and it may not be possible to
determine much just by looking at him.

To estimate intelligently whether the person is dangerous or
merely annoying, an interview is needed. When the principal is
safely out of the visitor’s reach, the EP specialist can stop to ask
the person a few questions. The person will probably want to state

114

his case in the hope of gaining access to the principal. The inter-
viewer can simply ask a few questions that encourage the visitor to
talk. In addition to listening to the answers, the interviewer should
study the visitor’s manner: Does he seem mentally ill? Does he
seem violent or desperate? It is also fruitful to ask him what ex-
actly he wants from the principal and why. A sympathetic ear and
reassuring or apologetic tone from the interviewer may be enough
to satisfy the visitor that he is not the victim of a hateful conspir-
acy. A further step is to ask what the visitor will do if he does not
get what he wants from the principal. Indications that the visitor
feels backed into a corner with no way out or that his grievance is
profound and unbearable are signs that he may be dangerous. Of
course, there is no way to be certain of who is and who is not dan-
gerous, but a threat file packed with hundreds of names is too un-
wieldy to be of much use, so the EP specialist has to focus on the
people who are the mostly likely threats.

If the EP specialist deems the person to be a potential threat, he
should build a file that contains the person’s photo, a description
of his grievance or desire, and a list of where and when he has
tried to approach the principal in the past. With that information,
the protective agents will know who to watch for and will be better
able to predict when and where he is likely to turn up. Although
the dangerous visitor to a protectee’s home or office is obviously a
great cause for concern, keeping even the benign nuisance visitor
at bay is an important duty.

Stalkers. In recent years, the threat of stalking has gained
much attention. News reports describe incidents in which televi-
sion and film stars and other celebrities have been the object of
intense, unwanted attention. (The long list of objects of stalkers’
attentions includes such familiar names as Jody Foster, David
Letterman, John Lennon, Michael J. Fox, and Michael Landon.)
When that attention consists of too much fan mail, it’s a nuisance.
When the stars are physically stalked like prey, when an inappro-
priately interested person follows the principal around, lurks at lo-
cations where the principal is likely to appear, or actually sneaks or
breaks into the principal’s house or office, it’s a major problem
and one that, unfortunately, is difficult to solve.

115

Interestingly, it is not necessary to be nationally famous to at-
tract a stalker. A principal need only be prominent in the circles he
inhabits. If the stalker feels the principal occupies a higher social,
economic, or other plane than the stalker does, that impression
may be enough reason to become fixated on the victim.

Though they may not appear mentally ill, stalkers typically have
developed an irrational love for or hatred of their victims. The
stalker may feel his prey loves him deeply, even if the two have
never met. That feeling may be based on the most casual contact
between the two, on an exchange of glances, or on nothing at all.
The stalker may even feel that the victim’s current rejections are a
test of his love. Other themes that may motivate him are des-
tiny-the idea that fate has decreed that the stalker and the victim
should be together; revenge against a former employer, a business
partner, or a politician; and narcissism, in which the stalker is mo-
tivated by rage over an insult or slight.

Some research suggests that the great majority of murderous
stalking cases involve jilted lovers-most often, spurned men
stalking the women who rejected them. Clearly, jilted-lover cases
could apply to many types of protectees.

How can an EP specialist protect his client from a stalker? First,
the agent must identify whether the person is in fact a stalker. Several
techniques of home and office security help with that: archived video
recordings (which allow the EP specialist to see whether and how of-
ten the suspect has visited or lurked), interviews with suspects, ete.

Second, the agent must attempt to rid the principal of the threat
and annoyance posed by the stalker. In some cases, working to
have the stalker arrested, jailed, or committed to a mental institu-
tion may be appropriate. Doing so requires paying significant at-
tention to record keeping (details of encounters and communica-
tions with the stalker) and evidence handling (saving gifts, letters,
voice-mail messages, and other forms of evidence in a way that
preserves forensic information such as fingerprints, postmarks,
etc.). However, many persons who have relied on the justice sys-
tem to rid them of stalkers have found that method slow, cumber-
some, and sometimes ineffective. There is also reason to believe
that restraining orders and peace bonds only challenge the stalker

116

to try harder. Arrest and incarceration may help temporarily, but a
stalker who hasn’t killed anyone is unlikely to be jailed for life-
he’ll get out, and he’ll be back.

An executive protection-oriented solution is to view stalking as
yet another threat against which the target must be hardened. That
means preventing the stalker from seeing, communicating with, or
following the principal. Severing those contacts serves several
purposes: it insulates the principal from annoying, frightening, and
potentially dangerous encounters; it prevents the occurrence of
encounters that might encourage the stalker (such as one-to-one
conversations in which the victim attempts to dissuade the stalker
from his activities); and it hardens the target for the purpose of
making it more desirable for the stalker to move along to another
target. The EP specialist’s goal, of course, is not to steer the
stalker toward another victim but merely to steer him away from
the agent’s own protectee.

Stalking continues to draw attention in the media and in crimi-
nal justice circles, particularly as it relates to domestic violence.
The era of stalking is still developing-there are now cases in
which police and prosecutors have construed aggressive e-mail
communications as stalking.

Safety

Preventing injuries and minimizing their impact is a key part of
protecting the principal and facilitating his activities at the office
and at home. The two safety considerations most in line with an
EP specialists’ responsibilities involve (1) fire prevention and sur-
vival and (2) first aid. In well-constructed, well-managed homes
and offices, it is not as if fires break out constantly, but when they
do they can be fatal, obviously, and even when not fatal they are
extremely inconvenient and disruptive. In other words, a fire that
doesn’t represent a failure to protect the principal’s physical well-
being may, considering the damage and other inconvenience, still
represent a failure to facilitate the principal’s work and personal
activities. The other major safety consideration, first aid, provides
the EP specialist with the opportunity to perform heroic service,
keeping the principal alive or at least preventing further injury or

117

reducing pain. First aid skills, when applied to guests or associates,
can also make the principal look like a hero for keeping such a use-
ful person as the EP specialist around. Moreover, because minor
injuries are fairly common, there’s a good chance the protective
agent will be able to use his first -aid skills.

Fire Prevention. Preventing fires at the principal’s workplace
and home is not an onerous task. That stands in contrast to the
challenge of ensuring fire safety in facilities over which the EP
specialist has almost no control, such as hotels. That particular
challenge is discussed in Chapter 7, Domestic and International
Travel. At the office, most fire prevention will already have been
attended to by building codes, inspectors, and facility managers.
(However, the protective agent had better make sure fire preven-
tion has been attended to properly. If in doubt, it might be
worthwhile to hire a fire safety engineer to check the environment
carefully.) The EP specialist can take the extra step of providing
the protectee with packaged smoke hoods, some brands of which
enable the wearer to breathe safely for up to 15 minutes while es-
caping a smoky buildingj= an additional smoke detector beyond
those provided by the building designer or facility manager; an es-
cape ladder (if feasible); an extra fire extinguisher; and, above all,
practice in escaping the building by several different routes. Such
practice should include crawling along the floor to avoid breathing
smoke and poisonous gases and making one’s way out in darkness.

At the executive’s home, the EP specialist may have even more
control over the situation. If the home is large or old or for some
other reason a little more susceptible to fire than other houses, it

might pay to hire a fire safety engineer to assess the situation and
recommend equipment, practices, and building modifications that
would reduce the likelihood of fire. If the home has a security
alarm system, it might make sense to integrate fire detection and
notification with the security console.

58 One type is QuickMask®, which is effective against smoke, tear gas, OC
(oleoresin capsicum, or pepper) spray, and the nerve agent sarin, which was used in
the March 20, 1995, attacks on the Tokyo subway. Contact Fume-Free, Inc., P.O.
Box 1680, Stuart, FL 34995. Phone (800) 386-3373.

118

Certainly there are many simple measures that the principal,
being an intelligent person, may already have taken. However,
human nature tends to leave many obvious precautions undone, so
the EP specialist should double-check on the household’s fire-
readiness. In terms of equipment, the gear is much the same as
described above for the office: smoke hoods, smoke detectors, es-
cape ladders, and fire extinguishers. In terms of practices, the
principal, along with his family and domestic staff,59 should be
trained in a number of matters: the best means of escape (specific
windows and doors to use, rope or chain ladders and permanent
fire escapes, the importance of crawling down low, and how to
escape in darkness); the importance of checking the temperature of
doorknobs to see if they are hot before opening any door; rendez-
vous points outside the house; how to report fires (by shouting
and by calling the fire department as soon as the fire is noticed, not
after waiting for the fire to grow); safe smoking, cooking, and
heating procedures; the necessity of reporting suspicious-smelling
appliances; and what to do when clothing catches on fire (stop,
drop, and roll). Most people are generally aware of these practices,
but by having the principal and other members of the household
rehearse them occasionally, the EP specialist will be following Sun
Tzu’s advice to “make no mistakes.”

With a little effort, the EP specialist can help bring the risk of
fire down to near zero and also greatly reduce the principal’s risk
of injury if there is a fire. There are enough threats over which a
protective effort has little control: plane crashes, cancer, suicide. It
certainly makes sense to minimize the threats one can.

First Aid. First aid is discussed in this chapter on security at
homes and offices because those are the places where the principal
spends, by far, the most time and therefore where he is likely to be

59 Why the domestic staff? Can’t they take care of themselves? Probably, but
goodwill and prudence demand that they be trained, too. Undesirable publicity can
result when an employee of a famous person dies or is injured. One example is the
news coverage that resulted from the shooting and stabbing of a security guard at
Sylvester Stallone’s estate in Miami on July 17, 1996. No one suggested Stallone
had anything to do with the incident, yet the news creates a sour association in the
public mind.

119

when he injures himself, falls ill, or for some other reason requires
first aid. If the EP specialist wishes to protect the principal from
harm and help him operate productively, statistics support the
relevance of being able to apply first aid.v”

It isn’t necessary for the EP specialist to be a doctor, an emer-
gency medical technician, a battlefield medic, or a registered nurse.
While a protective agent must be a good generalist and possess a
wide range of knowledge, in-depth, expert medical training is too
much to ask. What is required is a sound understanding of “10-
minute medicine”-that is, the steps required to assess and stabi-
lize a person who has suffered an injury or the sudden onset of
illness, such as a heart attack.

The EP specialist should not attempt to learn 10-minute medi-
cine solely from a book. Much better is to take a short course in
emergency medicine or first aid, CPR, and the Heimlich maneuver.
A good course would cover, at least, the primary survey of a pa-
tient (checking airway, breathing, and circulation; performing tri-
age), the secondary survey (assessing the patient’s spine, scalp,
face, chest, abdomen, back, pelvis, and extremities), injuries (soft
tissue, fractures, trauma, medical emergencies), and the proper
contents of a first-aid kit (see box).

*First Aid Kit Contents*
triangular bandages	splints (several differ-	pocket (Swiss army)
(cloth)	ent sizes)	knife
rolled bandages	pillow	CPR barrier mask
eye protector	blanket	face masks
occlusive dressings	blood pressure cuff	towel
adhesive tape	stethoscope	sugar or candy bar
shears	cloves	_plastic wrap
Diphenhydramine	convenience drugs,	plastic or paper cup
(8enadryl) capsules,	such as aspirin,	(to place over ob-
25 mg.	antacids, or burn	ject protruding from
	cream	body)
gauze pads and	adhesive bandages
dressings

60 See Chapter 1, Threat Assessment.

120

The EP specialist’s skills accompany him wherever he goes, of
course, and so should his first aid kit. The chapter on automobile
travel mentioned the importance of placing a first-aid kit in the car.
It is also important to keep such a kit both at the principal’s office
and at his home, and to bring one along when traveling. In addi-
tion, the EP specialist should carry a fresh supply of any prescrip-
tion drugs required by the principal and be familiar with and able
to respond to known medical problems of the principal and his
family.

Emergency medicine skills help a protective agent assist both
the principal and those the principal cares about. If one of the
principal’s family members or guests should require first aid
(because of, say, a kitchen accident or a heart attack), the EP spe-
cialist can step in and save the day. This is an example of the
agent’s global responsibility to the principal’s world.

Note that some legal questions arise regarding the provision of
first aid. If the person requiring first aid is one to whom the EP
specialist owes no duty of care, then no legal blame can be laid
upon him if he refrains from assisting the person. If the EP spe-
cialist does assist that person, he assumes some responsibility,
varying from state to state, for providing first aid ably and at least
doing no harm.

It is up to the EP specialist and the principal to decide
whether such risk should be taken; however, it doesn’t look
good, and is possibly immoral, not to assist an injured person
whom you could obviously and reasonably help. Because of the
variation in states’ Good Samaritan laws, this question is one that

the EP specialist, the principal, and a lawyer should iron out in
advance.

Bombs

Bombings, sad to say, are common. (See sidebar.) The big ones
make the news all too frequently; the little ones are so common
they don’t get much attention. Some bombs or incendiary de-
vices (the distinction being that the former primarily explode
with great force, while the latter explode and produce an in-
tensely hot fire) are easy to make. The recipes can be found

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readily in books, on videos, and on the Internet, while the in-
gredients can be found in hardware stores and chemical and
farm supply houses.

Powerful homemade bombs (such as pipe bombs) can be quite
compact. Highly powerful homemade bombs tend to be large (like
the bomb carried in a rental truck outside the federal building in
Oklahoma City). Amateurs who want bombs that are both com-
pact and highly powerful can steal bomb materials from construc-
tion or military sites; terrorists, of course, can obtain the most ex-
otic, miniature bombs in the world. In short, to anyone with such
a desire, building a bomb is well within reach.

FBI Bomb Report

Bombing is on the rise. According to “FBI Explosives
Unit-Bomb Data Center, General Information Bulletin
95-2: 1994 Bombing Incidents,” the latest FBI report
available, 3,163 bombing incidents were reported to the
EU-BDC in 1994. That is a 6 percent increase over
1993.

Explosives accounted for 77 percent of the incidents;
the rest involved incendiary devices. In 78 percent of
the incidents, the devices successfully detonated or ig-
nited. Only 4 percent of the actual and attempted
bombings were preceding by a warning or threat.

The top five bombing targets were residences (52 per-
cent of incidents), commercial operations and vehicles
(both 11 percent), open areas (7 percent), and academic
facilities (4 percent). Bombings injured 308 persons and
killed 31.

The trend is clearly upward, as the chart on the next
page shows:

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1~1~1~1~1~1~1~1~1m1m1~

Bombing Incidents, Explosive and Incendiary,
Actual and Attempted

(FBI Data)

States with especially high numbers of bombing inci-
dents include California (545), Florida (312), and Illinois
(353). Populous states with relatively low numbers of
incidents include New York (109) and Texas (193).

As for knowing what to look for, pipe bombs account
for 39 percent of all improvised explosive devices.

The techniques for preventing, detecting, and reacting to bombs
are similar for both the home and the office. Good, ongoing in-
telligence will help the EP specialist determine the relative likeli-
hood of a bomb attack and the types of attacks that might be ex-
pected. For example, a protectee who faces the wrath of an ex-
spouse’s boyfriend could be targeted for a pipe-bombing or mail-
bombing, while a protectee who, through dealings in international
business, has been targeted by terrorists might instead have to be
defended against an explosives-packed car parked against his home

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or office or the detonation of a bomb placed under a bridge over
which he drives. (Chapter 5, Automobile Security, discussed pro-
tection measures against bombs planted in or on the executive’s
car.) The source of the threat does not positively determine the
type of bomb attack to be expected, but it might give some prob-
abilities based on past events. Certainly, not everyone is a likely
target of a bomb attack, but having some knowledge of what to
expect helps the EP specialist determine where to focus his pre-
ventive efforts. This section on bombs is extensive; fortunately,
many of the protective measures specified below for bombs also
protect the principal against other assaults and hazards.

Prevention. Absolutely preventing a bomb attack against the
principal’s home or office is impossible, but the EP specialist can take
several steps to make such an attack more difficult. This is another
instance of target hardening, whereby the EP specialist makes it more
challenging for an attacker to harm the principal, under the theory that
certain attackers will, in effect, take their business elsewhere. In dis-
couraging the placement or delivery of a bomb, target hardening con-
sists of forcing the bomb to surmount numerous security rings before
reaching the principal. A number of measures can be selected for
both home and office, depending on which are deemed necessary and
which are physically feasible. These measures also increase the level of
security against other intrusions. For bomb prevention, target hard-
ening measures include the following:

selecting a building that is set back from the street
surrounding the property with a fence or some other
barrier, such as a row of trees or bushes
eliminating or minimizing hiding places against the
building (foundation plantings, trash bins, mailboxes,
) and inside the public areas of the building
controlling access to exterior building doors, parking lots,
and garages (via guards, card systems, or other means)
controlling access within the building (through interior
control of access to the principal’s floor, suite, or per-
sonal office) to make it difficult for anyone to leave a
bomb close to the principal

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In high-threat environments, the installation of bomb-proof
glazing material designed to minimize the effects of shattering
glass can be an effective injury-reduction measure. Bomb-proof
sheer curtains also minimize glass damage.

The measures just listed make it hard, though probably not im-
possible, for a bomber to park a car loaded with explosives right
next to the principal’s home or office, to place a bomb up against
the building, or to place a bomb right in the principal’s personal
office or other room.

If physical barriers are in place and procedural access control is
enforced, no one is likely to be able to hand-carry an explosive de-
vice right into the principal’s office or bedroom. However, where a
person might be prevented from going, a piece of mail might be car-
ried right into the principal’s hands. If that mail is a bomb, the con-
centric rings of protection will have been penetrated just as success-
fully. The term of art used to be “package bombs,” but sophisti-
cated, new bomb materials are thin enough and light enough to
travel easily even in slim envelopes. There’s no particular preventive
measure an EP specialist can take against the sending of mail
bombs; instead, he must rely on detection and interception.

Detection. If the principal is to be protected, it is simply es-
sential to establish mail bomb safety procedures. Themail must
not go to the principal before it has been screened. Screening,
however, does not necessarily involve expensive equipment. It is a
multi-stage process that escalates for suspicious pieces of mail.
Because the overwhelming majority of letters and packages are
routine and benign, what is needed is a screening process, a sort of
triage in which the mail checker decides which few pieces require
further study. At work, the mail-checking responsibility might fall
to a mail-room clerk or to the EP specialist. At the home, proba-
bly the EP specialist will have to handle it.

Over time, bomb experts have discerned certain characteristics
that may indicate the presence of explosives. Whoever is given the
mail-checking responsibility should be trained on the right proce-
dures for performing the first-level examination and for reporting
questionable items to a superior. No mail should reach the principal
before it has passed the screener. It is important, however, that the

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screening process be quick. The protective effort will lose the sup-
port of the principal and his staff if the mail is delayed inordinately.
The only time they understand and support this process is when the
news reports a bombing, and that only lasts for a week or so.

Despite advances in bomb materials, plastic explosive is still not
as thin, light, or pliable as paper. That means a paper-thin, letter-size
envelope, weighing less than an ounce and carrying correct postage,
is probably OK. Anything over an eighth of an inch thick may need
further checking, as would any envelope that is marked to the prin-
cipal’s personal attention, is mailed from a foreign country, bears
misspelled words, shows grease spots or strange smells, or bears an
illegible return address. Another red flag is excess postage: typically,
the bomber prefers not to hand his envelope to a post office em-
ployee for weighing and therefore places too much postage on the
envelope to be on the safe side. In the initial screening, the mail-
checker should also feel the envelope, gently, trying to detect the
presence of any strings or wires. Themail screener should also ex-
amine the envelope’s weight symmetry. The weight should usually
be evenly distributed, like a stack of papers. If the weight is all in the
middle or on one end, that could be a bad sign.

If an envelope fails this first cut, it needs further checking be-
fore it can be passed to the principal. First, the mail-checker
should inquire whether the principal was expecting anything from
the apparent sender. Next, the sender listed on the return address
should be contacted to see if he sent the item. If neither method
satisfies the mail-checker’s concerns, he should notify the protec-
tion or security staff.

The technology involved in bomb-detection machines changes
rapidly, and there’s no sense buying yesterday’s technology.
Therefore, before asking the principal or his company to layout
the money for one of those expensive devices, the EP specialist
should gather as much information as possible from police bomb
squads, vendors, and possibly consultants who are knowledgeable
about such equipment. Some machines can detect most bombs,
but none can detect all, and many machines require substantial
training before their results can be interpreted correctly. Also,
some technologies harm magnetic storage media, so they might

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not be practical to use if the principal often receives computer
diskettes or tapes by mail. Among the types of bomb-detection
equipment are computed tomography, ion vapor characterization,
neutron stream, nuclear magnetic resonance, thermal neutron acti-
vation, vapor trace analysis, x-ray (dual-beam, backscatter), and
quadrupole resonance. It’s not a simple matter. The most com-
monly used device is the x-ray scanner. It is simple to operate, is
relatively inexpensive, and gives a visual read of package contents.
Even at $5,000, it’s cheap insurance.

Because of the greater ease of concealing a bomb in a package, as
opposed to an envelope, and the greater difficulty of observing sus-
picious signs about them (weight distribution, etc.), packages need a
greater level of scrutiny. Any package could be a bomb, but usually
the number of packages received by the principal is relatively small
(in relation to letters). The triage process for packages includes di-
recting extra suspicion to a package that is not expected, that carries
a return address that is illegible or proves impossible to check with a
phone call, that is marked to the personal attention of the principal,
or that was not (or, in a case of uncertainty, may not have been) de-
livered by a postal worker or legitimate delivery service employee. If
a package does not pass this first level of scrutiny, the mail-checker
should follow the steps already outlined for letters.

Of course, the need for detection also applies to bombs that do
not arrive through the mail. At work, security staff should be on the
lookout for “orphaned” boxes, bags, briefcases, or other objects that
could contain bombs. The number of watchful eyes can be greatly
increased if the EP specialist or corporate security staff instructs

employees to be alert to such items and report them at once. At
home or on the estate, staffers can be asked to report suspicious
items found on the grounds. Protective personnel, especially any
patrolling guards, should routinely scrutinize places where bombs
could most readily be placed, such as against the house or next to or
inside any important outbuildings. If the threat level rises because of
an important event on the premises, bomb-sniffing dogs may need
to be brought in. Local law enforcement agencies may be able to
provide that service, depending on their capabilities and the EP spe-
cialist’s or principal’s relationship with them.

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Reaction. If a bomb is discovered or a bomb threat is re-
ceived, well-rehearsed responses should be initiated. At the work-
place, the discovery of a suspicious object may be grounds for an
evacuation, or it may not. The decision depends on the threat
level, the degree of suspicion about the object, and the difficulty,
danger, and expense of evacuation. The decision tree should be
established in advance, so that the EP specialist or corporate secu-
rity staff know for certain, in a potentially tense situation, who
should make the decision and using what criteria. If there have
been bomb threats recently, the object looks very suspicious, and it
is not too difficult to evacuate the building, then naturally the
building should be emptied. (The evacuation route may have to
differ, however, from that used in a fire in order to keep people
away from the location of the possible bomb.) It is also important
to consider whether, in a high-rise building, evacuating people
from floors far above the bomb will only bring them closer to
danger as they pass the bomb floor. If, by contrast, the current
threat analysis suggests bomb risk is minuscule, the object is only a
little questionable or can be neutralized or safely removed by ex-
plosives experts, and evacuations in the past have often resulted in
unacceptable disruption, then perhaps the building should not be
evacuated. It is hard to make the decision, but thinking through
the various considerations in advance, during calm moments, will
help the EP specialist make that call.

At the executive’s home or estate, evacuation is usually not as
problematic. At the home, too, the EP specialist is likely to have
more control over what response is made in reaction to the dis-
covery of such an object, not having to contend with corporate
security and large numbers of employees. Of course, the evacua-
tion of the residence must be done cautiously; the bomb could be
a decoy designed by adversaries to draw the principal out of his
secure enclave.

Sometimes suspicious objects are simply discovered on the
premises, but other times the question of bomb response arises
from a telephoned bomb threat. In cases where bombers or their
associates call ahead to say a bomb has been placed and will be
detonated, the goal may be not mass destruction but mass disrup-

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tion. If such a call comes in, much can be gained by attempting to
question the caller. At an office with a central switchboard, it
might be sufficient to supply the telephone operators with a list of
questions to ask the caller. If a caller can easily reach anyone to
leave his message, it may be necessary to supply all employees with
the bomb questionnaire. At the executive’s home, the question-
naire can simply be placed next to or under all the phones in the
house. In both locations, those who are expected to use the ques-
tionnaire must be instructed, in advance, on how to do so. A little
practice goes a long way during a tense situation.

Bomb call questionnaires aren’t long; it’s unlikely the caller will
hang on the line for a long conversation. The list can be printed
on a small card or a sheet with blank spaces to be filled in. The
following is one version of such a questionnaire, but the EP spe-
cialist will want to tailor the one he uses to the specific threats and
circumstances faced by his protectee:

Bomb Call Questionnaire

Ask the caller:

When is the bomb going to go off?
Where is it?
What does it look like?
What would cause it to go off?
Why would anyone want to hurt us?

Note about the caller:

Quality of voice: accent, pitch, speed, nasality; presence of
stammer, lisp, or other feature.
Apparent emotion: is caller calm, nervous, crying, excited, angry?
Does the voice sound familiar? Who does it sound like?

It may not be possible to obtain much information, but every
little bit helps. If the bomb threat is real, the smallest nuggets of
information may help in finding the bomb or catching the bomber.
If the threat is a hoax, clues written down by the person taking the
call may lead to the caller’s capture.

Once a threat has been received, it may be necessary for the
protective staff to search for the device. That is not a highly desir-
able assignment-who wants to find a bomb?-but it is necessary.

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If a bomb is found, the local military or law enforcement EOD
(explosive ordnance disposal) team should be called in; if no bomb
is found, the executive can resume using his home or office.

One good bomb-search technique is for two agents to search
each room. They divide the room into horizontal layers, typically
four (floor to waist, waist to chin, chin to ceiling, and above a false
ceiling, if any). Standing back-to-back, they begin to search the first
layer, working their way around the room until the layer has been
searched by both agents. Then they search the next layer, then the
next, until the room is judged clean. The procedure is repeated in
every room that requires searching. One reason it is so important
to ask a bomb threat caller where the bomb is located is that it can
take a long time to search a home or office building. If the caller
can help narrow the search, so much the better.

If the searchers find a suspicious object, they should personally no-
tify the situation leader or call him by using the internal phone system.
Use of radios could detonate certain types of bombs. The executive
protection team should create a safety zone with a radius of 300 feet
or more-not just outwards, but also upwards, in the case of a high-
rise building. Naturally, they should not touch the object but leave it
to the EOD experts. One factor to beware of, however, is that the
object found could be a decoy designed to distract the search team
while the real bomb explodes elsewhere in the building.

Procedures

The preceding precautions-threat assessment, rings of protec-
tion, security engineering, intelligence and surveillance, fire and
first aid measures, and bomb safety-are wasted if they are not
converted from one-time activities to regular, consistently followed
procedures. Almost any protective measure can be defeated, but
protective measures that are not employed are especially easy to
defeat. For example, a threat assessment that is performed once
and then forgotten is worth little. Security alarm systems don’t do
much good if they are turned off or if repeated false alarms are
assumed each time to be false. And a first aid kit is no help if it
has been left at home and the principal suffers an injury at work or
if the EP specialist hasn’t reviewed the contents in a year. In fact,

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procedures are important not just in home and office security but
in all facets of executive protection.

When it comes to making no mistakes, established, rehearsed,
and sound procedures are everything. The EP specialist should
make a point of training his own agents, the principal’s family and
domestic staff, and the principal’s office staff about proper proce-
dures regarding all the security measures discussed in this chapter.
The training has to cover specific steps to take when someone
comes to the door, when a package arrives, when tradesmen arrive,
when the fire alarm goes off, and so on, plus one all-important
rule: that the procedures must be followed alwqys. Why should the
rule be so strict? The reason is that the visitor who strongly re-
quests an exception is more likely than others to be an adversary,
and the incident that seems to merit an exception is more likely
than others to have been staged just for the purpose of causing an
exception to security procedures. Most people understand that
offices and households have rules. People who push for excep-
tions to those rules or procedures may have a harmful motive.

The principal himself in many cases needs reminding of the im-
portance of protective procedures. While protection service car-
ries some benefits in the convenience department, it also carries
some unavoidable inconveniences. A principal might wish to de-
tour from a planned, well-checked travel route. Eager for a certain
piece of mail, he might step forward to grab all the day’s mail be-
fore it has been screened for bombs. He might even prop a se-
cured door open for convenience. The best approach is for the
EP specialist to anticipate these “violations” and work around

them. The EP specialist can’t usually insist that the principal com-
ply with procedures, but he can tell the principal that those actions
may increase the risk to the principal’s life. He should intervene
only under circumstances that present a clear danger.

The Home

The EP specialist has some control and influence here. Presumably,
if the client is interested in personal protection, he will also be will-
ing to let the EP specialist suggest modifications to the physical at-

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tributes and the procedures followed at the client’s home or estate.
The client might not accept all the agent’s suggestions if he believes
they are too inconvenient or expensive. However, from the EP spe-
cialist’s point of view, securing the home is usually less problematic
than protecting a corporate site. He has only the client to please (not
a whole company); the amount of traffic into and out of an estate
should be much less than at an office; and if any place can be made
into a fortress, or at least a comfortable version of one, it is an estate.

Note that the foundation for determining the security needs of
the residence is a full security survey. Such a survey should cover
fire protection, access points, neighborhood environment, police
and emergency responses, lighting and alarms, etc.

This discussion will focus on securing the principal at a de-
tached house on a piece of land at least large enough to separate
the house from the street and other houses. If the protectee lives
in an apartment, the agent’s ability to make physical modifications
for security is much more limited because he probably cannot
control the whole building. In that case, only some, not all, of the
following discussion applies.

Range of threats

At the beginning of this chapter, the discussion of updating the
threat assessment emphasized the importance of calculating the
risk that a particular principal might reasonably face. The threat
assessment might determine that likely threats consist primarily of
burglary, vandalism, and car theft-problems that most other resi-
dents on the block face. In that case, the EP specialist can take the
appropriate cautions and then concentrate on the facilitation side
of executive protection. On the other hand, if the threat assess-
ment determined a very high level of threat, such as bombs, kid-
napping, terrorist attacks, or sophisticated surveillance for pur-
poses of industrial espionage, political gain, or blackmail, then the
EP specialist will have to edge his efforts toward hardening the
target. The EP specialist should look over the measures and pro-
cedures that are listed below and, perhaps with technical help,
choose those that are appropriate to the protectee’s location on the
threat-level spectrum.

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Physical security

An earlier section of this chapter described the advantages of hir-
ing a security engineer or other security consultant to select physi-
cal security equipment. There are so many technical details in-
volved in selecting and effectively deploying security equipment
that an average EP specialist is unlikely to be able to keep up with
all of them. However, even if the agent plans to hire out the detail
work, he had better understand the basics of security hardware and
systems-at least enough to know the vocabulary and the general
options. Below are some recommendations that apply particularly
to protection of the estate.

U sing the previously described theory of concentric rings of
protection, security should begin not at the house but at the prop-
erty’s perimeter. Depending on the threat level, the land should be
demarcated as being private. However, the ways of doing so are
not always self-evident. A security concept known as “crime pre-
vention through environmental design” offers several good ideas.

CPTED is the use of physical design features to simultaneously
discourage crime and encourage legitimate use of an environment.
Originally developed to reduce crime in public housing projects,
CPTED can be applied to any space from a home or office build-
ing to an entire city.

CPTED offers protection without the fortress mentality. Use of
heavy-duty security construction is minimized, and when it is used, it
is integrated into the overall design, reducing negative visual impact.

Major concepts in CPTED include these:

defensible space
surveillance
lighting
landscaping

Defensible space. In the defensible space concept, areas are desig-
nated as public, semi-private, or private. Those terms designate
the appropriate use of each zone and determine who may occupy it
and in what circumstances. Public zones are generally open to
anyone and are the least secure of the three zones-for example,
the street in front of the estate. Semi-private zones create a buffer

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between public and private zones. They are accessible to the pub-
lic, but are set off from the public zone. At an estate, the route to
the mailbox or wherever packages are delivered might be a semi-
private zone (and then only open to delivery persons, not the gen-
eral public); at an office, an example of such a zone would be an
interior courtyard. Private zones are restricted. Access is con-
trolled and limited to specific people or categories of people.

Zones are divided by barriers, either physical or symbolic.

Physical barriers include fencing, walls, gates, some forms of land-
scaping, and locked doors. Symbolic barriers-low, decorative
fences; flower beds; or changes in sidewalk patterns or materials-
do not prevent physical movement but indicate that a transition
between zones has taken place.

S urueillance. A space can be designed to maximize surveillance
by its legitimate users, and criminals are reluctant to act if they feel
they will be seen. Informal or natural surveillance can be maxi-
mized by designs that minimize visual obstacles and eliminate
places of concealment for potential assailants. Formal surveillance
methods, such as closed-circuit television, electronic monitoring,
fixed guard posts, and security patrols, are used when natural sur-
veillance must be supplemented. Public and semi-private zones
that are isolated or concealed from view may require formal sur-
veillance.

Lighting. Proper lighting discourages criminal activity and en-
hances natural surveillance opportunities. The necessary amount
of lighting varies, but the key attribute is evenness-bright spots
and shadows should be avoided. Highly vulnerable areas and
those that could conceal a potential attacker should be lit especially
brighdy. It’s also important to light up the criminal without spot-
lighting the potential victim.

Landscaping. Landscaping performs several CPTED functions.

Features such as decorative fencing, flower beds, ground cover,
and varied patterns in cement work can clearly show separation
between zones. If more substantial barriers are needed, shrubbery
such as evergreen hedges or dense, thorny plants (trifoliate orange
among them) can be used to create formidable obstacles. Visual
surveillance corridors can be maintained by limiting shrubbery to a

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maximum height of three feet and trees to a minimum height of
six feet at the lowest branches. That way, visibility between three
and six feet from the ground will remain unimpaired. Even the
growth rates of various plants should be taken into consideration,
as a bush too small to hide behind this year may be just right next
year if trimming and pruning fall behind schedule.

CPTED works best when its precepts are integrated into new
construction. Nevertheless, even for a property that is already
built, the EP specialist can keep CPTED in mind when deciding
(1) how the principal should enter and leave the estate, (2) where
on the estate various activities should take place for greatest secu-
rity, (3) what security hardware should be purchased and, espe-
cially, where it should be installed, and (4) what would constitute
optimal surveillance, lighting, and landscaping.

Working from the outside in, the EP specialist will have to be
familiar with and make decisions about the following security
equipment. Of course, high-end security would require many of
these devices, while moderate or low-end security would require
only a few. In addition, some of this equipment would look offen-
sive or unattractive in areas of the estate that are seen daily but
might be acceptable in concealed areas. Here are the major cate-
gories of physical security equipment:

fences: wooden, chain link, wrought iron; topped with
spikes, barbed wire, razor ribbon
fence sensors: taut-wire, strain, flex, shock, fiber-optic
gates: vehicle, pedestrian, automatic, manual, high se-
curity, decorative
vehicle barriers: bollards, tire traps, pneumatic or hy-
draulic anti-ram devices
lighting: visible, infrared, motion-activated
closed-circuit television systems: pan-tilt-zoom
controls, low-light, infrared; various housings (outdoor,
extreme weather, indoor, concealed, domes)
perimeter intrusion sensors: capacitance field, elec-
trostatic field, infrared beams, fiber-optic continuity,
microwave motion, passive infrared, buried pressure,

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seismic geophone; tamper-evident seals (for utility ac-
cess panels, manhole covers, etc.)

high-security apertures: metal or solid wood doors;
windows made of security glass, plastic, or wire-glass or
covered with security film (possibly blast- or bullet-
resistant); grilles; door viewers; hinges with non-removable
pins; window-locking hardware; locking skylights
building-intrusion sensors: passive infrared, mag-
netic, mechanical, mercury, continuity loop, glass-break,
piezoelectric, shock; for windows, doors, walls, sky-
lights, ceilings
interior-intrusion sensors: passive infrared, CCTV
motion detectors, infrasonic, microwave, photoelectric,
ultrasonic, vibration
access control systems: locks (manual, electric strike,
pneumatic, electromagnetic); cards, keys (regular or
noncopiable), digital touchpads; for doors, windows,
gates, garages, manhole covers
safes: fire, weapons, valuables
security equipment monitoring: monitoring station
(on-site, long-distance); integrated security, fire, and
utility/process monitoring; CCTV switchers, recorders,
monitors, multiplexers, video printers
fire detection, notification, and suppression sys-
tems: detectors (independent, hard-wired, smoke, heat,
ionization), alarms, sprinkler systems (water, clean
agents)
communications: radios; intercoms; panic buttons;
distress codes on keypads or phone numbers; cellular
phones; personal duress transmitters that pinpoint
principal’s location-in shape of pen, beeper, name
badge on chain; scrambled telephones, cellular phones,
fax machines, radios

To gain a cursory understanding of the categories just listed, the
EP specialist should take some time to read a book or two on the

136

basics of physical security equipment and perhaps make a habit of
reading a security magazine regularly. Appropriate books can be
ordered by mail from specialty publishing houses or found at li-
braries, especially those at colleges with security or criminal justice
degree programs.

Special considerations

After the major physical security matters, a number of special con-
cerns merit attention. Such considerations arise mostly because of
the principal’s personal wealth, valuable property, or desirability as
a kidnapping target.

First among the special considerations is the safe room. A safe
room is a place in which the principal and, if necessary, his family
can “hole up” if intruders invade the house. The idea is that the
principal and his family would lock themselves in the room, con-
tact a source of help, and await rescue. A safe room needn’t be
large-a bathroom or walk-in closet would be fine-but it needs a
fortified door with a dead bolt lock that is hard to defeat, must not
be vulnerable to break-ins through a window or other portal, and,
of course, should have in it some means of communication with
the police or security staff, such as a land-line or cellular telephone,
a citizen’s band or other two-way radio, or a panic button wired to
a central monitoring station. Based on the level of threat and the
principal’s self-defense capabilities, the EP specialist and the client
can discuss whether it would be a good idea to keep a firearm in
the safe room, too. Aside from that, the safe room should contain
smoke hoods, water, duct tape, a signal whistle, pepper spray, a
first-aid kit, flashlights, and batteries.

When police respond to an incident, they want to know
whether anyone on the scene is carrying a firearm. EP specialists
have the same need. An agent who rushes into the house to an-
swer a panic alarm from the principal needs to know whether the
principal or one of his family members is likely to be armed. The
EP specialist should know the location and type of all firearms in
the house.

A few other items that need to make the estate security check-
list are these:

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Make sure security measures apply to the estate’s out-
buildings and garage, not just the main part of the
The garage may prove a less-observed route to
the house. Also, if the garage is well secured, then once
the principal’s car is searched for bombs it can stay
searched and not have to be rechecked constantly.
For both security and quality of life reasons, it might be
worthwhile to set up an emergency power generator
on-site. If assailants cut the electricity, security systems
will still operate, and if a storm knocks the power out,
the venison won’t rot and the wine cellar won’t get too
hot.
If the principal has any special collections (such as art,
guns, or wine), they may need customized protection
against theft or damage.
The use of a shredder to destroy personal documents
(letters, bills, bank statements, itineraries) greatly re-
duces the likelihood that anyone who snooped through
the estate’s garbage could learn anything useful.
Examine the security of the telephone service. A cut
phone line can seriously hamper security-it prevents
the principal from calling for help, and it keeps the
alarm system from sending a signal to the police or the
alarm monitoring company. First, fmd out where the
telephone company line runs into the house (usually at
the interface box). Make a judgment on the security of
the box itself and the lines that run from it to the house
and away from the house. Ask the phone company to
move the interface box to the inside of the home.
Most phone companies don’t like to do so, but if the
principal’s security concerns are explained to them, they
will usually comply. If the phone line runs overhead, it
can be covered with guarding material at the residence
and at the pole location. The idea is to make it very dif-
ficult for someone to cut (or tap into) the line. A
backup plan is to purchase a cellular backup. That way,

if the land-line phone system goes out, due to tamper-
ing or any other problem, the house phones will switch
to cellular and calls can still be made.

A final, very important consideration for home security is K-9
assistance. Even in an era of sophisticated technology, an age-old
helper-the dog-is one of the best tools available for detection
and deterrence.v’

The main assets a K-9 adds to a protection detail are its ex-
traordinary senses of hearing and smell, which allow the dog to
detect an intruder long before a human could. The dog’s sense of
smell is at least 100 times better than man’s, and its hearing is eas-
ily 10 times better than man’s. In addition, a dog can detect a
greater range of sounds than its human counterpart. Those assets
make a dog an excellent aid to a protection detail.

The dog is also useful for detecting explosives. It can be used
to check for explosives throughout the home, in addition to cars,
aircraft, and any other area or form of transportation that the prin-
cipal will use. In fact, a single dog can be cross-trained to detect
explosives and serve as a patrol dog.

By far the best use of a K-9 is a handler-dog team, in which the
handler is ultimately responsible for the actions of the K-9 and
serves as the reasoning part of the team. On a tracking, apprehen-

sion, search, or patrol assignment, a handler-dog team can do the
work of several human patrol officers. Around the estate, the
handler can also ensure that the K-9 behaves in a way that does
not cause the principal any embarrassment.

In some cases a K-9 should be used inside the home. For ex-
ample, if the principal is a woman and she wants privacy from her
male EP specialist in the evening, a dog can serve as the agent’s
ears (and nose) literally right next to the principal’s bed. That

61 For this section on K-9s, the author wishes to acknowledge the help of Karen
Freeman Duet and George Duet of K-9 Companions Dog Training and K-9 Secu-
rity and Detection Int’l, L.L.c., 13703 J.J. Lane, Lake Matthews, CA 92570. They
are also authors of The Home and FamilY Protection Dog: Selection and Training (Howell
Book House, 1993) and The Business Security K-9: Selection and Training (Howell Book
House, 1995). The Duets can be reached at (800) 870-5926.

139

works, of course, only if the principal likes the arrangement and
the dog is properly trained for such an assignment.

The use of a dog by itself in a perimeter protection situation is
somewhat effective but less than optimal. The dog without a hu-
man partner is vulnerable to a number of dangers because of its
inability to reason. A person on the other side of the estate’s fence
can plan for the defeat of the dog, whether by poisoning, shooting,
cutting the fence and luring the dog, or cajoling with food. Out-
doors, alone, the dog is at a disadvantage to humans.

By contrast, a dog inside the home has a distinct advantage over
a human intruder. The dog can hear the intruder before he even
enters the house. The dog also has the drop on him because of
the dog’s familiarity with the environment. Those factors, coupled
with the element of surprise that the dog can have on its side, puts
the intruder at a real disadvantage when a dog is in the house.

A protection operation may wish to use K-9s for temporary as-
signments, such as at the principal’s vacation home. In that case, a
local K-9 handler may be used. Alternatively, for ongoing use of a
dog at the principal’s main home, it might be better to purchase
the dog. K-9s require special care and handling, and it is impor-
tant that anyone who plans to use, and especially to own, a K-9 be
properly trained.

The Office

The task of protecting a principal at his office poses some inter-
esting challenges that differ from those faced at the principal’s

home. For one, the EP specialist mayor may not be in charge of
security for the whole office building. The principal’s company
might use only part of a large building, or the company may em-
ploy a corporate security director who is part of a different chain
of command and over whom the EP specialist has no control.
Another challenge is the volume of human traffic and the wide
range of activities, which make the workplace a much more fluid,
complex, unpredictable, and uncontrollable environment than the
home. Although the following section describes some of the of-
fice-based threats from which a principal must be protected, one

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threat is frightening enough and complicated enough to merit its
own chapter (Chapter 8). That threat is the range of dangers that
come under the heading of workplace violence.

Corporate protection program

As mentioned above, protecting a principal at the office raises
some special challenges. Those challenges extend beyond those
associated with actually performing the job and reach into the
realm of corporate culture, politics, and structure. These latter
challenges are especially acute in situations where the EP specialist
is funded by the corporation that the protectee works for, and not
by the protectee himself. A corporate executive protection pro-
gram will only succeed if the company supports it both financially
and psychologically.

The existence of an executive protection program in the corpo-
rate environment may constantly be under scrutiny; its permanence
is not guaranteed. Both the corporation and the executive may
have certain disinclinations to continue the program. Why? First
of all, executive protection raises unpleasant thoughts of danger
and death. Second, executive protection doesn’t contribute to the
bottom line; it isn’t a profit center. Third, if the executive protec-
tion operation runs 24 hours a day, the corporation might not fully
support its budget, requiring the principal to cover some costs
himself. Fourth, the principal may feel the EP specialist’s presence
is burdensome; fellow CEOs may look at him as an oddity when
they themselves go about their day unprotected. Fifth, the execu-
tive may worry that others think he isn’t man enough to take care
of himself. In some settings, the executive protection program is
on firm footing only as long as the principal remembers the latest
kidnapping headline.

Without a doubt, the preceding objections are hard to counter-
act. However, the EP specialist can minimize them by learning
and working within the corporate culture. If the agent knows the
rules of the game, he can survive, even thrive, and perform a vital
service for both the principal and the company. Perhaps the fun-
damental rule of the game is to maintain the confidence of corpo-
rate leadership, and that requires making sure the protection pro-

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gram is perceived positively. No matter how efficacious and cost-
effective the program is, if key corporate figures believe-even
ignorantly-that the program is not worthwhile, then the opera-
tion is sunk, just as surely as if it were a victim of its own incom-
petence.

How should the EP specialist build a favorable reputation for
the protection program? He should take the trouble to show the
corporate decision-makers the high quality of the program and its
personnel and of his own ability as a corporate officer, not just as a
narrowly limited protection specialist. Skill in executive protection
is, obviously, a central requirement, but it is just as important that
the EP specialist be perceived as a respected, effective, well-
informed, and articulate executive who can represent the CEO and
the corporation in their best light. Developing personal comfort
and dialogue with the major players, keeping them informed,
seeking their advice, and being accessible pays huge dividends.

Executive protection in the corporate environment does not
exist in a vacuum. The EP effort has to fit into the corporate mis-
sion. That’s why the EP specialist needs to understand the corpo-
rate big picture and accommodate himself to it. Where is the
company headed? What are its resources? What motivates corpo-
rate leadership? If the EP specialist can answer those questions
and integrate the answers into the EP effort, he won’t go wrong.
It is also wrongheaded for an agent to believe that his special ac-
cess to the principal exempts him from having to conform to cor-
porate rules.

When corporate accountants claim that the executive protection
program is an expensive, intrusive extravagance, the rebuttal must
be this: EP permits the chief executive to live safely in and move
efficiently through a dangerous world-and to concentrate fully on
the business at hand. The same rebuttal can be given to an execu-
tive concerned about the unavoidable quantum of inconvenience
that EP imposes on him.

Range of threats

The EP specialist’s ongoing threat analysis tells him what to pro-
tect the principal against and approximately how likely various

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threats are. However, an agent thinking primarily of protecting a
principal physically could overlook some categories of concern. At
the workplace, threats to the principal are of two types: those that
could harm him physically (robbery, bombs, kidnapping, harass-
ment, etc.) and those that could cause him or his company serious
inconvenience or embarrassment (computer crime, drug use and
sales, industrial espionage, etc.). The first category is familiar ter-
ritory for an able EP specialist; the second category may require
that a specialist be called in. A principal’s body and property are
valuable, but so is his reputation, which could suffer severe dam-
age if, for example, drugs were found in his office, a hacker vio-
lated his computer, or a visitor absconded with vital trade secrets
from the principal’s desk.

Physical security

In many cases, the EP specialist will not be in charge of overall
corporate security. If he is, he has a great deal of control over the
security of the work environment and can choose from the many
security equipment options listed in the section on physical secu-
rity for homes, above.v? But more likely, the EP specialist can at
best influence the security of the workplace. In that case, he should
focus his efforts on the locations where security will make the
greatest difference to the principal’s safety: the parking lot or ga-
rage and the executive suite. The security of other areas, such as
the main entrance, may not be customizable to the needs of the
principal, but the EP specialist should still check to make sure se-
curity equipment and procedures there are sufficient. The concept
of providing concentric rings of protection still holds.

The principal’s parking space should not be graced with a large
sign announcing “President” or any other tide. Any value such a
sign may have for purposes of vanity is far outweighed by the fact
that it tells everyone exactly where to find the principal and his car.

62 Some additional options that might be useful in a workplace setting are bio-
metric devices (fingerprint, hand geometry, iris pattern recognition, palm systems,
retinal scans, signature comparison, voice comparison), which are normally too
expensive and elaborate for home use. Such devices, a high-security alternative to
keys or cards, are used to control access to buildings, rooms, and computers.

143

The best arrangement is a locked garage or else an aboveground
parking space that is constantly under surveillance. These protec-
tive measures guard the car from theft or vandalism, prevent any-
one from planting a bomb in it, and reduce the chances of an am-
bush as the principal enters or leaves his car.

It is also useful for the principal to be able to enter and leave
the office building by a relatively surreptitious route when neces-
sary. The client might prefer to enter through the front door most
of the time, but if something causes the threat level to rise sud-
denly (such as a mass of protesters at the front door), it would be
advantageous to be able to take an elevator straight from the ga-
rage to his suite. In addition, to whatever extent is feasible, the EP
specialist should map out alternate exits from company property in
case one gate or driveway is blocked.

As for the executive suite, depending on the threat level, the EP
specialist can consider access controls at the outer entrance to the
suite. For examples, at some offices, a visitor stepping off the ele-
vator must be buzzed in through locked glass doors even before
reaching the receptionist for that floor. That ring or layer of secu-
rity can be complemented with protection at the door to the prin-
cipal’s room, with locked rest rooms, with a panic button at the
desk of the principal’s secretary or administrative assistant, and
perhaps even with a safe room adjacent to the principal’s office.
The physical protections must be supplemented with procedural
measures (such as keeping couriers at a distance, double-checking
that maintenance workers are who they purport to be, etc.) to en-
sure that no one who shouldn’t be there ever reaches the princi-
pal’s office.

The full range of protective measures presented in this chapter,
working in concert, can greatly reduce the risk posed to a given
principal. By conducting careful threat assessments, setting up
rings of protection, arranging for high-quality security engineering,
gathering intelligence, making thorough safety preparations, insti-
tuting proper bomb procedures, and establishing responsible secu-
rity routines among office and domestic staff, the protection spe-
cialist can get as close as possible to Sun Tzu’s goal of holding only
those positions that cannot be attacked.

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